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Introduction
The aim of this research is to establish an independent evidence base for identifying 
the value and the limits of mediation as an alternative to, or used alongside, 
judicial review. It has been devised in response to claims made by government 
and mediation providers that mediation can lead to savings in costs as well as in 
court time, and provide remedies and solutions to disputes that cannot be offered 
by the court. These claims will be considered in the specifi c context of judicial 
review, which not only has an important constitutional function, but, compared 
to other forms of civil litigation, offers fl exibility, low costs and speed. Moreover, 
claims as to the value of mediation need to be examined in light of the realities 
of judicial review litigation. For example, a large proportion of judicial review 
claims end in settlements negotiated between the parties, with little input from 
the court. Therefore, any aspects of added value that mediation may offer need be 
considered in relation to bilaterally negotiated settlements as well as in relation to 
judicial determinations. 
The claims for mediation stand in stark contrast to the low take-up of mediation 
by lawyers generally. In particular, it is indisputable that the take-up of mediation 
as an alternative to judicial review is low. The research team was interested in 
analysing the reasons for this, for instance, whether it comes about as a result of 
lack of understanding of the process, an assessment of it as adding no value to 
bilateral negotiations, or more principled concerns such as the importance of a 
transparent supervisory role for the court, the need to create precedents, and the 
retreating role of adjudication in public law.
Mediation in public law: the ambivalence of policymakers 
and the concerns of practitioners
Since Lord Woolf’s Access to Justice report in 1996, there has been considerable 
enthusiasm amongst policy makers and some members of the judiciary for 
increased use of, and experimentation with, alternative dispute resolution (ADR),
Section One
Introduction and background
2Mediation and Judicial Review: An empirical research study
including mediation.1 Shifts in policy have occurred as a result. These include the 
new attention paid to ADR in the civil pre-action protocols, the government 
pledge on ADR, the introduction of case management powers for judges, and 
changes to the funding code for civil legal aid. In addition we have seen the setting 
up of a number of court-based mediation schemes,2 the development of case 
law regarding mediation and public pronouncements on the value of the process 
by senior members of the judiciary. However, it is important to stress from the 
outset that all of these developments apply to mediation in civil litigation generally. 
There has been little or no mention of public law and the few specifi c references 
which have been made to it have been ambivalent or contradictory.
An important question which has fuelled the research reported here is whether 
judicial review actions should be treated in the same way as other forms of civil 
litigation. Judicial review has an important constitutional function in providing 
‘the means by which judicial control of administrative action is exercised’3 and 
in ‘ensuring that the rights of citizens are not abused by the unlawful exercise of 
executive power’.4 As the government has pointed out:
‘The government believes that the ability to challenge the acts or omissions 
of public authorities is a necessary check on the use of the power of the 
state, and a positive encouragement to maintain high standards in public 
administration or by public bodies.’5
The special status and function of public law was recognised in the 2001 
government pledge to use ADR to resolve disputes involving government 
departments wherever possible. The pledge specifi cally excluded public law and 
human rights disputes. The exclusion refl ected Lord Irvine’s view that, while 
ADR has an expanding role within the civil justice system, ‘there are serious and 
searching questions’ to be answered about its use and that it was ‘naïve’ to assert 
that all disputes are suitable for ADR and mediation. Examples cited by Lord Irvine 
included cases concerning the establishment of legal precedent, administrative law 
problems, and cases which ‘set the rights of the individual against those of the 
state’. These, he said, must be approached with great care.6
On the other hand, also in 2001, in his judgment in the case of Cowl,7 Lord 
Woolf commented: 
‘Particularly in the case of such disputes, both sides must by now be acutely 
conscious of the contribution alternative dispute resolution could make to 
resolving disputes in a manner that both met the needs of the parties and 
1 ADR includes alternatives to litigation such as ombudsmen and mediation. The current project focuses on 
mediation. 
2 See, for instance, H Genn (1998) Central London County Court Mediation Pilot: Evaluation report, LCD 
Research Series, No. 5/98; H Genn (2002) Court-based ADR Initiatives: The commercial court and the court 
of appeal, LCD Research Series, No. 1/02; H Genn (2007) Twisting Arms: Court-referred and court-linked 
mediation under judicial pressure, Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/07; L Mulcahy, with M Selwood and A 
Netten (2000) Mediating Medical Negligence Claims – An option for the future, Stationery Offi ce, Norwich.
3 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 408E.
4 R v Ministry of Defence ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, 556D–E.
5 Government consultation paper, Access to Justice with Conditional Fees (March 1998).
6 Inaugural Lecture to the Faculty of Mediation and ADR (1999) at www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/1999/27-1-
99.htm (last accessed 05.05.09).
7 R (Cowl) v Plymouth City Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1935.
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the public, and saved time, expense and stress . . . Today, suffi cient should be 
known about ADR to make the failure to adopt it, in particular when public 
money was involved, indefensible.’
Despite Lord Woolf’s enthusiasm, mediation in public law disputes remains 
rare. Cowl remains the only authority on mediation which is directly related to 
public law disputes and other judges have not followed Lord Woolf’s lead in 
promoting mediation in this area.
Lord Irvine’s reservations, on the other hand, have been echoed and articulated 
in discussions among academics who have expressed concern about the dangers of 
the ‘vanishing trial’ and the privatisation of justice.8 Commentators have questioned 
how well the principle of public accountability is served by mediation and how its 
increased use might impact upon the supervisory jurisdiction of the court over 
the activities and decision-making of public bodies. It is argued that, in the fi eld of 
public law, the radiating effect of court judgments on decision-making by public 
bodies is a particularly important check on the authority of the state.9
Public law practitioners are also amongst those who have raised concerns,10 
many of which were expressed at workshops organised by the PLP in April 
2004 and in October 2005. A number present raised practical concerns about 
the impact of mediation. These included reservations that the process could be 
vulnerable to tactical use by either side to cause delay or avoid the establishment 
of unfavourable precedents. Concern was also expressed that failed mediations 
would result in unnecessary delays and increased costs. Even practitioners who 
can be described as being ‘pro-mediation’ grappled with the potential confl icts 
that could be created between the constitutional and supervisory role of judicial 
review on the one hand and the private and confi dential nature of mediation on 
the other.11
However, the views of public law practitioners do not always appear to be refl ected 
in policy initiatives designed to promote mediation. Responses to the Legal Services 
Commission’s (LSC) consultation paper A New Focus for Civil Legal Aid in 2004,12 
refl ected the chasm between the views expressed by public law practitioners and 
those of policymakers in their approach to ADR and mediation. So, for example, 
in their response to the proposal to restrict public funding to mediation in certain 
cases, the Housing Law Practitioners’ Association (HLPA) asserted:
8 M Galanter, ‘A World without Trials’ (2005) Annual Distinguished Alternative Dispute Resolution Lecture, 
University of Wisconsin.
9 For a summary of some of these arguments see V Bondy, M Doyle and V Reid, ‘Mediation and judicial 
review – mind the research gap’ (September 2005) Judicial Review 220.
10 V Reid, ‘All aboard the band wagon’ (September 2004) Legal Action; S Wilken (2002) ‘ADR in public law: 
a new hope?’ http://www.39essex.com/index.php?art_id=147 (last accessed 06.05.09); V Bondy, ‘Who 
needs ADR?’ (2004) Judicial Review 306, fl agging concerns surrounding the use of mediation in cases 
involving public law challenges.
11 Wilken, ‘ADR in public law’, n. 10 above; M Supperstone QC, D Stilitz and C Sheldon, ‘ADR and public 
law’ [Summer 2006] Public Law 299.
12 ‘A new focus for civil legal aid’, www.legalservices.gov.uk (0.5.05.09).
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‘We think further research is needed on mediation and other forms of ADR. 
We do not consider that public funding should be denied or restricted merely 
due to the existence of the options of mediation and other ADR.’13
A joint response on behalf of a group of public law specialists comprising 
solicitors and barristers was submitted by the PLP, expressing strong opposition to 
any proposals that might lead, directly or indirectly, to compulsory mediation.14
The Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) (now the Ministry of Justice 
(MoJ)) and the LSC have largely disregarded these concerns. Rather, they have 
made clear that the use of ADR is to be promoted whenever possible. The LSC 
now has, as a result, the power to limit post-permission legal-aid certifi cates to 
mediation, so denying funding to pursue a case to trial and effectively compelling 
mediation. However, it is worth noting that the LSC does not appear to be 
exercising this power at present.
The post-Bowman reforms of judicial review procedure introduced in October 
2000 do not entirely refl ect Lord Woolf’s enthusiasm for ADR, as expressed both 
in Cowl and in his Access to Justice report. Indeed the Bowman Committee Report 
asserted that there is ordinarily little scope for alternative dispute resolution in 
judicial review.15 However, the reforms do encourage early settlement. So, for 
instance, the objectives of the Bowman Committee report included: 
‘ensuring that the system:
(a) disposes of unmeritorious cases fairly at the earliest possible 
stage, and
(b) encourages both parties to examine the strength of their case and 
to settle where necessary, at the earliest possible stage.’
Lord Irvine’s initial hesitation about encouraging parties in public law disputes to 
use ADR, and mediation in particular, was also refl ected in the judicial review pre-
action protocol (PAP), drafted by a working party following a consultation exercise 
by the DCA in 2001. The responses to the consultation led the group to conclude 
that there were signifi cant risks associated with a claimant inappropriately using 
ADR, and as a result a reference to ADR was not included within the body of the 
protocol.16 However, a cautious reference to ADR was included in paragraph 3 of 
the introduction which stated:
‘Where alternative procedures have not been used, the judge may refuse 
to hear the judicial review case. However, his or her decision will depend 
upon the circumstances of the case and the nature of the alternative remedy. 
Where an alternative remedy does exist a claimant should give careful 
consideration as to whether it is appropriate to his or her problem before 
making a claim for judicial review.’
This provision remained in force until October 2005 when a standard paragraph 
on ADR was inserted into all PAPs, including that for judicial review, without any 
13 HLPA response to the New Focus consultation in October 2004 http://www.hlpa.org.uk/uploads/
LSCresponse.doc (last accessed 05.05.09).
14 See Public Law Project response to consultation in ‘A new focus for civil legal aid’ http://www.
publiclawproject.org.uk/downloads/Response-NewFocus.pdf (last accessed 13.05.09).
15 A Report to the Lord Chancellor (2000) (hereafter the Bowman Committee Report), LCD, London, 
p. 67, para. 17.
16 See http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/preaction/judrevpa.htm (last accessed 06.05.09).
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further consideration of the value of ADR in the fi eld of judicial review.17 The new 
protocols required that:
‘The parties should consider whether some form of alternative dispute 
resolution procedure would be more suitable than litigation, and if so, 
endeavour to agree which form to adopt. Both the Claimant and Defendant 
may be required by the Court to provide evidence that alternative means 
of resolving their dispute were considered. The Courts take the view 
that litigation should be a last resort, and that claims should not be issued 
prematurely when a settlement is still actively being explored. Parties are 
warned that if the protocol is not followed (including this paragraph) then 
the Court must have regard to such conduct when determining costs. 
However, parties should also note that a claim for judicial review “must be 
fi led promptly and in any event not later than 3 months after the grounds to 
make the claim fi rst arose”.’
Elsewhere in the protocols it is noted that the forms of ADR that the parties 
are expected to consider include discussions, negotiations, the ombudsman, early 
neutral evaluation and mediation.18
Towards compulsory mediation?
The parties in judicial review actions cannot be compelled to mediate. The 
protocol expressly stipulates that ‘no party can or should be forced to mediate or 
enter into any form of ADR’.19 However, an element of ‘persuasion’ was added to 
the process. A failure to follow the requirements of the pre-action protocol may 
result in costs orders being made against the offending party. In addition, Lord 
Woolf’s suggestion in Cowl that ‘insuffi cient attention is paid to the paramount 
importance of avoiding litigation whenever this is possible’ even in disputes between 
public authorities and members of the public, appeared to provide another steer 
in this direction. Thus far, there are no known judicial review cases in which a 
party has been penalised in costs for failure to mediate, and data collected in the 
Dynamics of Judicial Review study revealed that it is extremely rare for judges in 
the Administrative Court to suggest that parties engage in mediation.20
There have, however, been increasing signs of an appetite to make mediation 
compulsory in civil litigation generally since this study was initiated, and other 
senior judges have now added their voices to Woolf. In 2008, within a few months 
of each other, two lectures were delivered that strongly promoted mediation. On 
17 See http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fi n/contents/protocols/prot_jrv.htm (last accessed 
06.05.09). In an interview carried out for this study in January 2008 with MoJ offi cials responsible for the 
drafting of the protocols, the offi cials recognised the constitutional role of the Administrative Court and 
explained that the inclusion of the paragraph on ADR in the judicial review protocol was not intended to 
suggest any degree of compulsion to mediate.
18 PAP, see n. 16 above, paras 3.1 and 3.2.
19 Civil Procedure Rules Protocols Practice Direction 4.7 http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fi n/pdf/
practice_directions/pd_protocol.pdf (last accessed 05.05.09).
20 V Bondy and M Sunkin (2009) The Dynamics of Judicial Review Litigation: The resolution of public law challenges 
before fi nal hearing, Public Law Project, London. Out of 115 solicitors interviewed in the course of this 
study (60 acting for claimants, and 55 for defendants), only four (3%) said that they had experienced a 
judge suggesting that the parties attempt mediation in a judicial review.
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29 March 2008, Lord Phillips delivered a speech on alternative dispute resolution21 
in which he described himself a mediation enthusiast. He suggested that 
‘Parties should be given strong encouragement to attempt mediation before 
resorting to litigation. And if they commence litigation, there should be built 
into the process a stage at which the court can require them to attempt 
mediation – perhaps with the assistance of a mediator supplied by the court.’
Whilst he stopped short of arguing for compulsory mediation, he is clearly 
favourable to the suggestion:
‘What are the pros and cons of compulsory mediation? Strong views are 
expressed about this on both sides. Those opposed argue that compulsion 
is the very antithesis of mediation. The whole point of mediation is that it is 
voluntary. How can you compel parties to indulge in a voluntary activity? ‘You 
can take a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink’. To which those in 
favour of compulsory mediation reply, ‘yes, but if you take a horse to water it 
usually does drink’. Statistics show that settlement rates in relation to parties 
who have been compelled to mediate are just about as high as they are in the 
case of those who resort to mediation of their own volition.’
The Master of the Rolls, Sir Anthony Clarke, gave a speech at the Civil Mediation 
Council’s national conference on the future of civil mediation in May 2008, which 
also demonstrated a stance in favour of compulsory mediation.22 In it he criticised 
the Halsey judgment23 as being ‘overly cautious’ in its conclusion that compelling 
parties to mediate could constitute a violation of Article 6 European Convention 
on Human Rights, and suggested that this point may be open to review ‘either by 
judicial decision or in any event by rule change’. He said that he wanted to see 
directions to mediate made routinely by judges.
The need for further research
This study was designed neither to promote the use of mediation nor to 
undermine it, although the authors of this report wish to state from the outset 
that they oppose any compulsion on parties to mediate and hold that the decision 
to mediate should always be a decision made by the parties together with their 
legal representatives. 
Rather, this study seeks to examine critically the claims that are made for and 
against mediation in relation to public law disputes; attempts to understand its lack 
of take-up by practitioners; and considers whether it is possible or desirable to 
encourage greater take-up and in what circumstances.
A key goal of this project is, accordingly, to determine the extent to which 
mediation could be said to provide either a more effective way of resolving some 
disputes or a valuable complement to the adjudication process. The approach 
adopted by the research team was based on the assumption that any in-depth 
policy debate about the place of mediation in public law should be informed by the 
views and experiences of public law practitioners.
21 http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/speeches/lcj_adr_india_290308.pdf (last accessed 05.05.09).
22 Sir Anthony Clarke (2008) ‘Alternative dispute resolution: an English viewpoint’, paper presented at the 
Civil Mediation Council’s national conference on the future of civil mediation.
23 Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust; Steel v Joy and Halliday [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576.
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The study aimed, in particular, to explore public law practitioners’ reluctance 
to mediate. Does this come about as a result of their lack of understanding of the 
process? Do they regard mediation as adding any value to bilateral negotiations 
and adjudication? Do practitioners have more principled concerns which relate 
to the special role of judicial review in the civil litigation landscape, or concerns 
about the retreating role of adjudication in public law? The research also sought to 
explore attitudes towards the use of mediation as an alternative to litigation. 
The structure of this report
In Section 1 of this report we explore the issues raised in this section in depth. 
Section 2 explains the research methods used. Section 3 looks at the progress of 
claims through the judicial review process and at the stages at which settlements 
tend to occur. This provides the context for subsequent considerations as to where 
in the process mediation might feature alongside other regularly utilised forms 
of negotiated settlements, notably bilateral negotiations, and what factors might 
motivate parties to choose mediation over other modes of negotiated settlement. 
Section 4 provides a snapshot of the attitudes of public law practitioners and their 
experiences of mediation. It sets out the main ‘objections’ to mediation amongst 
practitioners both with and without mediation experience. Section 5 examines 
critically the main claims that are made for the benefi ts of mediation over litigation, 
and we focus in particular on the aspects of process and substantive outcome that 
mark mediation out from adjudication. Section 6 explores the role of lawyers in 
mediation and what they expect from mediators. In Section 7 of the report, we 
look briefl y at the issue of the speed and cost of mediation, and Section 8 presents 
15 case studies of mediated judicial reviews and brief details of other mediated 
disputes involving public bodies drawn from interviews with lawyers and mediators. 
This represents the fi rst attempt to collate and present a signifi cant number of 
mediation case studies in the public law fi eld and thus provide information not 
hitherto available about real life examples of judicial review mediations. The fi nal 
section brings together some of the key fi ndings of the study and refl ects on 
their signifi cance. 

Introduction
With very few exceptions, there is a dearth of data on the use of mediation in 
judicial review cases and it was this gap in knowledge that the current project hoped 
to fi ll. The research methods utilised in this study were designed by a research 
team able to draw on a wide range of research skills, practice-based knowledge 
of judicial review litigation and mediation, policy expertise and academic critique. 
Throughout the project the varied expertise of the team members informed and 
infl uenced the design of the interview schedule and the nature of the access to and 
interaction between the research team and participants. In the view of the research 
team, their ‘insider status’ as recognised experts in the fi eld gave considerable 
credibility to the project and facilitated the involvement of more research subjects 
in the study than would otherwise have been the case. In addition, it is argued that 
it prompted the production of more detailed accounts of case handling than would 
have been so with a less experienced team.
Baseline data on the judicial review landscape: the Dynamics 
of Judicial Review study1
The fact that there is a lack of authoritative data in relation to the conduct and 
fate of most judicial review actions meant that there was little data with which to 
compare mediated cases. Very little has been published on the journeys that public 
law disputes make through the litigation system and the points at which mediation 
might be used to nudge a case towards settlement. However, the project team 
were fortunate in being able to draw on recently collected data from a study 
entitled ‘The Dynamics of Judicial Review Litigation: The Resolution of Public Law 
Challenges before Final Hearing’ (the Dynamics of Judicial Review study). This 
Nuffi eld Foundation-funded project was conducted by the Public Law Project in 
partnership with the University of Essex and provided essential baseline data on 
the circumstances in which and stage when there was potential for resolution by 
mediated settlement. These data and the analysis of them are reported fully in The 
Dynamics of Judicial Review Report, published in June 2009.
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before fi nal hearing, Public Law Project, London.
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The above-mentioned study produced two datasets which provided the 
research team with a unique ‘map’ of the life cycle and dynamics of judicial review 
litigation. More specifi cally this involved:
1 An analysis of 1449 civil judicial review claims (excluding immigration/
asylum cases) that were issued during a nine-month period in 
2005. These data were obtained from the Administrative Court’s 
computerised information system, known as ‘COINS’. This made 
available invaluable quantitative data on what happened to judicial 
review cases at various stages in the process and included information 
about success rates at permission stage, the incidence of withdrawal 
and settlement of claims and the stages at which they occurred.
2 Interviews with 123 solicitors about 172 judicial review cases.
The current study utilised two particular types of data from the Dynamics of 
Judicial Review study interviews. The fi rst of these involved information about 
the nature, timing and quality of settlements in judicial review cases and the 
factors which contributed to or inhibited settlements. Practitioner-interviewees 
were asked to describe their behaviour in particular judicial review cases and to 
elucidate their general approach to case handling, including the reasons why cases 
did or did not settle, and the substance of settlements.2 The second set of data 
focused on approaches to alternative forms of dispute resolution. In particular:
• the likelihood of any alternatives to court-based adjudication (complaints 
procedures, referral to an ombudsman or mediation) being considered 
or used at any stage of the judicial review processes;
• the reasons for rejection of such avenues where considered;
• attitudes towards ADR and the extent to which these had shifted 
in response to policy initiatives and judicial endorsement of these 
mechanisms;
• the extent to which such alternatives are prompted or otherwise 
supported by judges as a case-management strategy and the stages at 
which this is most likely to occur; and
• interviewees’ experience of mediation.
These data provided the research team with a preliminary snapshot of the 
extent to which public law practitioners are familiar with mediation and helped us 
to frame a set of more probing questions about mediation in the current project. 
The dataset also helped to identify the perceived barriers to the use of mediation 
that warranted further investigation.
Understanding motivation and perceptions – data collection 
in the current project
The Dynamics of Judicial Review study provided the research team with a valuable 
set of baseline data, but detailed information about knowledge, experience and 
2 See V Bondy and M Sunkin ‘Settlement in judicial review proceedings’ [2009] Public Law, April 237–259; 
and Bondy and Sunkin, The Dynamics, n. 1 above.
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attitudes towards mediation was still lacking. By utilising qualitative research 
methods, the project team aimed to gather more insightful accounts of the actual 
and potential use of mediation in the judicial review arena. In this context, face-
to-face interviews were considered to be the most effective way to investigate 
attitudes to mediation amongst practitioners. 
Semi-structured interviews were used to explore the extent to which the 
perceived barriers (fl agged up in the Dynamics of Judicial Review project interviews 
and outlined above) are insurmountable. They also allowed the research team 
to consider a range of possible solutions to the objections raised in the earlier 
project with interviewees. Those who identifi ed problems with mediation were 
asked to refl ect on the viability and practical implications of ‘solutions’ suggested 
by the research team and working party. In this way, we developed a reiterative 
process in which dialogue between the various experts involved in our research 
was facilitated.
The expert working group
One of the priorities for the research team was to set up a working party made up 
of mediators, solicitors and barristers, administrative court judges and academics 
who were experts in the fi eld of public law or mediation. The purpose of this group 
was to provide a forum in which representatives from a number of stakeholder 
groups could take part in shaping and challenging the issues explored.3 The working 
party provided invaluable input to the project at two main stages over the course 
of two meetings and one seminar. At an early stage they helped in the formulation 
of questions to be put to interviewees. As the data were being collected, and 
analysis undertaken, these experts were also asked to comment on emerging 
themes. Because of the diverse backgrounds and interests of the participants, the 
presented themes generated lively discussions as well as disagreements, thereby 
helping the team indemnify the angles that need further exploration and the 
dividing lines in the debate.
Internet search
Before embarking on data collection, the research team undertook an internet 
search in order to ascertain what information was already available about mediated 
public law cases. Obtaining information on mediations is diffi cult because of the 
shroud of confi dentiality that surrounds the process.4
The main sources of public law mediations were the Ministry of Justice ADR 
Pledge annual reports and the database of the Nationwide Academy for Dispute 
Resolution (NADR), a limited company offering dispute resolution services and 
3 The group discussions took place under ‘Chatham House’ rule.
4 The search did not include medical negligence or personal injury cases involving public bodies, or family 
public law cases, and it focused on challenges made against public bodies by individuals rather than 
organisations.
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accreditation of mediators and arbitrators.5 Its online mediation database and 
mediation case summaries (covering approximately the past 20 years) identify 
fewer than 10 cases as public law cases in which mediation was used or was 
mentioned in the court record. Many of these are well known – such as Cowl6 and 
Anufrijeva7 – and all are in the public domain.
The Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR), another dispute 
resolution provider and producer of the booklet ADR for Public Authorities: A guide 
for managers, provides anonymised case digests on its website.8 Only one of these 
appeared to be a public law case, involving a dispute between a local authority and 
a care home over fee levels within a contract. Although the residents of the care 
home were affected by this dispute and the outcome, they were not parties to the 
case and are not described as having attended the one-day mediation. This case 
involved similar issues to those of a case described by one of the interviewees, 
although in that case the individual care-home residents attended one of the two 
mediation sessions.
The government’s ADR Pledge (March 2001) specifi cally identifi es public law 
as an area in which ADR may not be suitable. Therefore, it is to be expected that 
not many of the cases summarised in the annual reports monitoring the use of the 
pledge commitment are judicial review claims. In published reports since 2002,9 the 
Ministry of Justice reports on only two cases involving public law issues. One was 
a negligence and discrimination claim relating to immigration detention; the other 
a judicial review involving three public bodies. Neither summary provides much 
detail, although in the latter case mediation is said to have resulted in £30,000-
worth of cost savings.
The sample
The focus of this project went beyond an interest in experiences of mediation. Rather, 
it sought to evaluate whether, in the view of subject specialists, mediation could 
ever provide a valuable addition to the dispute resolution ‘toolkit’ of practitioners 
in the highly specialised arena of the Administrative Court. However, it became 
clear during re-examination of the Dynamics of Judicial Review study data  that 
distinctions needed to be made between those practitioners with an understanding 
of what constituted mediation and those who were ill-informed about the process. 
Given the focus of the project on the views of experts it was decided to concentrate 
further explorations mainly on the former category, that is practitioners who were 
known to have an interest in and experience of mediation. As a result, interviewees 
were selected from among practitioners who had participated in the Dynamics of 
5 See www.justice.gov.uk and www.nadr.co.uk (last accessed 06.05.09). Note that seven cases are listed as 
public law mediations in the database, although these include cases where no mediation was used but was 
mentioned by the judge and an additional four are described in the mediation case summaries list. Also 
note that it is often diffi cult to identify from the information provided whether or not a case is in fact a 
judicial review.
6 R (Cowl) v Plymouth City Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1935.
7 Anufrijeva v London Borough Southwark [2003] EWCA Civ 1406.
8 www.cedr.com/CEDR_Solve/casestudies/results.php?param=adm (last accessed 0.6.05.09).
9 The 2006–07 report is available at www.justice.gov.uk/news/announcement-150108a.htm. There is a link 
for archived reports from previous years.
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Judicial Review study who had relevant mediation experience and who were re-
interviewed with a new focus on mediation. Other experts in the fi eld of public law 
were identifi ed for interview through expert networks.
Interviews were not undertaken with litigants who had experience of mediation. 
Whilst their views would undoubtedly be of value, problems of identifi cation,10 
limited resources and, most importantly, a desire to focus on the ‘gatekeepers’ 
to mediation prompted the research team to focus all their efforts on expert 
practitioners instead. We recognise, however, that litigants’ views and experiences 
are an integral part of the picture when assessing the value of mediation, and so 
we suggest that this is an important area for future research.
Policymakers
Policymakers have provided much of the impetus for an increasing use of mediation 
in the post-Woolf-reforms environment. As a result, it was considered important 
to involve representatives of such stakeholders in the interview sample. The views 
of four senior policy advisers from the Ministry of Justice and LSC and two senior 
representatives of the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council were sought 
because of their expertise in public law, litigation and funding issues.
Members of the judiciary
The project team was keen to include nominated judges11 in the Administrative 
Court who deal with a large volume of judicial reviews in the sample. An early 
interview was conducted with Mr Justice Collins, the then Lead Judge with judicial 
oversight and control of the Administrative Court. An interview was undertaken 
in the early stages of the project with Lord Woolf (now an experienced mediator) 
because of his prominent role in civil justice reforms and his well-documented 
enthusiasm for mediation. Two other judges, Mr Justice Ouseley and Mr Justice 
Sullivan, participated in focused discussion in the expert working group set up by 
the project team. In addition, the research team drew on interviews (undertaken 
as part of the Dynamics of Judicial Review project) with two experienced barristers 
acting as deputy administrative court judges, one of whom had a particular interest 
in ADR. Both were well known for their lecturing and published work in the fi eld 
of public law and it was anticipated that they would have a broader perspective 
than merely their own case work portfolio. Two other members of the judiciary 
who were approached declined to take part in the research.
Expert barristers and solicitors
Most of the interviewees in the sample of expert barristers and solicitors were 
approached because they were known to have had experience of, or interest in, 
mediation. Those few who were not in that category were approached because 
they fell into one of the following categories:
10 Many of the mediations to which the research team were alerted in the fi eld of judicial review had 
happened some time ago and diffi culties in lawyers tracking down their former clients and negotiating 
their participation in the project were anticipated.
11 Judges are nominated by the Lord Chief Justice to sit on cases in the Administrative Court. See www.
hmcourts-service.gov.uk.
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• were experts in the fi eld of judicial review;
• were experts in an area of law in which mediation is rare, such as 
planning, housing and prisons law;
• had handled a large volume of public law cases;
• were involved in the not-for-profi t sector; or
• had represented a large number of different defendant public bodies.
Unfortunately, there are no accessible offi cial records of the cases in which 
mediation took place. Moreover, it was clear from the outset that very few 
mediations had occurred in the context of issued judicial review cases. As a result, 
a snowballing technique was used to identify practitioners for interview. A total 
of 45 practitioners were asked to participate in the research project. The sample 
included a number of lawyers who had been involved in the Dynamics of Judicial 
Review project and had additional insights to offer on mediation and others 
identifi ed through professional networks who had experience of mediation in the 
fi eld of public law. Of the claimant solicitors in the sample, eight were in private 
practice and two worked for national legal charities. Solicitors with expertise in 
defence work included: an in-house solicitor with a London Local Authority; a 
solicitor in a London private practice acting for both London and out-of-London 
authorities; a former solicitor, chief executive of a local authority and a trained 
mediator; a solicitor at the Department for Work and Pensions; a senior solicitor 
acting for central government; and a junior and a senior practitioner from the 
Treasury Solicitor’ Offi ce (TSol) who had a particular interest in mediation. Of 
the nine barristers interviewed, six were also trained – though not necessarily 
practising – mediators, and all but one barrister who specialised in local authority 
work had at least some mediation experience.
On the whole, the response to interview invitations was positive, and, on 
occasion, enthusiastic. But not all who were invited agreed to an interview, or 
even responded. The perspectives of defendant lawyers were noticeably harder 
to obtain, as were interviews with commercial lawyers.
Mediators
The sample also included 11 interviewees who were practising mediators. Of these 
six mainly practised as barristers or solicitors, and have also been included in the 
sample of practitioners above. A further four interviewees who were practitioners 
had trained as mediators but did not practice. The sample of mediators drew on 
those who had experience of public law mediations. Within this group only one 
invitation to take part in the study was turned down.
Questionnaire design
The exploratory nature of this qualitative project led to the choice of semi-
structured interviews as the most appropriate research method. Several different 
versions of the questionnaires for use in interviews were designed and amended 
by the research team before the fi nal version was adopted. In addition, four pilot 
interviews were conducted which led to further amendments being made. The 
interviewees were asked about their experience in public law litigation, their area 
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of expertise and the rates and modes of settlements of judicial review cases in 
which they had been involved. The interviews proceeded to focus on; 
• factors which contributed to, or inhibited settlements;
• the potential for mediation to add value to the judicial review process 
as compared with bilateral negotiations, roundtable discussions and 
adjudication;
• views about the most appropriate stages at which mediation might be 
of value;
• aspects of mediation which might prove problematic in the area of 
judicial review;
• interviewees’ views of the role that the Administrative Court should 
play, if any, in facilitating mediation.12
In addition, a series of more practical questions were asked which focused 
on such issues as how they would go about arranging mediation, how they 
would select a mediator and why, and what their role might be in a mediated 
public law dispute.
Interviewees were asked to describe in detail any experience they had of 
mediated public law cases and to evaluate the success of the process when 
compared to other forms of dispute resolution. Those with little or no mediation 
experience were asked to consider why it did not feature in their work and to 
examine the obstacles they recounted.
The interview process
A conversational style was adopted in interviews in which prompts and probes 
were adapted to the discussion that arose in the course of the interview. It was 
considered important to provide opportunities to test and tease out interviewees’ 
perceptions against various ‘what if’ scenarios. In this way, interviewees engaged 
in the re-examination of perceived obstacles to mediation as well as wholly 
uncritical endorsements of mediation as they arose. It follows that in some 
interviews the questionnaire was not always rigidly adhered to but used instead 
as an aide-memoire of key areas for exploration.
All but three interviews were conducted face to face. Three were conducted 
by telephone. Interviews lasted one-and-a-half hours on average, with the shortest 
interview lasting 41 minutes and the longest 2.5 hours. It was felt that the emphasis 
on getting interviewees to re-think their previously unchallenged assumptions led 
to them becoming more engaged with the topic than if they had been asked to 
supply unchallenged opinions. Interestingly, several interviewees remarked in the 
course of the project that they were re-thinking referral to mediation in their 
current caseload as a result of the questions that were put to them.
12 This question yielded few meaningful insights and was not pursued in the analysis.
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Data analysis
All interviews undertaken by the research team were recorded and transcribed 
with the consent of the participants. Because of the discursive and exploratory 
style adopted in interviews it was not always easy to code responses into neat 
categories. Instead, a number of key themes were identifi ed on close reading of the 
transcripts and used to organise the qualitative data. Anything said about a particular 
theme was clustered together in a Word document. An Access database was then 
created which allowed the research team to enter a separate record for the data 
for each interviewee on a spreadsheet with summaries of their key arguments. 
Once responses to questions have been clustered in this way the research team 
undertook a close reading of the responses and identifi ed sub-themes.
In addition, the details of all mediated public law cases reported to the research 
team were entered into a separate database. Data were stored electronically 
and password-protected. Access to the data was limited to the members of the 
research team and care has been taken in reporting the data to ensure that none 
of the interviewees are identifi able as the authors of particular quotations.
Introduction
This section looks at the progress of claims through the judicial review process and 
the stages at which settlements tend to occur. This provides us with an overview of 
current settlement activity which will allow us to consider how and when mediation 
could usefully be mapped onto existing processes. Until recently, little has been 
known about settlement rates in judicial review, especially where this occurs prior 
to the onset of litigation. This section is based on the analysis undertaken by the 
Dynamics of Judicial Review study which provides a unique overview of settlement 
activity in the fi eld. This allows us to present both quantitative data, on rates of 
settlement and withdrawal at each stage of the judicial review procedure, and 
qualitative data, gleaned from experienced practitioners about litigation strategies 
at each of the stages.
Before visiting the data, it is important to draw attention to certain features 
of judicial review litigation. Firstly, judicial review is a remedy of last resort, to 
be used only if there is no other alternative which could solve the problem. This 
means that for public law specialists, the consideration of alternatives prior to 
commencing a judicial review is an intrinsic part of the process. Secondly, the 
process is considered to be simple and relatively quick as compared with other 
forms of civil litigation. Thirdly, the permission fi lter enables the court to engage 
in a form of early neutral evaluation by refusing permission to proceed in claims 
that are not arguable. Finally, as will be seen in this section, signifi cant settlement 
rates are the norm in judicial review actions.
The post-Bowman reforms of the judicial review process in 2000 have provided 
new incentives to settle disputes at an early stage and to reduce the number of 
Section Three
A brief anatomy of settlement in 
judicial review1
1 The data and fi ndings in this section are drawn from V Bondy and M Sunkin (2009) The Dynamics of 
Judicial Review Litigation: The resolution of public law challenges before fi nal hearing, Public Law Project, 
London. See also V Bondy and M Sunkin, ‘Settlements in judicial review proceedings’ [2009] Public Law, 
April:237–259.
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last minute ‘door of the court’ settlements which gave rise to avoidable costs in 
terms of legal fees and court time. The pre-action protocol, introduced in March 
2002, required the parties whenever possible to identify and communicate the 
issues in dispute prior to proceedings being issued, further promoting a culture of 
early resolution.
The judicial review procedure and the stages at which
cases conclude 
The judicial review process consists of six key stages.2 
• The potential claimant sends a letter before claim in accordance with 
the pre-action protocol except where exemptions apply. Examples 
of such exemptions include cases which are urgent or where the 
defendant is functus offi cio.3
• The defendant replies, usually within 14 days, either agreeing to provide 
the remedy sought or aiming to persuade the potential claimant that 
the claim has no merit.
• If matters are not resolved and a claim is issued, the claimant must 
serve the defendant with the claim within 7 days of the date of issue.
• The defendant fi les an acknowledgment of service within 21 days of 
service of the claim. 
• Permission stage when a judge considers whether a case is arguable 
and should be allowed to proceed to substantive hearing.
• Substantive hearing.
Urgent matters can be dealt with by way of interim relief or at an 
expedited hearing.
The Dynamics of Judicial Review study shows that there are three stages in the 
judicial review process at which settlements occur. These are:
• following the letter before claim (LBC) and prior to issue;
• immediately after a claim has been issued;4
• after permission to proceed has been granted.
Using data from the Dynamics of Judicial Review study, obtained from interviews 
with practitioners, it was established that, as a result of communications between 
the parties following the letter before claim, an average of 60 per cent of initial 
threats of judicial review did not proceed. Some disputes disappeared when 
defendants were able to demonstrate to the claimant solicitor that the case 
lacked merit, but the majority concluded in favour of claimants when defendants 
2 On procedure, see http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/1220.htm#fi ve (last accessed 06.05.09).
3 Functus offi cio ‘is a judicial or offi cial person prevented from taking a matter further because of limitation 
by certain regulations’, HM Court Service Glossary of Latin Terms, http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/
infoabout/glossary/latin.htm (last accessed 06.05.09).
4 Sometimes following an injunction, but not always.
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responded positively, and either provided the claimant with what they were asking 
for or offered suffi cient concessions to avert proceedings.
Thus, of each 1000 threats of judicial review made in a letter before claim, 600 
(60 per cent) do not result in the issue of any proceedings. Figure 1 below shows 
that, of the original 1000 threats of judicial review, 400 cases are issued. Data 
from the Administrative Court in the same study enable us to calculate that, of 
these, 136 cases (34 per cent) are settled or withdrawn shortly after issue. This is 
either because interim relief is granted, which effectively resolves the dispute, or 
a remedy is provided by the defendants or, more rarely, because lack of merit is 
revealed. Of the remaining 264 claims that are considered at the permission stage 
by a judge, a total of 158 cases (60 per cent) are refused permission to proceed. 
Of the 106 cases that are granted permission, 60 (56 per cent) are settled before 
they reach fi nal hearing.
Accordingly, out of every 1000 threats of judicial review, only 46 disputes, a 
mere fi ve per cent, reach a substantive contested hearing. It is important to bear 
these fi gures in mind when we come to consider the actual or potential role of 
mediation in this arena.
Figure 1: The progress of 1000 claims through the judicial review process
The potential for mediation
It could be argued that mediation is only necessary where direct negotiations 
between the parties have failed to achieve resolution. Moreover, if mediation is 
to be attractive to litigants, both sides in a dispute must have either something 
to gain from engaging in it or something to lose from not attempting it. The 
parties are otherwise unlikely to seek the involvement of a third party, with the 
consequential investment of time and costs. A barrister/trained mediator with 
extensive mediation experience explained:
‘There are lots of cases that will settle without the need for the formal and 
potentially costly process of mediation . . . For lots of local authorities, if 
interim relief . . . and permission [are] granted, they don’t have the will, 
energy or enthusiasm to defend a case to a substantive judicial review and 
carry all those costs, they would just say OK, we’ll provide this support
. . . something that is quite limited and straightforward, most asylum support 
cases [for example] . . . wouldn’t end up being mediated because [it’s] a 
low level kind of support and it is a yes or no [issue] . . . There isn’t much 
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to negotiate about, either they’ll do it or not. It’s likely to be in the more 
complicated care packages where mediation would have a role to play.’
Having described the standard trajectories of judicial review cases, we move on 
to consider how and why settlements happen and where in the process mediation 
might feature.
Cases that are resolved without being issued
The pre-action protocol has undoubtedly contributed to an increase in the rate 
of early settlement by encouraging an early exchange of views.5 Practitioners 
reported that the defendants’ response to a letter before claim was sometimes 
suffi cient to demonstrate that there was no merit in a claim and no further action 
would then be taken. More often, however, defendants take appropriate action in 
response to the threatened challenge. A claimant solicitor specialising in education 
and disability law explained:
‘I would say that about 40 per cent [of our claims are resolved] after we’ve 
sent the pre-action protocol letter and before us having to issue proceedings. 
Resolving means either they give us what we want or they give us more 
than we want. Or they give us enough such that . . . proceedings are no 
longer merited . . . I think they settle because the problem . . . has arisen, 
not through any deliberate intent, but because of, well, incompetence is 
probably putting it too strongly, but organisational diffi culties on the part of 
the public authority. They settle because the pre-action protocol letter will 
invariably be passed to the authority’s legal department who may then advise 
them . . . that they’re unlikely to succeed if the judicial review is brought 
against them, or . . . that actually to effect the remedy sought is much more 
straightforward and cheaper and less problematic than fi ghting a case . . . 
And particularly in education cases where what you might be asking is just 
for somebody to take a decision correctly . . . A lot of decisions are taken 
on an administrative level and by people who aren’t at all skilled in public 
law, and therefore may not be aware of the issues of propriety or illegality 
or perversity or now proportionality.’
Another example of cases that can easily resolve was given by an experienced 
public law practitioner interviewed for this project: 
‘Cases that are about delay in doing something are the most common cases 
to settle at the letter before claim stage because all the public bodies need 
to do is just get on and do it.’
Interviewees also drew attention to the fact that defendants will avert challenges 
by conceding just enough to avoid proceedings, but without necessarily addressing 
underlying issues. In the words of one claimant solicitor:
‘Approximately one-third of potential claims end as a result of sending the 
letter before claim. This happens either as a result of the defendants bringing 
up materials that we were not aware of, or more often they resolve it in a 
way which means that there is no need to proceed. It may be a combination. 
Their concession is not always all that we want, but it is suffi cient to mean 
that we are not in a position to go ahead. As always in judicial review, the 
clients are not interested in procedural stuff, they are interested in the 
substantive stuff, and they rarely get it in judicial review. The question is 
5 See Bondy and Sunkin, ‘Settlement’, n. 1 above. 
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whether they get it subsequently. And if the defendants are clever, they fi nd 
a way of remedying the error, but it doesn’t mean that the reconsideration 
will allow us to achieve what the client wants.’
This was confi rmed by a barrister acting for local authorities who said:
‘In reality there’s no error that can’t be cured by being thought about again
. . . Some [clients] may say they’ve managed to cut down litigation by so 
doing. If you have made a bad decision, it is best to acknowledge it straight 
away or if not acknowledge then at least to address it by saying . . . we’re 
going to make another decision in three weeks and we’re hard at it. And 
if it is a case of failure to carry out an assessment, it is essential that the 
assessment should be carried out.’
Although there are variations in the degree of trust and co-operation between 
claimants’ and defendants’ representatives, it is clear that parties engage, wherever 
possible, in pre-issue dialogue. Defendants presented themselves as seeking to 
address matters wherever they could by taking a fresh decision or providing the 
required service. Where the challenge is not to a decision, but to a failure to carry 
out a duty, there is clearly no room for negotiation, as the matter can only be 
resolved if the authority complies with its duties.
Practitioners pointed out that many cases that cannot be resolved in direct 
negotiations would also be unsuitable for mediation. Included in this category 
were urgent cases, claims requiring legal determination on a point of policy or 
law where there was no perceived room for compromise, or cases where the 
defendant is functus offi cio and has therefore no legal power to change the decision 
being challenged.
Several further factors appeared to militate against mediations of cases at the 
pre-issue stage. On the claimant’s side there is the requirement to issue proceedings 
promptly, and in any event no later than three months from the date of the 
decision being challenged. In addition, publicly funded claimants may encounter 
funding diffi culties that would make it more viable for them to consider mediation 
after a claim has been issued. Often the issues in dispute may not be crystallised 
until later on in the process. The last point was mentioned by a claimant solicitor 
with extensive mediation experience in the area of community care law:
‘[Mediation] is not [likely] pre-issue or pre-letter before claim, because the 
parties are almost not in a position to mediate. The issues haven’t been 
crystallised suffi ciently for them to realise that it’s something that they need 
to give serious consideration to. Public bodies are really reluctant to commit 
the time and the cost to a formal mediation, unless they’re in the context of 
ongoing litigation.’
And fi nally, where defendants refuse to settle a case because in their view it 
has no merit, they are also unlikely to agree to engage in mediation. They would 
expect such a claim to be refused permission and disappear. This leaves a very 
small margin of cases in which both parties are likely to be able or willing to 
engage in mediation at this early stage.6 This was summarised by a barrister and 
trained mediator:
6 Only one such pre-permission mediation was reported on in interviews and there is insuffi cient detail 
as to this early mediation as it was reported by a person who had not dealt with it directly. See the case 
studies in Section 8 below.
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‘because of the time limits, as a claimant, I would want to issue some form 
of a claim before I mediate – partly because I wouldn’t want to lose the 
chance to bring a timely claim, and partly because I would have thought that 
I would at least want to have all those participating in the mediation to have 
the ability to say, “We think the outcome should be that this is quashed, and 
so we ask you to sign a consent order.” And so I think [mediation is more 
suitable] after issue and post-permission, basically. The problem with the 
process is that after issue, pre-permission there’s a very short window there 
– you have to set up summary grounds, so I think, realistically, it’s [post-
permission], in terms of mediation.’
Clearly, the potential for mediation at this stage is limited, but this does not 
mean that it should not, or does not, happen. In the sample of 15 mediated disputes 
presented in Section 8, four mediations appear to have taken place after the letter 
before claim but prior to the claim being issued.7
Cases that are resolved after being issued, but before permission is 
considered by a judge
It could be argued that it is only after a claim has been issued that the claimant is 
in good position to consider mediation. Having issued proceedings, their position 
is now protected, and they will normally have had a substantive response from 
the defendants which indicates their understanding of the issues. Defendants who 
might have delayed responding to a threat of proceedings in order to see whether 
it materialises will now take a closer look at the complaint. If they consider that 
a claim has some merit, but have been unable to reach an agreement with the 
claimant, they may be more amenable to considering alternatives to bilateral 
negotiations such as mediation after the issue of a claim. 
There are clearly circumstances in which mediation holds no attraction at this 
stage. Where defendants are confi dent that the claim lacks merit they tend to 
prefer to take no action until it has been considered by a judge at permission 
stage. In other instances it can be more cost-effective to concede rather than 
resist a claim, regardless of the merits. In the words of a barrister acting for 
central government:
‘It is a question of who wants to get rid of the dispute, or what you’re 
interested in. Usually for defendants, they want to get rid of a case as quickly 
and as cheaply as possible, both in terms of legal expenses and resources.’
Moreover, interviewees felt that, where defendants indicate willingness to 
concede, the likelihood is that a negotiated settlement will be reached directly 
between the parties’ representatives. Even where the concession is limited and 
does not provide a substantive resolution, such as when the defendants offer 
to reconsider the decision, the claimant often has no choice but to accept it as 
usually it would undermine the grounds for the challenge and pre-empt the judicial 
review. On the rare occasions when this is not the case, or where the defendants 
prefer a long-term solution rather than merely dealing with the specifi c challenge, 
7 See cases studies 4, 6, 14 and 15 in Section 8.
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mediation would only become relevant where both parties wish to reach a solution 
but are unable to do so by themselves.
Where merit is accepted by the defendants, a settlement ought to follow. 
Where defendants believe that a claim has no merit or where the outcome of 
permission is uncertain, they are likely to want to wait and see what happens at 
permission. As the only cost for the defendant at this point is that of preparing the 
acknowledgement of service, it is diffi cult to see what would convince defendants 
to agree to mediation. 
In our sample of mediated cases, only one mediation occurred at this stage 
in the process, and it was initiated by the defendant government department. In 
this case, the department appears to have been motivated by recognition that the 
claim had merit, although other motives, whilst not explicitly reported, may have 
played a part, such as a desire to avoid publicity. In any event, the mediation failed 
to achieve a settlement and the case went on to a full hearing.
Cases that resolve after permission has been granted
Once permission to proceed to adjudication has been granted, defendants will 
look at the case afresh. Confi rmation that a case is considered by the court to be 
reasonably arguable provides a new incentive for defendants to reconsider their 
position and to try to avoid adjudication. We have seen earlier that more than half 
of the claims in which permission was granted were settled at this point, and we 
know that nearly all were settled in favour of the claimant.8 As a barrister who is 
also a trained mediator explained:
‘You get a permission order and suddenly, if you’re for a defendant and 
permission’s been granted, it’s a completely different proposition to simply 
facing a judicial review claim, because the judge has said there’s an arguable 
case and you then have to kind of get ready to produce your case and your 
evidence, and do quite a lot of work, and so the . . . opportunity to face up 
to the case exists.’
It follows that it is at this point, after permission had been granted, that mediation 
is most likely to be considered and to occur. But only where bilateral negotiations 
cannot produce a settlement. This is not because mediation cannot potentially add 
value to settlements at any stage, but because parties are unlikely to be prepared 
to expend time and money setting up mediation if they can reach an agreement 
between themselves. It is worthy of note that of the 15 mediated judicial review 
cases identifi ed in the course of this project, 10 are known to have occurred after 
permission had been granted.
Conclusion
The Dynamics of Judicial Review study has shown that most judicial review claims 
are settled and that most settlements result in a positive outcome for the claimant. 
It was estimated that over 60 per cent of judicial review threats are resolved 
without the need to issue proceedings as a result of communication between the 
parties. Settlements also occur immediately after proceedings are issued, when 
8 For a full discussion on post-permission settlements, see Bondy and Sunkin, The Dynamics, n. 1 above.
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over a third of claims settle, Of claims that are granted permission, more than half 
settle at that stage.
Settlements occur mainly as a result of defendants accepting that claims have 
merit, although other pragmatic considerations can also play a role. While cases 
that settle as a result of direct communication between the parties could, in 
principle, also be mediated, possibly with a better outcome for one or both parties, 
mediation remains an unlikely option where more familiar and straightforward 
routes to settlement are available to lawyers. 
Further, the nature of the remedies in judicial review enables defendants to avert 
many challenges simply by agreeing to reconsider and come to fresh decisions. In 
such circumstances, claimants often have no choice but to accept the defendant’s 
concession and withdraw proceedings. Such ‘pragmatic’ concessions on the part of 
defendants offer the short-term advantage of disposing of troublesome challenges 
quickly and cheaply, but often produce the same outcomes for claimants without 
addressing underlying issues or providing substantive remedies for them.
Thus, in the light of current practices, any realistic exploration of the potential 
role of mediation in judicial review would need to focus on the small percentage of 
unresolved cases that proceed beyond the permission stage in which both parties 
have an interest in reaching a settlement but are unable to do so because bilateral 
negotiations have broken down or stalled.
The question remains as to whether there could be an expanded role for 
mediation in some cases if defendants could be motivated to engage more fully 
with the substantive underlying issues rather than seeking to dispose of claims 
by making minimal concessions. This question will be explored more fully in the 
following section.
Introduction 
Lawyers have a critical role in determining the incidence of recourse to 
mediation and evaluations of mediation schemes have typically identifi ed them as 
‘gatekeepers’. In light of the low take-up of mediation as a method of negotiated 
settlement in public law cases, it is therefore essential to understand the attitudes 
of legal practitioners to mediation and the infl uence such attitudes may have on 
their advice to their clients regarding the choice of legal redress mechanisms. In 
this section, we discuss practitioners’ attitudes towards the use of mediation, 
drawing on data from interviews with public law practitioners conducted during 
the Dynamics of Judicial Review study, as well as from subsequent interviews with 
lawyers who have an express interest in, and experience of, mediation.
What do practitioners understand by the term ‘mediation’?
Despite the extensive literature on mediation generally, it became clear in the 
course of the Dynamics of Judicial Review study that public law practitioners 
were often unclear about the precise meaning of the term ‘mediation’. They 
expressed a variety of assumptions about the mediation process, some of 
which revealed misunderstandings about the differences between mediation and 
other forms of negotiated settlement, for example, bilateral negotiations and 
roundtable meetings. In addition, mediation was sometimes treated as being 
synonymous with compromise. Such confusion about the process is not unusual 
and has previously been commented on in the UK and other jurisdictions. Buck 
has raised the point that:
‘The defi nitional problem is not merely an academic debate as the confusion 
about terms can prevent public agencies imparting clear information and can 
therefore act as an obstacle to growing public confi dence. It is also likely that 
as more courts and tribunals make use of ADR procedures there will be a 
greater need to develop consistent understandings of relevant terms.’1
It became evident that, when ‘misapplying’ the term, interviewees were 
sometimes using it to connote collaborative or co-operative styles of negotiation 
Section Four
Mediation experience and attitudes 
among public law practitioners 
1 See, for instance, T Buck (2005) Administrative Justice and ADR: The Australian experience, DCA Research 
Series 8/05, London, section 5.3, pp 55–57. at p. 56.
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between lawyers, leading to creative and satisfactory resolutions of complex 
disputes. An account given by a solicitor specialising in community care law 
illustrates this point: 
‘I would describe another situation as a form of mediation. This is a case 
where we had a public funding certifi cate. We weren’t going to issue though, 
because the client had such particularly severe learning disabilities . . . which 
meant that she needed an absolutely concrete predicable path in her life, 
otherwise her behaviour became uncontainable. She was being moved from 
one day care centre to another and needed a very clear plan to ensure that 
it happened [which] meant that the old day care centre needed to delay its 
closure in order to allow that to happen. They sort of agreed in principle 
that that would take place, thereby preventing us from issuing, but we did 
have a very detailed sitting around the table with both solicitors present, 
chaired by the head of the learning disabilities services, in which the detail of 
the process was negotiated and fashioned out, and if that hadn’t been agreed, 
then we would have to revert to issuing proceedings.’
Although the absence of a neutral third party means that such interactions 
should not, technically, be referred to as mediations, they nonetheless demonstrate 
versatility in negotiating style within the existing adversarial system. Some 
commentators would describe this behaviour as marking a shift in litigation culture 
away from the battleground to the negotiating table. In the US, where mediation 
has long been integral to the civil justice system, alongside litigation in various 
forms, a number of ‘collaborative lawyering’ programmes have evolved. These are 
said to refl ect a desire on the part of lawyers who are trained in the adversarial 
system to develop new skills and approaches to dispute resolution.2
ADR and the settlement orientation as an intrinsic part of 
judicial review
The pre-action protocol stipulates an obligation to consider alternatives to 
adjudication from the outset. It lists ‘discussions and negotiations’ as the fi rst 
of four options for resolving disputes, followed by ombudsman, early neutral 
evaluation and mediation. The public law practitioner will also be aware of the 
need to consider the availability of a statutory appeal, internal appeal or use of a 
complaints procedure. Where public funding is applied for, the solicitor will have 
to satisfy the LSC that there is no viable alternative to legal proceedings. Such 
evaluations are subjected to further scrutiny when counsel is instructed, often to 
advise on the merits at an early stage, or at the point of issuing. This means that, 
in publicly funded judicial reviews, by the time a claim is issued, the question of 
alternative processes and remedies will have been considered several times. The 
permission stage can be said to provide a form of early neutral evaluation, indicating 
to the parties the strengths or weaknesses of their respective cases. This happens 
not only as a result of the decision to grant or to refuse permission to proceed 
to judicial review, but also through observations made by judges when making the 
permission decision. In addition, judges can engage in case management at this 
2 For a review of the literature on these issues, see C Menkel-Meadow (2003) Dispute Processing and Confl ict 
Resolution: Theory, practice and policy, Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington, Dartmouth; and L Mulcahy, 
(2005) ‘Feminist fever? Cultures of adversarialism in the aftermath of the Woolf reforms’ in Current Legal 
Problems, J Holder and C O’Cinneide (eds), Oxford University Press, Oxford, vol. 58, pp. 215–234.
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point and, when deemed appropriate, direct that the parties attend court for an 
oral permission hearing. This provides an opportunity for the judge to encourage 
communication between the parties with a view to promoting a settlement.3
It was shown in the Dynamics of Judicial Review study that the opportunities and 
incentives to negotiate arise at various stages. Signifi cant proportions of disputes 
settle, fi rstly, as a result of the letter before claim being sent, secondly, following 
the issue of a claim, and then again after permission has been granted, suggesting 
the existence of a ‘settlement culture’.
Claimant solicitors involved in the Dynamics of Judicial Review study commonly 
provided a long list of attempts at settlement made prior to issuing proceedings.4 In 
a case that was settled after permission was granted, one interviewee, a solicitor at 
a London law centre who specialised in housing law, described repeated efforts to 
communicate with the defendants, a London local authority, before fi nally issuing 
proceedings:
‘I sent many letters arguing that [the council] should treat this as a new 
application. It led to another interview, but the same decision [was made], 
namely that there has been no material change of circumstances. I applied for 
legal aid, briefed counsel to draft the claim form, and wrote again explaining 
why the decision was wrong. I got no reply to this letter nor to a subsequent 
letter and only then did I send the pre-action protocol letter to HPU with a 
copy to legal services. I tried again to settle just before issuing.’
It was argued that even in urgent cases, efforts can be made to avoid court. One 
claimant solicitor expressed this view in the context of a case concerning failure 
on the part of a local authority to make adequate community care provisions:
‘Our fi rst contact with the council was by way of letter before action, as 
time was ticking on at the stage when the family approached us. There were 
time pressures for a variety of reasons: there was the risk of the placement 
going to someone else, the claimant was beginning to self-harm more 
frequently, the family unit was about to break down and it was turning into a 
desperate situation. It was August and the placement was due to commence 
in September. We constantly tried to avoid issuing . . . but in the end there 
was nothing left to get out of the negotiations. We encouraged the family to 
continue its relationship with the social workers, and there were frequent 
meetings between these parties.’
It was not only claimant solicitors who made vigorous attempts to resolve cases 
prior to trial. Interviewees in the Dynamics of Judicial Review study demonstrated 
that both parties in potential judicial reviews made efforts to keep cases out of 
court,5 including suggesting the use of meetings and other alternatives to trial.
Lawyers were strongly of the view that settlements negotiated between two 
competent legally qualifi ed professionals could be just as successful as those involving 
mediators. One out-of-London solicitor with eight years’ litigation experience had 
3 V Bondy and M Sunkin (2009) The Dynamics of Judicial Review Litigation: The resolution of public law challenges 
before fi nal hearing, Public Law Project, London.
4 For a full discussion on pre-permission communication between the parties and rates of early settlements, 
see ibid.
5 Ibid; and V Bondy and M Sunkin, ‘Settlements in judicial review proceedings’ (2009) Public Law
April 237–259.
28
Mediation and Judicial Review: An empirical research study
an indirect experience of mediation which, in their view, compared unfavourably 
to a directly negotiated post-permission settlement:
‘I was involved in a case recently, concerning closure of a residential facility 
for disabled adults. I was litigating in parallel with another law fi rm on the 
same issues for a different group of clients. They chose the mediation 
route, and we went for a judicial review. At great expense, they obtained a 
reassessment of their clients’ needs, but no commitment to keep the facility 
open. We negotiated a settlement after obtaining permission, and we got 
them to enter a new contract to keep the facility open. I think that we got a 
better result for less of an expense. We were both funded by the same LSC 
area offi ce who tried to pressurise us to join in on the mediation.’
Interviews conducted with expert practitioners in the current project confi rmed 
this approach. In the words of one barrister:
‘I don’t see the need for a mediator. I think that as lawyers we ought to 
be able to have proper discussions and we ought to be able to listen to 
each other and put our concerns on the table openly and then sort things 
out, hopefully come to a consensus. And if we can’t, then we carry on 
with litigation.’
Clearly, where lawyers are able to conduct fruitful discussions with each other 
and reach a satisfactory solution, they are unlikely to seek the assistance of a 
mediator. This begs the question, however, of whether lawyers are right to think 
that cases that cannot be negotiated, even by competent and willing lawyers, are 
also intrinsically unsuitable for mediation. Lawyers without mediation experience 
may not appreciate either how mediation could enable parties’ entrenched 
positions to change or how it could facilitate different outcomes from those 
reached through direct negotiations.
Practitioners’ perceptions of the circumstances in which 
mediation is suitable or unsuitable
Practitioners in both the Dynamics of Judicial Review study and the current study 
identifi ed a wide range of circumstances in which they thought mediation was 
irrelevant or unsuitable in their work. In this section, we explore the main reasons 
they provided as to why mediation was not appropriate in particular types of case. 
Table 4.1 below sets out the reasons given by interviewees in the Dynamics of 
Judicial Review study.
It is important to stress that most of the lawyers in that study had no mediation 
experience and their views about the suitability or unsuitability of mediation were 
therefore untested.6 We move on subsequently to explore the views of lawyers 
and mediators with public law mediation experience and will make some comments 
regarding the differences and similarities between the views of the two groups.
It can be seen from the table that the three factors most frequently mentioned 
as rendering mediation unsuitable in judicial review cases were considered to 
6 Of the 123 interviewees in the Dynamics of Judicial Review study, only 19 lawyers (eight acting for 
claimants and 11 for defendants), comprising 17 % of the sample of interviewees, had had some experience 
of mediation. The experience of the majority of these lawyers was in areas other than public law. Only 
seven interviewees had experience of mediation in the context of public law disputes. 
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be urgency, the need for a judicial determination on a point of law or policy, 
and lack of room for compromise. Urgency was mentioned by nearly twice as 
many claimants as defendants. This is unsurprising given that it is inevitably the 
claimant who is in need of an urgent remedy, for example, in cases of imminent 
homelessness or a school placement. The need for judicial determination on a 
question of law or policy was mentioned by both sides in almost equal numbers.
Table 4.1 showing the main reasons given by Dynamics of Judicial Review study 
interviewees for considering mediation unsuitable.7
What is interesting is that four times as many defendant solicitors as claimant 
solicitors cited ‘no room for compromise’ as a reason for the unsuitability of 
mediation or other forms of ADR. Because of the relatively small sample, it is 
impossible to draw any fi rm conclusions from this, but it might possibly refl ect 
the fact that in public law disputes, the key to resolution or to compromise
lies with the defendants rather than the claimants. As expressed by one public
law specialist:
‘What claimants want is fairly obvious and it is up to defendants to offer it; 
they are always in a position to make an offer and start negotiations, without 
the need for a formal ADR structure.’
The subsequent in-depth interviews with lawyers who had experience of 
mediation, allowed further exploration of these issues. Their responses revealed 
some overlap with the earlier study, but the more experienced practitioners 
interviewed in this study placed more emphasis on the question of whether the 
use of mediation raises issues of principle that are problematic in the context of 
public law disputes and how these can be overcome. These included the need for 
judicial precedents, the need for transparency and publicity in public law cases and 
issues of power imbalance between unequal parties.
Here we focus on three key issues: the perception of lack of room for 
compromise; the need to set a judicial precedent; and the importance of 
transparency in public law disputes. The question of power imbalance is discussed 
later in Section 6.
7 This table is reproduced from Bondy and Sunkin, ‘Settlements’, n. 5 above.
8 http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/infoabout/glossary/latin.htm: ‘Having discharged duty – A judicial or 
offi cial person prevented from taking a matter further because of limitation by certain regulations’.
9 I.e. disparity in starting points, parties not on equal footing, need to ensure that parties are adequately 
represented.
Reason Claimant Defendant Both 
Urgency/time limits 35 18 53 
Question of law/policy/liberty 19 21 40 
No room for compromise/strong case 5 21 26 
Costs implications/expense 9 7 16 
Defendant is functus officio8 5 2 7 
Power imbalance9 3 - 3 
Total number of responses 76 69 145 
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No room for compromise
The contention that cases in which there was a need for an authoritative 
statement on ‘yes or no’ questions of law or policy are unsuitable for mediation 
emerged as a strong theme in interviews with lawyers both with and without 
mediation experience. Many held the view that, where the parties disagree 
on the correct legal position or on whether a statutory duty is owed, a legal 
determination is needed. If the defendants hold that no duty is owed, they would 
be acting unlawfully in conceding a claim in such circumstances and, hence, would 
not participate in any negotiated compromise, including by way of mediation. 
This may explain why four times as many defendant as claimant solicitors in the 
Dynamics of Judicial Review study cited the lack of room for compromise as a 
factor rendering mediation unsuitable.
A claimant perspective on this was articulated by a solicitor specialising in 
complex public law cases who explained:
‘There are cases where for one reason or another you would not be 
able to achieve anything, where you are dealing with an issue of statutory 
construction or something. It’s a pure black and white question of law and 
there is no room for compromise – either one interpretation of the law is 
right or the other is right and there is no other practical means by which 
the problem can be resolved. In that situation I wouldn’t offer [mediation] 
because it would be an empty offer.’
He went on to give an example:
‘I am doing a case at the moment which is about whether the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman’s reports, as far as their fi ndings are concerned, are binding on 
the Secretary of State. Now the answer is either yes or no. A mediator is not 
going to be able to assist anyone in reaching that answer.’
Other examples which fell into this category involved cases in which the scope 
or function of statutory provisions were being called into question. This might 
be the case, for example, in an action in which it was claimed that regulations 
contravened, or were incorrectly applied so as to contravene, the provisions 
of the Human Rights Act. In these situations, the only way forward is for the 
court to decide between two opposing arguments. Eligibility for housing under 
homelessness legislation was another example of such a category. These are cases 
that were suitable for either/or determination rather than compromise. In the 
words of one defendant solicitor:
‘Because of the nature of the cases I deal with, I have probably formed a 
blanket view that cases are not suitable for ADR, unless something really 
different arises in the facts. I’d like to think that in those circumstances I 
would think of ADR, but in homelessness cases it is not my fi rst, second, or 
even third thought.’
And in the words of another defendant solicitor:
‘Although ADR may sometimes be suitable when the claim is about the way 
in which a particular policy has been applied to a claimant, it is diffi cult to see 
how it could work when the claim is that the policy is wrong or that it has 
been wrongly interpreted. In such cases it is often desirable for reasons of 
legal certainty that a court give judgment on the issues.’
Section Four: Mediation experience and attitudes among public law practitioners 
31
While interviewees pointed out that not every dispute fell into this category, 
public law disputes were often rights-based. One interviewee gave the example 
of prison cases that revolved on whether a decision on remission was correct, or 
whether the treatment of a prisoner was proper. She characterised these as being 
‘very polarised, very structured, very rigid, and frankly best resolved by a judicial 
review’. Another example was given by a barrister who is also a mediator:
‘Where there’s a hard-edged dispute of law you require a binding 
determination, don’t you? Often, when you’ve got central or local 
government discharging public decision-making duties and from the public 
purse, in terms of what follows, that’s perhaps, they would say, with some 
force, the only proper way of determining it. They have to have a legally 
enforceable determination by court of jurisdiction.’
Mediators might take the view that the perception that mediation inevitably 
involves compromise is mistaken, and that the fact that many of these issues are 
rights-based does not preclude mediation. Where a dispute revolves around 
a question of legal entitlement, one way to address concerns about how to 
enshrine claimants’ rights into a mediated settlement is for those rights to be 
identifi ed at the start and for statutory entitlement to serve as the framework 
for settlement discussions. A rights-based model of mediation was identifi ed 
by the Law Society of England and Wales in 1991 as an alternative mediation 
approach to that of ‘facilitative mediation’. While still expanding the range of 
possible solutions by exploring parties’ interests, the model requires a more 
directive role of the mediator.
The need for judicial precedent
Some critics see the promotion of mediation as signifying the ‘privatisation’ of 
dispute resolution and the retreat of law from the public sphere.10 Although trials 
can be expensive, individual rulings and the creation of precedents lead to improved 
standards of performance on the part of public bodies and help resolve important 
questions that affect many others who benefi t from such rulings indirectly. This is 
not possible where mediation is conducted in private and the settlement recorded 
in a confi dential document.11
In a similar vein, it has been argued that the emphasis mediators place on 
interests as opposed to rights undermines the importance of rights discourse in 
our society. Test case strategies used to protect the interests of the disadvantaged 
against the state have resulted in notable successes which have had considerable 
symbolic value. Disadvantaged groups have struggled hard for substantive rights to 
be embodied in legal rules and for their grievances to be heard within the public 
arena of the courts. The particular danger to which critics of mediation have 
drawn attention is that the secrecy and confi dentiality of mediation will consign 
10 M Galanter, ‘A world without trials’ (2005) Annual Distinguished Alternative Dispute Resolution Lecture, 
University of Wisconsin.
11 For a much fuller overview of this issue, see H Genn (2008) ‘Judging Civil Justice – What is civil justice for 
(and how much is enough)?’, Hamlyn Lecture, University College London, 27 November.
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issues of wider interest to the private sphere and cause them to disappear from 
the public agenda.12
It is worth bearing in mind that many of the principled objections to mediation 
raised by commentators and practitioners can apply similarly to other types of 
negotiated settlement, as will be discussed later. It is hardly surprising that such 
principled objections featured more strongly in the present research than in other 
empirical studies.13 A review of the fi ndings of other studies suggests that such a 
viewpoint is less frequently cited in the context of civil litigation more generally. A 
solicitor and trained mediator explained:
‘it’s really important that some of these points of principle go before the court 
and are determined . . . otherwise we’re faced with a complete stagnation of 
development of the law, and particularly for vulnerable people the law has 
to be clarifi ed . . . For example, most [home closure] cases have settled. It 
would be very helpful to everybody, the residents, the relatives and also local 
authorities, to know 100 per cent whether there was a legal obligation to 
assess the impact of closing the home on the residents before the decision 
to close the home is made.  . . . we say plainly there is an obligation; human 
rights, natural justice, bleatingly obvious, that good old legal ground. But 
local authorities will say ‘no’. And cases will still be brought . . . also, it is 
very important . . . to ensure that the law moves with the times and develops 
according to society developing.’
The above example, however, is as relevant in relation to settlements generally 
as it is to settlements negotiated through mediation, and this same solicitor 
acknowledged that the fi rst and foremost consideration in choosing the forum 
for dispute resolution is that of the client’s best interest. This was exemplifi ed by 
the ‘Human factor case’ described in Section 8. That case concerned a severely 
disabled woman, paralysed from the neck down and living in an NHS facility, who 
was told that, due to a shortage of women carers on the night shift, her intimate 
care would be carried out by male nurses instead. This woman raised personal and 
religious objections to this, yet the trust were unwilling to accept her objections 
until the matter went to mediation, when it was satisfactorily resolved. As a result 
of the mediated agreement, more female staff were trained. This meant that other 
care users would also benefi t from this settlement. 
This case could be seen as an example of a rights-based mediated settlement 
that achieved both an outcome desired by the claimant and a wider-reaching policy 
change that could affect other service users. But as the claimant’s solicitor pointed 
out, had there been a ruling to that effect, other solicitors as well as care users 
would have been aware of the judgment and could have relied upon it to request 
the same provisions from their local authorities:
‘the client obtained the relief that she needed, but there is still an important 
point as to does a person have any right to have their views taken into 
account regarding provision of intimate care by male or female staff?  And 
actually, it’s all about dignity . . . All of the cases that we deal with have 
important points of principle which will affect other people. But in all the 
12 R Abel (1982) ‘The contradictions of informal justice’ in The Politics of Informal Justice, R Abel (ed.), 
Academic Press, London, pp. 267–320.
13 See e.g. H Genn et al. (2007) Twisting Arms: Court-referred and court-linked mediation under judicial pressure, 
Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/07, London.
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cases that are settled, those points of principle are not placed before the 
court and the law is not developed because a settlement is reached for that 
particular client.
This is not a concern limited to mediation, however. The vast majority of judicial 
reviews do not involve matters of public interest, nor do they set a precedent. 
Settlements agreed directly between the parties have exactly the same effect as 
do mediated settlements with regard to the non-creation of precedents and lack 
of publicity. A barrister/mediator pointed out that defendants can, in any event, 
easily avoid unhelpful precedents:
‘defendants can and do cherry-pick cases, and take strategic decisions as to 
what to settle, and they do so with their own considerations in mind rather 
than the claimant’s considerations in mind. The embargo on running – apart 
from in truly exceptional cases – kind of academic points, is a trump card 
for defendants, because they can render particular challenges academic by 
agreeing to reconsider.  . . . it’s quite easy, if you look at this all from an 
academic perspective rather than an empirical perspective as well, to say, 
gosh, this is all terribly suspect, and constitutional issues and all the rest of it. 
But that is the real world . . .’
In the ‘Human factor case’, described above, the claimant solicitor was asked 
whether it would have been possible to continue the litigation to obtain a 
determination of the point of principle, once mediation had concluded. This very 
experienced practitioner had not experienced any case where a defendant agreed 
both to a mediated resolution for an individual and to the case going forward for 
a determination of principle. This, in her view, would not be in the defendants’ 
interests, ‘unless they were forward-thinking defendants’. Such a situation would 
also raise funding diffi culties, as the LSC would rarely fund action once the specifi c 
dispute had been resolved.
One barrister/mediator was sceptical of rhetorical claims about rights and 
interests in this context and pointed out that mediated agreements can address 
claimants’ primary concern, namely their service needs:
‘The mediation will create rights – an agreement will set up rights for the 
claimant which are substantive, that are a practical solution to the problem. 
I’m not sure recognition of legal rights is what people want. For example, in 
a community care case, does the client want a promise to provide them with 
a shower stool in three months or the right to a proper decision?’
Transparency and publicity
One of the key concerns to emerge from the in-depth interviews with practitioners 
with mediation experience was that mediation of public law disputes needed to be 
distinguished from mediation of other private civil disputes because of the special 
need for transparency in the performance of their duties by public bodies. This 
call for transparency was echoed in a number of accounts of which the following, 
made by a barrister, is typical:
‘Confi dentiality might be a problem – public law disputes are disputes about 
public administration, and for various reasons we feel that’s something that 
ought to be in the open – for reasons of consistency etc. Why do we feel 
that? I suppose reasons to do with the upholding and vindication of rights, and 
the need for public bodies to be seen to be acting at all times in accordance 
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with the law. So all of those things tend against confi dentiality; and also there 
are often specifi c factors to do with obligations that the defendant is under 
a duty to make public . . . – it’s not like a private individual that can choose 
what it does in the open, or what it doesn’t. So there may be legal duties – 
so, you have freedom of information, and you have all that kind of stuff, which 
impinges and the Human Rights Act – and all of that makes confi dentiality 
more controversial in the public law sphere than in the private.’
Discussions about transparency also focused on the need for public authorities 
to be seen to treat like cases equally. The remedies provided to one individual in 
a public law dispute can have implications for others. For example, an authority 
with limited resources cannot be seen to offer a particularly generous and costly 
provision to one individual or family and not to others in similar circumstances. 
Compromise in mediation can cause problems when standards need to be set. In 
the words of a barrister/mediator:
‘What is diffi cult for public authorities is that effectively the claimant is no 
different from an awful lot of other people and so they have to ask themselves, 
well, just because they brought proceedings against us and pursue this in 
mediation, is it right to be giving them something that we wouldn’t be giving to 
another with materially the same position. I think claimants think sometimes 
it is an excuse, but I think it is a bona fi de concern for local authorities
. . . it can be an issue for local authorities to enter mediation if it means not 
treating complainants alike.’
These arguments against the use of mediation in these cases are challenged 
by the fi ndings in the Dynamics of Judicial Review study that a signifi cant number 
of judicial reviews are resolved through agreed settlements which, like mediated 
agreements, are not, on the whole, in the public domain. Despite the stress 
placed on transparency and publicity, a handful of interviewees argued that 
mediation did not have to be treated as synonymous with secrecy. In theory, 
almost anything can be agreed between the parties to a mediation including a 
change in policy and the making of an agreed public statement. It was argued 
by some interviewees that both sides could agree that information about the 
mediation process and settlement reached could be released to the public and 
press. One interviewee described how a dispute between two local authorities 
was settled in mediation and a memorandum for public release drawn up as a 
result, demonstrating that there was no reason why mediated outcomes should 
be treated as undermining transparency. In another case, although the parties 
signed a confi dentiality agreement at the start of mediation, by the end of it, they 
agreed to waive confi dentiality because they needed to explain to the court how 
and why the particular agreement was reached. The claimant’s solicitor explained 
that this was needed to ensure enforceability of the agreement should problems 
arise in future:
‘it was important that we had that mediation agreement attached to the 
consent order in order to go back to court if there was any problem.’
In addition, mediators pointed out that mediated agreements in public law 
cases can include both the issuing of public statements after the mediation, and the 
attaching of mediated agreements to a consent order. But, despite the fact that a 
court order is considered to be in the public domain, it is nonetheless unlikely that 
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such an agreement would come to the attention of other lawyers so as to allow 
them to learn from that experience and be able to apply it in other, similar cases. 
The question of the power imbalance between parties in public law disputes 
was also raised by a signifi cant number of interviewees with mediation experience. 
This aspect will be discussed in the chapter dealing with lawyers and mediation.
Conclusion
Many public law practitioners have no direct experience of mediation and there 
is widespread misunderstanding of the process, with many lawyers confl ating 
mediation with other forms of negotiated settlement and regarding it as synonymous 
with compromise. These misperceptions could be partly responsible for lawyers’ 
assumption that mediation has nothing to offer in public law disputes that cannot 
be achieved through other, more familiar forms of negotiated settlement. Thus, 
the situation is self-perpetuating, as lawyers fail to consider mediation and, 
consequently, do not gain the knowledge and experience that could challenge 
their assumptions about its possible relevance to their work. Many public law 
practitioners are nonetheless evidently versatile negotiators capable of reaching 
creative solutions that are benefi cial to both sides in a dispute, a skill that ought 
to make lawyers more open, rather than resistant, to attempting mediation in 
situations that become ‘stuck’.
The study shows that practitioners considered mediation to be unsuitable in 
judicial review cases for a variety of reasons, both practical and principled. Those 
lawyers without mediation experience raised largely practical objections to the 
use of mediation, such as urgency of cases, inability on the part of the public 
body to change its decision without a court order, and there being no room 
for compromise on an issue of law or policy. The practitioners with mediation 
experience placed more emphasis on what could be termed principled objections, 
such as the need for judicial precedents, the need for transparency and publicity in 
public law cases, and issues of power imbalance between unequal parties.
The creation of precedents was expressed as having various functions. Claimant 
solicitors saw precedents as being necessary in order to develop certain areas of 
law, serving the needs of the wider community, as well as providing an important 
indicator for public bodies as to how to perform their duties lawfully. Defendants 
also saw precedents as having an important role in some cases, providing 
guidance to authorities on how to act in future similar situations, although in 
other circumstances avoiding the creation of a precedent was seen as a positive 
advantage to the defendants.
However, many of these concerns do not, in themselves, explain the lack of 
recourse to mediation, since they could be said to be as applicable to directly 
negotiated settlements as they are to mediated settlements. Nevertheless, 
settlements are negotiated directly between the parties’ lawyers as a matter of 
routine. Moreover, interviews with claimant lawyers and the examples of mediation 
they have been engaged in show clearly that principled objections do not appear, 
in fact, to inform their decisions about whether or not to mediate. Rather, it is the 
circumstances and interests of the individual clients that determine that choice.
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With regard to the need for scrutiny of public bodies’ behaviour and the need 
for precedents, it was pointed out by expert participants that these apply in only 
a small percentage of cases, and it is, in any event, open to defendants to avoid 
scrutiny and the risk of unhelpful precedents if they wish to do so by agreeing 
to settle a case. Hence, it is not an issue that is uniquely created by mediation, 
which is merely another form of negotiated settlement. This important issue 
must therefore be addressed in some other way, such as developing procedures 
for enabling the court to deal with legal issues after proceedings had ended, or 
use other mechanisms, for example, the ombudsman, to investigate such aspects 
wherever possible even after a case had ended. In addition, it is worth remembering 
that mediated agreements can include public statements as well as commitments 
to make policy changes that would benefi t others. This could be a matter of good 
practice on the part of defendant public bodies.
The matter of power imbalance in negotiations between a public body and an 
individual, another major issue of concern, is discussed in Section 6, where it is 
suggested that this is considered by lawyers and mediators to be largely redressed 
by ensuring the presence of competent and expert solicitors for claimants.
Given lawyers’ critical role in advising their clients regarding the choice of legal 
redress mechanism, it is essential to understand their attitudes to mediation and 
how their reservations about the use of the process might be infl uencing the take-
up of mediation in the public law sphere. It is also important that lawyers understand 
more precisely when the various concerns over the use of mediation in public law 
disputes apply and where they need not apply, so as not to reject mediation out 
of hand for the wrong reasons. There is, therefore, a need for specially designed 
training that is informed by the understanding of lawyers’ concerns and practices 
which aims to increase their understanding of the process so as to enable informed 
choices, rather than to encourage the take-up of mediation per se.
Finally, it is worth remembering that claimants and defendants are likely to 
be motivated by different considerations in making decisions about whether to 
mediate. For example, four times as many defendants as claimants cited ‘no room 
for compromise’ as a reason for considering mediation to be unsuitable. We 
have already seen in Section 3 that the main factor leading to settlement is the 
defendants’ recognition of the merits of the challenge. Where defendants think a 
claim lacks merit, and are therefore unwilling to make any concessions, they are 
unlikely to engage in any settlement process, including a process of mediation. 
This would seem to leave only a small minority of cases in which mediation could 
seem attractive to defendants, namely those cases in which a duty has been 
acknowledged, but the precise terms of its performance are the subject of dispute. 
It is diffi cult to envisage defendant public bodies agreeing to engage in mediations 
where a dispute can be resolved cheaply and swiftly by offering to do the bare 
minimum in order to ‘make the case go away’, even where mediation could lead 
to a creative and long-term solution that could ultimately prove advantageous 
to both parties. This would require a change of culture coupled with adequate 
fi nancial as well as staff resources.
Introduction
In this chapter we consider some specifi c positive claims for the mediation process, 
how these claims are borne out in the specifi c context of judicial review, and what 
practical outcomes mediation can generate that other processes cannot.
Drawing on interviews with practitioners, we look at what factors distinguish 
mediation from other forms of dispute resolution and how mediation compares 
in practice with other forms of negotiated settlement.
Does mediation empower parties?
Judicial review requires, on the whole, little participation from the parties compared 
with other forms of litigation. The claimant’s involvement is usually confi ned to 
giving instructions and signing statements. They need not attend court at all, let 
alone give evidence. The arguments are often legal and technical. The outcome, 
even if successful, can be frustrating in that it does not necessarily resolve the 
substantive issue that was the subject of challenge due to the limited nature of the 
remedies available. This can be frustrating for those individuals who want to have 
their ‘day in court’ and be heard by a fi gure of authority, a judge.
A barrister, who is also a trained mediator, described the contrast between 
mediation and adjudication in the following way:
‘if you look at who participates in a court case, it’s the judge and barristers, 
and it’s not the client . . . at a mediation, the interests take centre-stage, and 
you have the ability for the decision-maker and the party to . . . have a direct 
dialogue that takes place in a structured way, where there [are] checks and 
balances to secure equality – and that could be very powerful, and that could 
also lead to a breakthrough in terms of understanding.’
For claimants, therefore, mediation could seem particularly attractive in judicial 
review disputes if they wish to take an active part in the unfolding of their case. 
It could also be argued that, because in judicial review the arguments focus on 
strictly legal issues that are not always easy to explain, lay claimants can feel that 
they are being marginalised and that the issues that are important to them are 
being overlooked. Mediation could therefore afford individuals an opportunity to 
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take part in negotiations and present their own narrative. As long as their lawyers 
are present, they do not risk their rights and entitlements being overlooked.
The sense of empowerment arising from involvement in shaping and agreeing the 
outcome may be a positive experience, in contrast with the alienation that parties 
may experience when divorced from the process. This sense of empowerment 
can, in itself, be regarded as a form of positive outcome. Research in this area 
suggests that procedural justice (process) is often perceived as being as important 
as substantive justice (outcome) and that satisfaction with both process and 
outcome can be interrelated.1 So, for instance, a disappointing result can be more 
acceptable to a party if it is reached in a way that is perceived as fair,2 or when a 
disputant feels heard and understood.3
Yet, despite acknowledgment by some lawyers of this positive aspect of 
mediation, and awareness of its potential, empowerment did not feature 
prominently in accounts of actual mediations.
In part, this may be explained by the fact that the study focused on the views 
and perspectives of lawyers rather than litigants, and that lawyers are more 
concerned with obtaining what, in their view, is the best achievable outcome 
for their clients rather than with their clients’ experience of the process itself. 
This is not to say, though, that lawyers are necessarily insensitive or impervious 
to this aspect of clients’ experience, however, and, in fact, those interviewees 
who mentioned their clients’ experience of the mediation process recounted a 
number of examples of circumstances in which participation in mediation was not 
a positive experience for their client. It is interesting that several of the examples 
given of clients’ negative experiences in mediation came from lawyers who were 
also mediators.
Lawyers described mediations as long-winded, gruelling and even humiliating 
for their clients (see Section 8). Some lawyers emphasised that, like adjudication, 
the mediation process can also be very stressful. This was especially the case 
where mediations stretched late into the night in order not to lose momentum, as 
happened in at least one of the mediated cases in our sample.
Some lawyers questioned the universal applicability of the empowerment claim. 
For example, a lawyer with extensive mediation experience suggested that, in 
situations concerning a determination of the legality of a decision, participation is 
not a priority for claimants
‘I don’t know that actually parties always want their own outcome. A lot of 
parties want the judge to decide their case, they think that’s what judges are 
there for, that’s what justice is about, and I’m a citizen and I’m entitled to 
go to court and to get a decision yes or no. And they will accept the judge’s 
decision most of the time.’
1 H Genn et al (2006) ‘Tribunals for diverse users’, DCA Research Series 1/06, January, p. 194, exploring 
the views of tribunal users, and also citing research by T Tyler, J Baldwin, and previous Genn studies.
2 T Tyler (1991) ‘Procedure or result: what do disputants want from legal authorities?’, A Handbook of 
Dispute Resolution: ADR in action, K Mackie (ed.), Routledge, p. 19.
3 R L Wissler, ‘Mediation and adjudication in the Small Claims Court: the effects of process and case 
characteristics” (1995) Law and Society Review 29(2):352.
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The same lawyer gave an example of an actual mediation that had an unfortunate 
effect on a client:
‘I have been to a mediation which was just appalling . . . we started at 5 
o’clock and fi nished at 11 and the mediator didn’t actually speak to my client 
at all. It was just awful.’
Another lawyer/mediator compared and contrasted experiences of mediation 
and adjudication, observing that it is not possible to generalise about the 
appropriateness of either as this may depend on the parties and the case:
‘There is a sense of ownership potentially of the deal – you’ve chosen it 
rather than having a court impose it on you, although that can be overstated. 
I am not sure that people do typically get away from mediation skipping down 
the road holding hands and feeling they love each other after all, though 
I did do one educational negligence case where the insurers were deeply 
impressed with the way the parents and the boy had tried to claw back 
the lost education and they were very reasonable about what they wanted 
and they reached a nice easy settlement and I think they genuinely liked 
each other in the end of the process, but I am not sure this is necessarily 
typical. And equally there are some cases where the parties need a detached 
authority telling them the answer, so I don’t think that it’s a God-given rule 
that choosing [mediation] is always better than having a judgment handed 
down to you, but it can be.’
In some circumstances, mediation can have a negative effect on a claimant’s 
interests and, thus, the opposite effect from empowerment:
‘something to be aware of is that sometimes mediators who are very very 
keen to settle a case at all costs, may well put pressure on a client to agree 
to something which their legal advisor might be saying hang on . . .’
In addition, lawyers pointed out that mediation is not alone in its capacity 
to strengthen the voice of litigants. Claimants may indeed feel empowered by 
obtaining a High Court judgment against the public body with whom they are in 
dispute. For example, Southall Black Sisters describe on their website their victory 
in a judicial review as follows:
‘On 18 July [2008] at the High Court, in a dramatic turn of events, Ealing 
Council withdrew their case after one and a half days of a hearing which saw 
their defence rapidly unravelling. From the outset, it became apparent to the 
presiding judge, Lord Justice Moses and to all those present in the courtroom 
including the packed public gallery, that Ealing Council was skating on really 
thin ice in attempting to justify its decision to cut funding to SBS and to 
commission instead one generic borough wide service on domestic violence 
on the grounds of “equality” and “cohesion”.’4
The solicitor who represented the organisation described the women packing 
the public gallery, some of whom spoke little or no English and could not understand 
the exchanges in the courtroom, cheering and waving. Success in the High Court 
in this case was clearly felt as greatly empowering of the claimant organisation’s 
constituency user group.
4 http://www.southallblacksisters.org.uk/.
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Roundtable meetings can also have a similar effect. Mediation is often said to be 
particularly enabling of the involvement of vulnerable individuals who would fi nd 
the court setting confusing and intimidating. However, one solicitor specialising in 
community care law thought that careful consideration would be needed in order 
to assess the effect of a mediation setting on vulnerable clients. She recounted 
an example of a client with severe learning disabilities which made it diffi cult for 
him to communicate comfortably, as a case in point. She explained how she had 
opted for a roundtable negotiation over mediation because she wanted her client 
to attend and believed that he would feel intimidated by a more formal process. 
In her view, a mediator would introduce the presence of an unfamiliar third party 
and would not be conducive to her client’s participation:
‘it required a sympathetic approach because he had in fact limited capacity 
and they indicated to us that they wouldn’t expect it to be a very formal, 
chaired independent mediation process, because they [too] realised that it 
wouldn’t be suitable for him to have a formal process which would be too 
intimidating to him.’
Mediation and direct negotiations between lawyers
As we have said previously, a signifi cant number of public law disputes resolve 
as a result of direct communication between lawyers, in that the case does not 
proceed to adjudication and ends as a result of that communication. The Dynamics 
of Judicial Review study has shown that the majority of these cases conclude with 
some positive outcome for the claimant. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 
many interviewees insisted that negotiations can, and do, provide an adequate 
forum in which to resolve disputes with no need for a neutral third party. In 
common with other studies of mediation, a number of participants expressed the 
view that ‘good lawyers’ do not need an additional framework in order to reach 
good, and at times even creative, outcomes.
For example, scepticism about the added value of mediation was expressed 
by a lawyer specialising in environmental and planning law who had no mediation 
experience. He doubted that in the kind of disputes he was dealing with there was 
anything that could be gained from mediation that could not be otherwise obtained 
via negotiation. To illustrate that view, he described a negotiated settlement in a 
judicial review claim in which it was agreed to impose certain conditions on a 
planning decision about a new development rather than to quash the decision 
altogether. The settlement differed from the sort of decision that could have 
made by the court because it offered a practical solution to the real issues at stake 
rather than focusing solely on the matter of ultra vires. Whilst he agreed that this 
case could have been resolved by mediation, he argued that the same result was 
achieved through negotiation between experts and that mediation would have 
added unnecessarily to the costs of the case without any corresponding benefi t.
Mediation can be a useful forum not only where negotiations are impossible or 
have broken down. It can assist even in situations where the lawyers all agree on 
what needs to happen. In one very long-running community care dispute, in which 
the solicitors and barristers knew each other well, all the lawyers agreed that an 
Section Five: Is value added by mediation?
41
independent user trust needed to be set up. The purpose of the mediation was to 
agree the terms of the trust. One of the solicitors involved described the scene: 
‘There were about 20 of us in the room . . . Feelings between some of the 
lawyers ran high at times in the course of the proceedings. In a way, having 
somebody there who could take over if necessary, made everyone feel more 
comfortable about embarking on it. He [the mediator] was the independent 
person to break up fi ghts and say let’s move on, if necessary.’
Mediation compared with roundtable bilateral negotiations
We remarked earlier that roundtable negotiations can share similarities 
with mediation in empowering vulnerable parties and generating satisfactory 
outcomes. Here, we present views of mediators on the differences between the
two processes.
One mediator considered that roundtable meetings often excluded the clients 
themselves, and that mediation alone offers the opportunity of full participation 
by clients:
‘Roundtable conferences . . . are lawyer-centric; they are dominated usually 
by the senior lawyer present on that team. I do not believe that the parties 
. . . are involved other than peripherally in the large majority of them. 
Very frequently they’re in a side room, and the effective debate goes on 
unmoderated, on a bilateral, probably positional basis, as between lawyers 
on either side.’
For this interviewee, the mediator’s prescribed role is to ensure that clients 
have a chance to have their say and this means that the clients have to be present. 
He gave an example of one mediation in which he went to the trouble of visiting 
the claimant at home as she was unable to attend the meeting. Moreover, he also 
arranged for the defendants to visit the claimant at home. In another case, in which 
the claimant was unable to attend or be visited, he encouraged her parents to 
bring a photograph of her to the mediation. In other interviews, it was argued that 
mediator–litigant interactions, especially those undertaken in caucuses, allowed 
for issues and preferences to be teased out in a way which was not encouraged 
in bilateral negotiations where the lawyers tend to take centre stage. Another 
mediator emphasised the importance of being able to interrogate the underlying 
issues in a mediation: ‘We call it the exploring phase, to understand what it is that 
is driving the parties.’ He suggested that this approach is relevant in public law 
disputes ‘where often politics and what’s going on behind the scenes is the main 
drive for whether [a case] is going to settle or not’.
A number of interviewees identifi ed the formal structure of the mediation 
process as an asset when compared with roundtable meetings, which some felt 
could dissolve into a free-for-all. Mediation was considered to offer a guided 
structure overseen by someone with no personal interest in the dispute or its 
outcome. A barrister/mediator put it as follows:
‘The more straightforward disputes, you would hope could be settled more 
by roundtable meeting and without the need for a mediator. Another factor is 
how well the parties know one another or trust one another that can make a 
difference. If you’ve got solicitors or counsel who know one another and have 
a good relationship, they may feel reasonably confi dent in their ability to have 
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a structured dialogue without the need for external structure. If you have a 
really messy case or just don’t have that trust, and you need lots of bodies 
there to consult and give instructions or you have more than two parties, 
then really mediation would greatly improve the prospect of success.’
The practice of exchanging information in advance of mediations was also 
considered to help to frame issues for discussion on the day. In a similar vein, 
interviewees were also impressed by the greater clarity about what has been 
agreed which is likely in mediated settlement. One practitioner/mediator identifi ed 
this as a key role for the mediator:
‘in roundtable discussions there [are] always arguments about what’s agreed, 
is it binding, is it in full and fi nal settlement . . . there is always a danger that 
in fact each person will think they’ve agreed different things from what the 
other person is agreeing . . .’
Another interviewee suggested that the use of breakout rooms for private 
caucuses, a technique that has no purpose in bilateral negotiations, could provide 
a useful opportunity for refl ection in the course of mediation. Its particular use in 
providing a safe environment which allowed the mediator to push each side harder 
in evaluating their respective positions was stressed by several interviewees. One 
mediator described the value of such separate meetings:
‘the mediator is able to have private conversations with each team, out 
of the hearing of the other people, to try to expand the options that are 
available and the courses that might be attempted to move things on; and, 
with permission, can bring the fruits of that exploration team-to-team, and 
help them see if they want to make progress.’
Despite their many advantages, caucuses were viewed as unhelpful in certain 
situations. Some claimant solicitors found this aspect of the process unhelpful. One 
claimant solicitor with mediation experience argued that, if the legal representatives 
know each other, ‘then all of that to’ing and fro’ing [in] mediation is completely 
hopeless’. In one case, this interviewee insisted that the mediation be held with all 
parties seated around the table because, in his words: ‘I prefer to see the whites 
of people’s eyes that I’m negotiating with.’ Another practitioner described her 
experience in mediation consisting of sitting in a room doing nothing for an hour:
‘talking to your client, saying “right, we’ll say that when [the mediator] comes 
in” and then you’re waiting, and then he comes in and says “the other side is 
saying this, now what do you say?”’
She perceived this shuttle model as time-wasting and ‘ridiculous’ for the lawyer 
as well as the client.
Better outcomes?
Participants in this study felt that mediation offered considerable scope to add 
value to the judicial review process in terms of achievable outcomes, because 
of the focus on providing outcomes that are tailored to the parties and their 
particular needs. These can include agreements on actions to be taken, apologies, 
explanations and compensation to affected individuals, and even commitments to 
effect changes in policy and procedure. The range of options is in direct contrast 
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to the limited nature of the remedies available in judicial review, which can often 
leave a claimant frustrated. A barrister and trained mediator explained:
‘Although the administrative court is very fond of saying it’s the court of 
practical remedy, of course its remedy powers are couched in language 
which is anything but practical. So the main thing is that, as a claimant, you 
can obtain things [in mediation] which can be concrete and detailed, and 
of course can go outside the powers that the court has, because you’re 
not restricted.’
A barrister and trained mediator said:
‘there may be two reasons [for opting for mediation over a reconsideration]. 
The fi rst may be that the claimants won’t withdraw the proceedings just 
because they say we’ll take a fresh decision because if the underlying dispute 
is still there, there may not be much point to just withdrawing and then 
having to issue all over again and second the defendant may know that even 
if this set of proceedings gets withdrawn, if they take the same decision again, 
they’re just going to end up in the same place.’
Interestingly, even some of those interviewees with no mediation experience 
described the benefi ts they would expect from mediation in respect of outcomes, 
in particular the opportunity to achieve results that could not be obtained in court 
proceedings, as did these two lawyers.
‘Judicial review is a blunt instrument. If mediation could get a client e.g. a 
change of a social worker they’re not getting on with or an apology, that 
would be added value.’
‘For me, the point of mediation . . . is that it allows the substantive issues 
in contention to be discussed as opposed to the fairly bold ‘you can or you 
can’t’ type decisions that will come out of court.’
Another barrister with mediation experience also noted the limitations of a 
court ruling in judicial review, in terms of what can be achieved for the client. 
He highlighted that mediation has considerable potential to inject some common 
sense into settlements:
‘there may be different ways, perhaps more practical ways of meeting the 
shared concerns of the different parties that the courts can’t propose. The 
court in judicial review is in such a limited function and mediation can look 
much more widely and much further and see whether there is a practical 
resolution, a different way of delivering services that doesn’t cost as much 
so that the local authority or the NHS trust is happy but which is suffi cient 
to safeguard the individual’s position, so that’s why those are so appropriate 
for mediation.’
A claimant solicitor, also a practising mediator, described why he chose 
mediation in a particular judicial review case which was about setting up a user 
independent trust for the parents of a severely disabled child. He stressed the 
various ways in which the detail of the outcome could be fl eshed out in a much 
more meaningful and effi cient way in the course of mediation:
‘we agreed a mediation, because we thought that . . . the most we could have 
got from the court proceedings is a declaration that the [local authority] 
hadn’t properly considered whether to do a user independent trust, and 
asking them to do it, consider it, whereas the mediation may have been a 
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way of not only asking them to consider it but if they agreed that one was 
possible, fi guring out the practicalities of it. And in effect moving the process 
on much more signifi cantly than going to get a high court hearing, getting a 
declaration or a mandatory order and then the authority going away, making 
a decision. And then you’d still have to have all of the negotiations about the 
actual trust itself.’
Although the mediation did not result in a settlement, the solicitor viewed it as 
a success as he considered that his clients had achieved a lot more than if they had 
just gone to the High Court.
The opportunity to include issues that the court could not address was welcomed 
by a number of interviewees. For one, who has used mediation successfully in 
several licensing cases, mediation was not only quicker:
‘but the outcome included issues that couldn’t have been resolved in court. In 
other words, the mediation not only settled the issues that were the subject 
of the court proceedings, but also disposed of other issues. The outcome of 
proceedings in those cases would have been uncertain and possibly leading 
to defeat for my clients.’
Among the examples of actual mediated cases given in the interviews, there 
were several instances in which mediation appeared to offer a unique opportunity 
to achieve a tailored outcome that may not otherwise have been reached in 
adjudication or bilateral negotiations. Mediation can free up the parties in a way 
that roundtable meetings do not if, as some interviewees suggested, they focus on 
purely legal remedies. A claimant solicitor who uses mediation frequently in her 
work explained:
‘a roundtable meeting post-permission will still look at the grounds for 
judicial review and the prospects of success. And so therefore the parties 
would be very very limited by that sort of setting, because by defi nition 
you are effectively putting the parties in the same room in the context of 
the litigation. And you don’t have any outside infl uences for the mediator 
to open up creative thinking of what other issues should we be looking 
at here. What really do you want that you can’t achieve through judicial 
review that we might be able to achieve through mediation? . . . So in my 
view that’s too restrictive. So a round table meeting, if it’s suggested, I’m 
not going to refuse it, but it won’t be as good an opportunity for both sides 
to settle as a mediation.’
Others commented on how mediation could disrupt oppositional dynamics of 
discussions by allowing greater fl exibility in the way that settlement negotiations 
were structured and outcomes arrived at. In a case in which the parties could 
not agree on the issue of costs to begin with, one barrister described how, to his 
surprise, the mediator suggested dealing with costs at the end of the mediation 
rather than at the beginning. The parties were then able to reach agreement 
on a number of other substantive issues, as a result of which they were then 
more inclined to compromise on costs. The barrister remarked that it would not 
have occurred to him to approach the problem in this way; it was the mediator’s 
insistence that forced the parties to try something different. 
‘the way in which the mediator handled the really diffi cult issue between 
us challenged my ideas about how you settle proceedings and the way you 
go about it; that you don’t immediately lock horns on the really diffi cult 
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issue that you’re in complete loggerheads on; that you see where all the 
agreements are and how far you can get with that. That’s not the way I would 
have dealt with it.’
In addition, the mediation generated proposals that had not been on the 
table before:
‘What was new was that they were actually putting in counter proposals 
and that’s why we felt encouraged, because we hadn’t thought we would 
even get that far. Secondly, the counter proposals were proposals that we 
didn’t automatically think we couldn’t live with. Obviously that changed the 
perspective for both parties.’
Another perceived benefi t of mediation in regard to outcome was that the 
resolution of an ongoing dispute in mediation that successfully addresses underlying 
issues can pre-empt years of litigation and unhappiness. A barrister gave an example 
of the circumstances in which mediation ought to be attractive to defendants:
‘I think there may be two reasons. The fi rst may be that the claimants won’t 
withdraw the judicial review proceedings just because they say we’ll take a 
fresh decision because if the underlying dispute is still there, there may not 
be much point to just withdrawing and then having to issue all over again 
and second the defendant may know that even if this set of proceedings gets 
withdrawn, if they take the same decision again, they’re just going to end up 
in the same place.’
Mediated outcomes also create certainty of outcome as expressed by a claimant 
solicitor: ‘If you go to court you never know what you’re going to end up with. At 
least here you know what you agree.’
Conclusions
The sense of empowerment arising from involvement in shaping and agreeing the 
outcome may be a positive experience, in contrast with the alienation that parties 
may feel when divorced from the process. This sense of empowerment can, in 
itself, be regarded as a form of positive outcome. Yet, despite acknowledgment by 
some lawyers of this positive aspect of mediation, an awareness of its potential, 
empowerment did not feature prominently in accounts of actual mediations. 
Lawyers also questioned the universal applicability of the empowerment claim 
and pointed out that, for example, in situations concerning a determination of 
the legality of a decision, participation may not be a priority for claimants. Some 
lawyers, including lawyer-mediators, also recounted a number of examples of 
circumstances in which participation in mediation was not a positive experience 
because the process was long-winded and gruelling for their clients.
It was also pointed out that it is not possible to generalise about the potential 
for empowerment of parties by either mediation or adjudication as this may 
depend on the parties and the case. In some cases, an adjudication by a High 
Court judge is evidently experienced as very empowering for successful claimants. 
Roundtable meetings may be more facilitative of participation by vulnerable 
or disabled claimants in some circumstances. Lawyers who are experienced in 
working with vulnerable clients are best placed to advise on the forum most 
suitable to meeting their clients’ needs both in terms of process and outcome. 
However, in order to provide informed advice, lawyers need to understand the 
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structure and practicalities of the various dispute resolution methods available, 
including mediation.
As an independent neutral third party, a mediator is in a good position to assist 
where parties are in general agreement about the course of action required to 
resolve a dispute but need help to hammer out the detail, as well as to reduce or 
obviate oppositional dynamics in more confl ictual situations. In terms of outcomes, 
mediation allows underlying issues in a dispute to be teased out and addressed in a 
way not possible in the court process or in bilateral negotiations. This can lead to 
effective resolution of longstanding disputes and avoid ongoing litigation. 
The ‘shuttle diplomacy’ method of caucusing in mediation is perceived as 
unwieldy and time-wasting by some lawyers, who prefer more direct face-to-face 
contact with the other party. In order to maximise the benefi ts of the process, it 
ought to be tailored to the nature of the dispute, the characteristics of the parties 
and the experience of the lawyers involved. 
While the potential attraction of the participatory aspect and the range of 
solutions of mediation are not in doubt, such benefi ts are not unique to mediation, 
as mediation enthusiasts sometimes claim, but may also be offered by other redress 
mechanisms. Overstating the claims for the benefi ts of mediation as a process 
may therefore fail to persuade lawyers who have experience of other processes 
that work successfully to empower clients and facilitate their participation as well 
as reach creative outcomes. Claiming a monopoly for mediation could tend to 
increase some lawyers’ resistance to exploring it as a useful option.
Introduction
As we have seen in previous chapters, the high level of settlements, lack of 
familiarity with the process of mediation and principled concerns over the use 
of mediation in judicial review cases combine to leave a narrow margin in which 
mediations are likely to occur. Yet the real-life mediations described to us in the 
course of the study, and which are presented in Section 8, show that mediation 
can make a signifi cant difference and have an important role to play in some cases, 
especially, for example, where details of complex arrangements for provision 
of services need to be negotiated. Courts may not be the best forum for such 
detailed negotiations. In the majority of mediations seen in the study, the claimants 
were vulnerable, for example, children with special educational needs and adults 
with complex community care needs. The practitioners who specialise in this 
kind of work, both with and without mediation experience, have presented as 
being protective of their clients and anxious to minimise any distress that could 
be caused to them en route to resolving their disputes with public authorities. 
They described giving careful consideration to the question of what would be 
the best and most appropriate process for their clients. Where mediation was 
felt to be the appropriate option, legal advisers chose their mediator with care 
so as to achieve the best possible match between the needs of their clients, the 
nature of the dispute, and the skills, expertise and personality of the mediator. 
The few lawyers who had signifi cant mediation experience would have a pool 
of mediators to choose from. Others who lacked experience told us that they 
would ask colleagues, where possible, for personal recommendations should they 
require a mediator.
A review of the literature on mediations generally suggests that commentators 
tend to characterise lawyers as resistant to referring cases to mediation. When 
they are involved in mediation together with their clients, their presence is 
regarded as unhelpful. There is no available literature on how these aspects 
manifest themselves in the specifi c context of public law disputes. In this section, 
we consider, therefore, the part that lawyers play in bringing about mediations, 
the role that they do, and could, play in the mediation itself, and how lawyers and 
mediators regard each other.
Section Six
Lawyers and mediators in public law 
mediations
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Solicitors as gatekeepers?
Some academic commentators as well as mediators have drawn attention to 
the critical importance of lawyers as gatekeepers in state-sanctioned mediation 
schemes. It is lawyers who are best placed to advise their clients about mediation 
and to encourage them to try it. Despite their initial reservations, lawyers are 
increasingly happy to accept mediation,1 a fi nding which has led some commentators 
to predict that a mediatory style is becoming co-opted as an everyday part of legal 
practice. But ‘intransigence’ by lawyers has been cited as a primary reason for the 
slow take-up of mediation in the United Kingdom.2 In the Central London County 
Court Mediation Pilot, the demand for mediation was lowest when both parties 
were legally represented.3
The use of terminology such as ‘gatekeepers’ and ‘intransigence’ is indicative 
of a view that lawyers are failing to recognise and utilise a good thing when 
they see it. 
It has been implied as well as explicitly stated by mediation providers and policy 
makers that the reasons behind lawyers’ lack of recourse to mediation include 
ignorance of the process, being wedded to an adversarial culture, and profi t 
motives. For example, a senior fi gure at the LSC4 thought that:
‘there is natural lawyer resistance – sometimes it is client resistance, but 
I mean lawyer resistance is the most likely explanation [for not using 
mediation]. It could be a mixture of the fi nancial attractiveness of pushing 
cases on to litigation, where they’ll obviously earn the most money, plus this 
more emotional desire to be in control of the process . . .’
The theme of profi t motives was also expressed by a non-lawyer 
mediator-interviewee:
‘Lawyers . . . tend to resist [mediation]; the measure of success of a law fi rm 
is the profi t per partner. It is a fi nancial measure, and mediation is not a way 
of earring a lot of money, so there is a real dilemma here. I did a mediation 
several years ago when a lawyer helped a party get a deal and avoid court. He 
was quite pale when his party signed the mediation agreement and he said: 
“I just kissed goodbye to £120,000 worth of fees.” . . . He had the grace or 
the ethics to encourage his party to do a deal that deprived him of £120,000. 
Now any lawyer that is measured by earnings, it must be quite a challenge, 
when mediation is proposed, to wholeheartedly support and advocate it. It 
is going to be easier to say it’s too early or inappropriate because you’ve 
got to keep your billing up. Now I can’t prove that. But psychologically 
there’s got to be something there; even if it is not in the front of the mind, 
it’s going to be in the back of the mind. That doesn’t apply to government 
departments of course.’
While we are not in a position to state categorically that profi t motives never 
feature in lawyers’ considerations as to the conduct of cases, we have not come 
1 S Roberts ‘Mediation in the lawyers’ embrace’ (1992) Modern Law Review 55(2):258–264)
2 M Nesic, ‘Mediation on the rise in the UK?’, http://www.adr.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/updocs/client0/
Nesic.doc (last accessed 12.05.09),.
3 H Genn (1998) The Central County Court Pilot Mediation Scheme Evaluation Report, Research Papers
No 5/98, LCD.
4 Interviewed in the course of this project.
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across any direct evidence to support this view. Indeed, settlements reached through 
direct negotiations that are, as we know, prevalent in judicial review litigation, 
give rise to even fewer profi t opportunities than mediation. Moreover, in-house 
defendant solicitors cannot be suspected of putting profi t above common sense 
and they appear no keener to engage in mediation than are claimant solicitors.
Solicitors can be said to be ‘gatekeepers’ in the sense of infl uencing the choice 
of redress mechanism through advising their clients on the processes available to 
them in seeking to resolve a dispute. It was clear from interviews that lawyers do 
not necessarily engage in a comprehensive discussion with clients in every case 
about all the potential remedies in existence, but limit the advice to the remedies 
that they consider relevant in the circumstances. Expertise and experience mean 
being able to eliminate the irrelevant and concentrate on the best route to achieving 
what the client wants or needs, as explained by a solicitor/mediator:
‘To be honest, now I don’t really go through a process in my mind as to 
whether a judicial review is appropriate, I will know pretty much instantly, as 
will my colleagues, what’s the route.’
In reply to the question: ‘What factors infl uence your decision to start the 
judicial review process as opposed to following another course of action?’ one 
expert public law solicitor said:
‘Essentially it is outcome determined . . . It’s what is most likely to produce 
what the client wants . . . I suppose [the decision] has to do with three things, 
First of all that there is a legal issue to be resolved which the judicial review 
process is better suited to sort out as opposed to, say, an evidential dispute. 
Second, that one of the available judicial review remedies is likely to change 
something in terms of the decision making of the public authority involved, as 
opposed to just being an empty remedy. The third thing is if there is nothing 
better that is likely to be more effective. If, for example, there is a diffi cult 
set of messy facts, the better way forward may be some sort of complaint 
procedure or something where there can be some defi nitive view reached 
on precisely what this person’s needs are, something that an administrative 
court judge would instinctively shy away from – that is a strong signpost in 
another direction.
However, although the practitioners who were interviewed for the Dynamics of 
Judicial Review study were routinely considering a range of mechanisms for resolving 
public law disputes and were experienced in negotiating with the opposing side, 
the majority of interviewees, 83 per cent, had no mediation experience. It must 
follow that ignorance of mediation on the part of lawyers means that mediation is 
not an option that readily springs to mind whenever a lawyer is dealing with a new 
case. Yet there was little indication of active resistance to mediation. For example, 
we have come across only one case of a mediation offer being rejected. In that 
case the defendants rejected a suggestion of mediation made by the claimants. The 
barrister representing the defendants, himself a trained mediator, explained that 
the rejection of mediation was made on the basis of his conviction that the claim 
had little merit, and he believed that the mediation proposal by the claimants was 
made for invalid tactical reasons.
Although only a small proportion of public law practitioners interviewed in 
the course of the Dynamics of Judicial Review study had a clear understanding 
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or experience of mediation, only a few suggested, without being prompted, 
that a better understanding might lead them to consider the use of mediation 
in appropriate cases. The majority provided other articulated reasons as to why 
mediation would be impossible, inappropriate or unnecessary. This suggests 
that other factors, apart from lack of experience, are at play in lawyers’ lack of 
recourse to mediation in the public law fi eld, as articulated in Section 4. In any 
event, ignorance alone does not explain the rarity of mediations in this context. 
This is evident from the small number of public law mediations among even the 
best-informed and most positive of our interviewees.
The role of solicitors in mediation as they see it
Lawyers and mediators held a variety of opinions about different aspects of 
mediation, for example, what type of case is suitable for mediating; whether legal 
questions and issues of legal rights should inform mediations; whether mediators 
need to understand the legal issues involved; and even what constitutes a successful 
mediation. But, with the exception of two interviewees acting for defendant local 
authorities, all our interviewees were of the view that lawyers need to be present 
at mediations involving public law disputes
This is not a self-evident position in mediation generally. Some commentators 
argue that lawyers are a hindrance because they cannot help introducing an 
adversarial element into an otherwise collaborative process5 and tend to insist 
on a legal solution at the expense of the client’s ‘real’ needs.6 Research on 
mandatory mediation schemes in North America suggested that it is unrealistic 
to expect lawyers trained in the art of the adversarial encounter to embrace an 
ADR philosophy.7 Although not the focus of our research, this view has not been 
expressed by our interviewees except in passing by one mediator who then went 
on to qualify it by saying that ‘as lawyers are getting more experienced in mediation 
they understand that it’s a different role and lots of them will take the back seat, 
be a supporter, give advice when needed and let the client take the lead’.
Solicitors are also seen by mediators as capable of assisting in reality testing, 
helping clients explore and negotiate their problems and supporting the clients 
5 L Mulcahy, ‘Can leopards change their spots? An evaluation of the role of lawyers in medical negligence 
mediation’ (2001) International Journal of the Legal Profession 8(3):203–224.
6 C Cunningham, ‘The lawyer as translator, representation as text: towards an ethnography of legal 
discourse (1992) Cornell Law Review 77(6):1298–1387.
7 The perception that ‘good’ lawyers are adversarial, apolitical and competitive tends to be perpetuated 
during the academic stages of training in which the Socratic method is still widely used and even the 
most impressive of clinical programmes tend to encourage students to concentrate on specifi c events 
and moments in time and to rely on linear modes of reasoning. Numerous critics have argued that 
the traditional law school curriculum inappropriately privileges an adversarial approach to disputes and 
pays undue attention to the case-based method and masculine ideals at the expense of more holistic or 
contextualised understandings of grievances favoured by mediators and feminists: D Bok, ‘A fl awed system 
of law practice and training’ (1983) Journal of Legal Education 3:70; S Carr-Gregg, ‘Alternative dispute 
resolution in practical legal training – too little too late?’ (1997) Journal of Legal Education 10(1):23–41;
A Hunt (1992) ‘Critique and law: legal education and practice’, in The Critical Lawyers’ Handbook, I Grigg-
Spall and P Ireland (eds), Pluto Press. In this way, legal training imbues graduates with an inappropriate 
fi delity to individualism, formal legality and abstract reasoning: D Kennedy, ‘Legal education as training for 
hierarchy’, in Grigg-Spall and Ireland (eds); R Abel and P Lewis (1995) ‘Introduction’ in Lawyers in Society: 
An overview, R Abel and P Lewis (eds), University of California Press.
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in the process.8 They are also instrumental in contributing to the discovery of 
mutually preferential outcomes while ensuring that any agreed resolution refl ects 
the applicable legal norm.9 The prevalence of out-of-court settlements in judicial 
review could indicate that lawyers enjoy some success in achieving these goals.
Solicitors and barristers acting for claimants in publicly funded cases in our study 
considered that their presence at mediations was clearly necessary because of the 
innate power imbalance between the parties. They saw their role at mediation as 
ensuring that their clients’ legal rights were protected, as well as supporting and 
reassuring their clients in the process of reaching the best resolution for them.
‘I think most people, when they have got to the stage of instructing a lawyer, 
feel the need for assistance and advice on reaching any kind of settlement
. . . And there remains the issue of power imbalance. If they feel they are 
being pressurised by a mediator . . . [they are] more likely to say ‘No’ than 
perhaps accept something that is being proposed for the right reasons. I 
think that a client needs to be confi dent that what they are agreeing to . . . 
is the best that they can achieve, and also that it is actually enforceable if it 
is not going to be adhered to. And if a client was in a mediation process just 
by themselves, it would be really diffi cult . . . the client can’t be expected 
to reach a decision on matters resolving a legal dispute, or explain their 
position, without the assistance of a lawyer, when the reason you are in 
mediation in the fi rst place is because there is a legal dispute.’
These concerns are heightened when solicitors represent vulnerable clients, for 
example, in community care, mental health and education law cases, as expressed 
by a solicitor specialising in community care law:
‘To expect my clients to engage in any sort of process, whether it’s the 
complaints process or ombudsman, mediation or litigation, without proper 
skilled representation, we’d be placing them in a completely unacceptable 
position.’
But, while being protective, claimant solicitors also recognised that assisting 
their clients to obtain the best resolution did not necessarily mean that they would 
get everything they wanted. Given that successful judicial review adjudications 
often conclude with no more than a fresh decision being taken, and given that 
defendants are unlikely to offer more than they have to in order to resolve a 
dispute, claimant solicitors can make an important contribution to the success of 
the mediation process by providing a reality check for their clients. An education 
law solicitor who is also a trained mediator described his legal role as follows:
‘I’d be absolutely clear at the outset . . . not only [about] what we’re trying 
to achieve but what’s possible, what we’re entitled to, what we’re not 
entitled to strictly speaking . . . So, for example, invariably in public law 
proceedings, in education matters, what you will get is something quashed 
and then a remittance back for reconsideration. But that doesn’t mean the 
reconsideration will give you the ultimate outcome that you want, all you’ll 
get is another bite of the cherry, maybe. So if we know that, if we’re going 
to get more than another bite of the cherry, that’s a signifi cant win for the 
8 W F Felstiner , R L Abel and A Sarat, ‘The emergence and transformation of disputes: naming, blaming, 
claiming” (1980–81) Law & Society Review 15(3/4):646.
9 R H Mnookin and L Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the shadow of the law: the case of divorce’ (1979) Yale Law 
Journal 88:986.
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client. So they need to know that, even though it might not be everything 
that they would want . . . it’s my job to put [everything] into the balance for 
the client . . . It’s reality testing, reminding them what they want, pointing out 
to them what they’re not going to get, what it would be unhelpful for them 
to do as well as the wins that they’re getting.’
A barrister specialising in prison cases summarised her role similarly:
‘My role would be in protecting my client’s interest. I would also make sure 
that we don’t get in the way of coming to a settlement, in the sense that we 
don’t set goals so high that we’ll not attain them so our mediation failed.’
The exception to the view that lawyers are indispensable at mediations was 
expressed by two lawyers representing defendant local authorities, one a solicitor 
in private practice and the other an in-house lawyer. Their clients are themselves 
experts in their fi eld, understand the issues involved and would be expected to 
be able to negotiate settlements by themselves. The solicitor in private practice, 
who had no mediation experience, and who thought that mediation had little to 
offer in his fi eld, said:
‘Because I have informed clients, I would set it up for them and not go. It 
depends on what they want. I would see what they want to discuss. I would 
see them afterwards.’
The in-house lawyer, who had a more positive attitude towards, but little 
experience of, public law mediation said:
‘It would depend on the type of case . . . [In the ‘A troubled teenager’ case]10 
I didn’t think that there was going to be anything added by my presence, 
because actually it was a trained facilitator – and [the parties] needed to sort 
things out themselves . . .’
All the other interviewees who represented defendants, however, were 
of the view that they had an important role to play in mediation, though it is 
not surprising that they saw their role differently from their counterparts who 
represent claimants. The claimant representatives, for example, were concerned 
with the issue of power imbalance and vulnerability of their clients, which was not 
an issue for defendant representatives. A barrister, who is also a trained mediator, 
with experience of representing mostly public bodies in complex cases, explained 
her role as counsel for defendants in mediation as follows:
‘You have to be very careful that you don’t say things that go beyond your 
client’s instructions because it’s quite easy to get carried away in a mediation 
in discussions of this, that and the other. I think your role can vary; you can 
end up taking the lead in discussions or you can take a very backseat role. 
Often . . . letting the respective clients talk can work quite well. Where I’m 
acting for a local authority or a health trust, if you’ve got a very good client 
who explains in a way that in court you never get from a client what their 
perspective is and why, you can sometimes see a shift . . . in the perception of 
the lawyers on the other side, where they realise, “Well, they have actually 
got a point.” So sometimes you’ll say very little in a mediation as counsel 
other than when you’re in your own private session. Sometimes you’ll say a 
lot, it varies enormously.’
10 See Section 8.
Section Six: Lawyers and mediators in public law mediations
53
Another barrister, also a trained mediator, agreed that different types of dispute, 
as well as different parties, call for different input from lawyers, and distinguished 
between everyday type disputes, involving individuals on both sides, and those 
involving complex legal issues:
‘I think it’s a big mistake not to have lawyers there . . . There are some 
[cases], neighbour disputes, family disputes, maybe. But anything that’s more 
commercial, rights-based, people just won’t have the confi dence to do 
without their lawyers there – they need their lawyers to hold their hands 
and advise them, and particularly so in judicial review, where often one will 
have to be very careful to ensure that the parties are not doing anything 
unlawful or inappropriate. So I think they defi nitely need lawyers there. I 
think it will depend on the nature of the dispute whether it’s useful to have 
barristers and/or solicitors there.’
Yet lawyers can be a hindrance if they are unable to leave behind their adversarial 
style, as pointed out by the same barrister/mediator:
‘There’s a perception [by solicitors] that barristers are less helpful to 
mediations than solicitors, sometimes justifi ed, because some barristers are 
too used to being confrontational, and adopting a rights-based approach, 
to be able to contribute helpfully to the mediation; some are just sort of 
steeped in a highly adversarial style of negotiation . . . [though] I’ve come 
across other barristers who’ve been immensely helpful and sensible.’
A barrister who had been involved in several complex public law mediations 
found that undertaking mediation training with one of the major providers had 
made a big difference to her approach and to her effectiveness as counsel in 
that setting:
‘I wouldn’t be pro-mediation in the same way as I am if I hadn’t done that 
[training] and seen the way it works. I think it enormously helps me when 
I’m at mediation and knowing what’s going on and deciding in my client’s 
interests, what to do next in order to broker an agreement, so I found 
it valuable.’
The response of a barrister who represented largely, but not exclusively, 
defendants to the issue of lawyers’ participation captures the difference between 
the two sides’ perspectives. He started out by describing a limited role in mediation 
for lawyers:
‘I tend to think that the lawyers are actually less important than the clients, 
until you get to drafting the settlement. That’s because . . . they probably 
look at it more through the legal prism, whereas actually the mediator wants 
to get rid of that mindset, and focus on the interests – and the interests are 
best refl ected through the clients . . . I’m not convinced there’s that much of 
a meaningful role, other than to be there to give advice to your clients, and 
to look at issues such as vires, and to provide . . . I suppose, a validity to the 
exercise.’
But recognising that his view sprang from a defendant’s perspective that did 
not refl ect the experience of a claimant participating in mediation, this interviewee 
went on to add:
‘probably, [in order] to create a situation where the mediation is fair and 
balanced, you need lawyers there, and I suppose that’s more important if 
you are in a situation where otherwise there is a power imbalance, because 
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you’ve got a sophisticated client for the defendant, and a kind of one-case 
client for the claimant.’
There would seem to be strong support for the involvement of lawyers in 
mediation, but it could be argued that this is a predictable result given that our 
sample drew largely on lawyers, albeit many of whom were also trained mediators. 
We will now consider mediators’ views about the role of the lawyer.
The role of solicitors as mediators see it 
In Twisting Arms, Genn reported that in nearly three-quarters of settled cases in 
the County Court pilot scheme11 the mediators attributed part of the success to 
contributions made by the legal representatives and commented favourably on 
their approach to settlement. Signifi cantly, mediators in this study who had been 
involved in public law mediations also considered solicitors to be an integral part 
of the process. One non-lawyer mediator stressed the role of lawyers in helping 
to frame realistic expectations and their involvement in drawing up the settlement 
agreements, as being of considerable benefi t. In their view:
‘Lawyers’ presence at mediation is important, not because I am not a lawyer 
but because I think it is important that the parties have their legal advisors 
there and I think it’s important that the legal advisors be the ones to draw 
up the settlement agreement. I do think it’s tough for lawyers to take a back 
seat in mediation because they are used to being the problem solvers and the 
advisors. But I think now lawyers are getting more and more experienced 
in mediation, they understand that it’s a different role and lots of them will 
take the back seat, be a supporter, give advice when needed and let the client 
take the lead.’
Interestingly, the issue of power imbalance was not identifi ed by the above 
mediator as being problematic, but a mediator who is also a QC explained the 
diffi culty for the mediator in the absence of a claimant’s lawyer:
‘It is diffi cult if you have an unrepresented individual against . . . an authority 
that is represented or has the expertise to represent themselves. It is then 
diffi cult for the mediator to maintain the same even-handed approach. A 
judge would do that overtly, he would say quite openly: ‘I am going to try 
and think of the best way Mr Snook could put his case,’ and that’s perfectly 
acceptable . . . It is more of a diffi culty for the mediator . . . if the individual 
isn’t advised and doesn’t know what a sensible settlement is. It is diffi cult for 
the mediator not to get drawn into giving advice in that situation . . . The 
lawyers need to be present, but [even] being in the wings might be better 
than nothing.’12
One solicitor who was also an experienced mediator, but with no judicial review 
mediation experience, distinguished between mediations that involve questions of 
law, and those that do not, commenting generally that lawyers are only needed in 
the former type of case, which would effectively include any judicial review:
‘Sometimes lawyers get in the way; sometimes lawyers assist. And that 
depends on the nature of the dispute, and also on the rules. In terms of the 
11 H Genn, Twisting Arms: Court-referred and court-linked mediation under judicial pressure (2007) Ministry of 
Justice Research Series 1/07, May.
12 The same interviewee went on to say that the fact that a litigant is unrepresented should not, in itself, be 
a bar to mediation, as a similar power imbalance would be manifest in court too.
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nature of the dispute, if there’s no real issue of law, and it’s just a case of 
resolving this dispute . . . you don’t need lawyers on that. If there are enough 
hard-edged issues, you’re going to need lawyers, unless you’ve got a mediator 
who’s got the specialist knowledge to be able to resolve those informally.’
A mediator who had worked with a number of experienced lawyers in public 
law mediations and who was clearly comfortable with the presence of lawyers, 
said this of his interaction with them:
‘I think it’s essential to have good legal advice, and experienced mediation 
advisers, legal advisers at mediations. I will look a team in the eye and say, 
‘How many times out of ten is that going to work in front of a judge? What 
are the risks that that’s not going to work? Will that fail – that argument?’ 
But what I will not do is to say, ‘I think that argument will fail, I think that’s 
a bum argument, and . . . although that might lie under my words . . . that’s 
the line for me.’
What are lawyers looking for in a mediator?
Lawyers in our sample were asked in the course of interviews to name characteristics 
such as particular skills or legal knowledge that they would look for or do look for 
when selecting a mediator, and why. A key theme to emerge is that the majority 
of lawyers would prefer to work with a mediator who is an expert in the fi eld. 
The majority of specialist public law lawyers argued that in a number of public 
law disputes they would seek to engage a mediator who was either a lawyer, or 
who had a clear understanding of the legal issues in the area of dispute. Although 
public law expertise was not the only skill sought in a mediator, an understanding 
of the legal and practical framework of the dispute was considered necessary for 
a variety of reasons. They also mentioned that the primary characteristics they 
looked for were excellent mediation skills and authority.
A solicitor who said that a mediator in judicial review disputes need not be a 
lawyer, did so on the basis that, by defi nition, mediation is not about legal issues:
‘I don’t think that they need to be lawyers. Almost by defi nition, if they are 
heavily legalistic and there’s a dispute about the meaning of the law, I don’t 
think that’s a case for mediation. In a lot of cases, nobody really cares about 
the law. In a lot of cases it’s about whether or not you get for your clients 
what they’re concerned about. In those cases you say, can we start from the 
other end and agree how to do things without the other side losing face etc. 
If there is an argument about the meaning of the provision, there is just no 
point in trying to mediate it.’
This view was echoed in that expressed by a mediator, who felt that understanding 
of the legal issues was important, but that mediation itself is not focused on what 
might or might not be achieved in court. He said:
‘It’s useful for me to get a hang of . . . both the legal and personal parameters 
. . . I do need to have a sense of where the issues lie, so that I can see where 
the risks lie, and help people to acknowledge to themselves, and occasionally 
to each other, where the risks actually are . . . [W]hat we do is to spend no 
time . . . at all about whether someone is going to get an order or not . . . 
we spend all our time [in mediation on], [w]hat is going to happen to this 
person, and this authority, tomorrow? And we are often completely freed 
from the merits of the litigation when we’re having this discussion.’
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Why did the majority of public law practitioners prefer a mediator with public 
law knowledge? Although an understanding of public law was not the only skill 
sought in a mediator, an understanding of the legal and practical framework of the 
dispute was considered necessary for a variety of reasons. 
One solicitor without direct mediation experience stated that specialist legal 
knowledge, whilst not a pre-condition in a mediator, would be desirable in order 
to ensure realistically practical outcomes:
‘I think that it would be diffi cult for [mediators] to identify what they are 
providing as an alternative to the legal process if they don’t understand what 
the legal process itself is capable of achieving or what the argument was 
about that put people into the mediation room in the fi rst place. Sometimes 
you get situations where the local authority says we can’t do what you ask 
for these reasons, and if the mediator does not know anything about the 
legal framework that is in place, so how do they get to the bottom of that? 
It’s just going to be totally artifi cial, I think. Put it another way – it is diffi cult 
to broker a practical solution if you don’t have any understanding of what, 
practically, the authority in question can do.’
A similar view was expressed by a barrister/mediator. While stating that it was 
not intrinsically imperative for a mediator to be an expert in the fi eld in which they 
were mediating, he went on to say:
‘But you do need to understand what the parties are talking about both factually 
and potentially legally . . . particularly if it is complicated. For example, if you 
were trying to mediate a community care case and you didn’t have a working 
understanding of what kind of duties local authorities, local social services had 
towards people with disabilities, you would be in the dark about it.’
Another barrister/mediator, who mostly represented defendants, thought 
that detailed understanding of a specifi c area of dispute is necessary, even if the 
mediator is not a lawyer or public law specialist per se. For many interviewees, 
like this one, the emphasis was on the mediator having a deep understanding of 
the subject area of the dispute – for example, education or community care – and 
the culture and roles within that area. Such an understanding is a powerful tool 
enabling the mediator to challenge parties with authority and encourage them to 
think creatively about solutions:
‘It depends on the nature of the dispute obviously. I would be particularly 
interested in someone who knew the subject matter rather than being 
familiar with public law. They come together in a sense. If I was doing a 
dispute in education, I would want someone who knows about education, 
because what I would want from a mediator is someone who can come up 
with a creative solution as we are not talking about money here. Therefore, 
someone who is familiar with the general fi eld. It doesn’t have to be a lawyer, 
it could be maybe an ex-chief education offi cer who could say “Why don’t 
you think about this or that?”, so someone who has authority and knowledge, 
who understands the culture of the dispute.’
Just as important is an understanding of the limits on the exercise of power on 
the part of public bodies. Although defendants themselves, as well as their lawyers, 
would be expected to be aware of the extent of their powers, practitioners see it 
as an advantage to have a mediator who is also aware of vires issues. This was seen 
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as essential for engaging in reality testing, as explained by a barrister/mediator 
who is a housing law specialist:
‘Personally, I do not subscribe to the CEDR view that any mediator could 
mediate any type of dispute . . . a lot of legal disputes, as opposed to 
commercial disputes, require a mediator who has a solid grounding in that 
area of law . . . it’s not a normal commercial decision-making situation, where 
I weigh up the pros and cons on a commercial basis and come to a deal, 
making an offer, and I know my bottom line . . . In . . . public law, quite 
often we’re dealing [not only] with…issues of fact, but also [with issues of] 
discharge of legal obligations by local and central government, who are . . . 
managing a social safety net . . . or managing the public purse, or managing 
the public assets, and there’s a statutory scheme which tells them what they 
can and cannot do, and a grey area in between as to how they might do 
it, depending on the individual factual circumstances. Now, obviously, they 
can’t really go beyond what their powers are, and they can’t do something 
which is probably outside of their powers. So, again, you need a mediator 
who is going to be able to say, would that be ultra vires? . . . Can we do this? 
Because, at the end of the day . . . it’s pointless doing a deal that’s not going 
to go through to fruition.’
The vires point was echoed by another barrister/mediator:
‘I suppose I would probably look for [a mediator with] some grounding in 
public law . . . because you would need to appreciate the constraints in 
terms of what could be achieved in judicial review, and also the constraints 
in terms of needing to make a decision that’s appropriate to the legal basis 
of the defendant, and also that it is then accounted for in a realistic way by 
the defendant.’
Asking the right questions does not necessarily presuppose legal experience, 
but a mediator’s familiarity with the area of law relevant to the dispute and its 
related terminology inspired more confi dence in some practitioners and was seen 
by them as helpful in shortening the mediation process.
A barrister and mediator, who often represents defendants in judicial review 
actions and who has extensive experience of public law mediations, explained how 
legal expertise can make a difference, despite holding that generally, the skills and 
experience of the mediator are the most important factors:
‘There are some cases where a degree of knowledge and experience in the 
area of law would be helpful, so I think that is a factor. Some of the cases 
which I have had that have involved quite complicated issues about health 
care provision and funding disputes, it seems to me that it would be helpful 
to have a mediator who’s got some knowledge of that, not that you’re 
expecting them to tell you what the answer is because that’s not their role, 
that’s your role and ultimately the judge’s role. But . . . familiarity with the 
terminology and the jargon, acronyms and concepts involved and why the 
different parties might have their respective positions . . . would just shorten 
the process. It means the mediator doesn’t have to ask for explanations of 
things to the same extent. So that’s sometimes helpful but less signifi cant than 
experience as a mediator . . . Most of the mediators I have had are lawyers, 
although some don’t practice as lawyers. They are full-time mediators.’
Mediators’ specialist legal knowledge was also seen as helpful in moving along 
complex legal issues. Despite being told during mediation training that a skilled 
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mediator could mediate anything, a solicitor specialising in education law carefully 
chose a QC/mediator to mediate in a complex education law dispute because he 
thought that engaging a mediator who was familiar with the relevant area of law 
‘gave a signifi cant advantage to both parties’ in a case that involved a novel point 
of law. Such an expert, he explained:
‘would be in a position . . . not to advise on the law, but to give [his] views as 
to what the law is, [which] would move things on. And it did do that . . . After 
day one, the [defendants] agreed that they could do a user independent trust 
and they began to think about the terms of it. So in my view it worked, even 
though in the end nothing came of it . . .’
Some practitioners also took the view that understanding public law is not 
purely about legal expertise; it also involves awareness of the social context of 
disputes. They thought that that mediators needed to have a wider grasp of the 
social realities of disputes involving vulnerable and disadvantaged claimants. 
‘I would want to have a mediator who has public law experience from 
[the] claimants’ side . . . I wouldn’t trust a mediator who hadn’t dealt with 
disadvantaged people. Although I do assume that mediators’ skills are 
transferable skills, I would prefer to have someone who understands how crap 
public bodies can be . . . I would hope that a good mediator wouldn’t need to 
have a particular expertise, but these cases are about peoples’ lives and human 
rights, and I would prefer someone who understands public law, who knows 
what the defendants should be doing. I know that it isn’t their role to decide 
on this, but this knowledge would make them aware of the context.’
A public law practitioner specialising in community care law, with extensive 
experience of setting up mediations in publicly funded disputes, said the following 
about how she chooses a mediator:
‘It depends completely on the case and the clients. In some cases I have used 
solicitor or barrister mediators. In some cases I have decided that actually it’s 
more appropriate to have a mediator who’s got no legal training. For example, 
one case [about nursing care] was dealt with by a non-lawyer mediator. He 
had a background in church, faith mediation, so where there was a dispute 
between particular faith groups, he’s skilled at dealing with that . . . So I think 
it really depends because personalities are so important; there are some 
mediators who I could see would be completely unsuitable for matching with 
particular personalities, with the parties in a particular case . . .
In some cases I think [legal knowledge is important], particularly when 
you need some reality testing. So there you have a sort of element of neutral 
evaluation. It’s not a formal early neutral evaluation . . . those skills should be 
part of the mediator’s skills in any event. Because the whole point is about 
looking at what is the real dispute between the parties, however it’s described 
in the legal documents. What do the parties want to get out of this?’
It could also be argued that a mediator who is not a lawyer has the advantage 
of not being tempted into giving legal advice, which goes beyond the remit of 
a mediator. Furthermore, mediators are trained to engage all participants; at a 
mediation where lay parties are attending, a mediator’s ability to stand back from the 
practitioners and ask for explanations, for terminology and concepts to be clarifi ed, 
can encourage the participation of parties. As discussed in Section 5 on the added 
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value of mediation, this aspect of participation is one feature that distinguishes 
mediation processes (and roundtables) from adjudication in judicial review.
Conclusion
The fact that mediations of judicial review disputes are rare is well established. 
However, the assertion by some mediators and policy makers that lawyers resist 
mediation because of profi t considerations, implying that they would choose to 
litigate unnecessarily rather than mediate, so as to maximise profi ts, has not been 
borne out by the evidence in this study. Although it could be argued that lawyers 
would be unlikely to disclose such motives to interviewers, we found that all the 
practitioners who participated in this study regularly engaged in settlement activity, 
which would undoubtedly generate less profi t than would mediation of the same 
cases. Further, in public law litigation, such an attribution about profi t motives 
would have to be levelled mainly at claimant solicitors, as defendant solicitors are 
often salaried, working for local authorities or central government. Yet we did not 
fi nd that defendant solicitors had more mediation experience than did claimant 
solicitors, nor were they more active in suggesting mediations. Accordingly, any 
gatekeeping that takes place would appear to do so for other reasons. 
It is clearly the case, however, that lawyers have a determining role in advising 
clients on the choice of redress mechanism and also in choosing a mediator. Once 
mediation is embarked upon, claimant solicitors in particular were near-unanimous 
in holding that they needed to be present and involved in the process.
Lawyers who act for vulnerable claimants were in no doubt that their 
presence at the mediation, together with their clients, was necessary, indeed 
essential. They saw their role as providing support in terms of ensuring that their 
clients’ rights and interests were protected, as well as providing reassurance 
when needed. Yet, while stressing their role in protecting their clients, they 
also understood that the process was not about ‘fi ghting’ for everything the 
client wanted. They were aware of the limitations of what clients could achieve 
through court proceedings and were anxious not to jeopardise the possibility of 
settlement by resisting any compromise. 
Likewise, they expected their mediators to understand the legal framework 
of the relevant disputes. Public law practitioners who had mediation experience 
expressed a strong preference for mediators who were either legally qualifi ed, 
or who had a working understanding of public law principles and the framework 
of duties and powers within which public bodies operate. This was not because 
lawyers expected mediators to provide legal advice. Lawyers, naturally, considered 
this to be their job. The reasons given for the clear preference for legally informed 
mediators were: that the mediator’s grasp of relevant terminology and concepts 
saved time and unnecessary frustration; that legal knowledge helped the mediator 
to understand the parties’ respective positions and enabled the mediator to move 
along complex issues and to challenge the parties where necessary; that it ensured 
realistically practical outcomes; and that legal knowledge was essential where 
novel points were being considered. Lawyers did also stress, however, that legal 
understanding was not the only required skill, and that excellent mediation skills 
and authority were essential.

Introduction
The claims that are made about the benefi ts of mediation as compared with the 
court process are typically expressed in the following terms.1
• It is low cost and speedy in comparison with litigation.
• It is fl exible and allows the parties to have, or regain, control over the 
dispute and its outcome.
• It offers remedies and relationship outcomes not available from 
adversarial processes.
In Section 5 we examined the claims made for the added value that mediation 
offers in terms of better, more fl exible processes (i.e. processes that empower 
the clients and engage them directly in the resolution of the dispute) and better 
outcomes (i.e. those that are holistic and provide practical remedies for the 
client). We queried whether these positive elements claimed for mediation are 
demonstrable in the specifi c context of judicial review disputes, as well as whether 
they are exclusive to the mediation process. Do they offer added value over and 
above what can be achieved by way of other forms of settlement such as skilful 
negotiation between solicitors, including roundtable meetings? 
In this section we also examine the claims regarding cost and speed in light of 
the available evidence. 
How quick is mediation?
We obtained little concrete data from our interviews on the speed of mediation. 
In none of the 15 judicial review mediations identifi ed by the study was speed 
mentioned as even one of the motivating factors, nor was it evident that mediation 
saved any time compared with litigation. Mediation meetings appeared to last no 
more than a day, although some took longer. Factors that infl uenced the speed 
of mediation, however, included the need to identify and agree on a mediator, to 
Section Seven
‘Cheaper, quicker, better’ 
– the claimed benefi ts of mediation 
explained
1 See CEDR (2003) ADR for Public Authorities: A guide for managers. https://www.nationalmediationhelpline.
com/what-is-mediation.php; http://www.ladr.co.uk/advant.html; http://www.mediate.co.uk/benefi ts_risks/
index.html (all last accessed 07.05.09) etc.
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obtain prior authority from the LSC where the client was publicly funded, and to 
secure a date and venue convenient to all parties.
One of the obstacles to speedy mediation in judicial review, which could 
undermine its potential for time saving, is that there is no system in place to 
assist public law practitioners who may be interested in setting up mediation, but 
who are unfamiliar with the resources available. This was the experience of one 
claimant solicitor who attempted to set up a mediation following a suggestion to 
that effect made by a judge:
‘I had this idea that mediation would be quick and wonderful, but it has taken 
so long. First we had to agree a mediator. I contacted CEDR as they were the 
only people I knew about and asked for CVs of suitable mediators. I looked 
for a profi le of someone compassionate with knowledge of special educational 
needs. I dismissed CVs of those with pure commercial background. This 
took time. Then we had to coordinate dates. I sent [the council] possible 
dates. They took so long to respond that new dates had to be considered. 
I needed to fi nd out about location and cost of premises for the mediation 
to take place. I also wrote to the LSC, who said that there was no need to 
amend the certifi cate. After all that, [the council] said that there is already a 
mediation scheme in place for Special Educational Needs which the council 
are paying into, so it would be free for us and help keep down costs. Finally, 
as I was trying to sort out dates yet again, [the council] sent a letter saying 
that the situation has now moved on and should be resolved through the 
council’s complaints procedure . . . it has all taken too long.’
How does the speed of mediation compare to the speed of 
judicial review?
It is very diffi cult to compare the speed of resolution of cases that are mediated 
with cases that are settled somewhere along the line in a judicial review claim, or 
even with cases that reach fi nal hearing. The small number of mediated judicial 
review cases and the multitude and complexity of case-specifi c factors make it 
nearly impossible to make a like-for-like comparison.
The Administrative Court offi ce can produce calculations showing the average 
periods taken from the time a claim is issued until the consideration of permission 
and from time of issue until substantive decision date. So, for example, in the 
period August 2005 until July 2006, it took on average 9 weeks for a claim to reach 
a permission decision on paper, 10.8 weeks to reach oral hearing of permission, 
and 31.9 weeks till substantive decision date. In the period August 2007 until July 
2008, the average waiting periods had increased to 13.4 weeks, 18.5 weeks and 
57.6 weeks respectively.2
Without knowing more about the timescales involved in the mediated cases, 
however, it is diffi cult to draw a comparison. Despite periodic concerns over 
delays in the Administrative Court, judicial review is generally regarded as a simple 
and speedy remedy, and it may be diffi cult to identify the circumstances in which 
mediation could offer speedier resolution than litigation.
2 Data provided by the Administrative Court in an email on 08.09.08.
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Certainly, in disputes that require urgent interim relief, mediation is unlikely 
to be relevant. One of the most frequently cited reasons for the unsuitability of 
mediation was in relation to urgent cases needing immediate resolution.
A claimant solicitor specialising in education law, who was a trained mediator, 
considered that mediation took too long to be of any help in urgent cases:
‘We’re about to issue proceedings in a case we got in yesterday, which is 
about where a child goes to school in September, next week, because the 
school is acting unlawfully. Now if they said let’s mediate, he still wouldn’t 
be in school in three months’ time by the time we’d got everything together, 
found the mediator, applied for funding from the LSC, found a date that’s 
convenient. And so the disadvantage to him . . . the disabled child, would 
be signifi cant.’
In addition, even in cases not requiring urgent relief, the question of what 
advantage mediation might have to offer in terms of speed compared with 
litigation cannot be considered in isolation from the issue of its timing within 
the judicial review process. The windows of opportunity for mediation early on 
in a judicial review are limited. A barrister and trained mediator described the 
problem as follows: 
‘The problem with the process is that after issue, pre-permission, there’s a 
very short window there – you have to set up summary grounds . . . there’ll 
be negotiations and there’ll be internal reality testing by the defendant, which 
could lead to settlement, but I can’t see it’s realistic to actually undertake 
a structured mediation in that process, so I think it’s once you’ve got the 
claim up . . .’
Although in theory the earlier the mediation takes place, the greater the 
potential for time saving, the ‘realpolitik’ of public law disputes appears to dictate 
a more likely role for mediation later on in the process, rather than at the very 
start of it. Mediation may, for example, offer a potential for time saving between 
permission grant and substantive hearing, especially when the pressures on the 
court list mean that cases are waiting many months to reach fi nal hearing. In 
these circumstances mediation could enable parties to have more control over 
the speed with which the matter is concluded.
Even post-hearing, mediation could arguably save time. If it deals successfully 
with complex matters that cannot be adequately resolved via the limited remedies 
available in judicial review, mediation may thereby enable the parties to avoid the 
need for future litigation. Publicly funded claimants, however, are unlikely to retain 
funding after a case has been successfully resolved. Moreover, the defendants 
would have to be convinced of the benefi t of spending time and money at that 
stage in the hope of savings in the future – not an insignifi cant challenge.
Who knows how much mediation costs?
It is diffi cult to say how much mediations cost, let alone compare that with the 
cost of judicial review litigation in particular cases. We considered the publicly 
available information on mediation providers’ websites on the basis that this is a 
likely starting point for solicitors wishing to inform themselves of the costs involved 
prior to embarking upon the process. But the information is varied and potentially 
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confusing, as can be seen from a sample obtained in an internet trawl. Some providers 
say nothing at all about fees, while others say that fees are negotiable. Where fees 
are set out, there is no consistency amongst providers regarding how their fees 
are itemised, or in the amounts they charge. There are also variations in the fee 
structures, for example, whether the rates are calculated on an hourly or daily 
basis, whether they are set out according to the mediator’s seniority and whether 
they include preparation and travelling. Most disconcertingly for lawyers involved 
in public law disputes is the fact that more often than not, the fees are calculated 
according to the value of the claim, which is irrelevant in public law matters.
Where daily rates that are not based on claim values are offered, they can be 
too wide-ranging to provide any real indication of what to expect:
‘Mediator fees will vary depending on a combination of the experience of 
the mediator; time preparing for and spent at the mediation; complexity 
and the value in the underlying dispute. For a full day of mediation with, say, 
four hours of preparation expect to pay somewhere between £1,000 and 
£5,000 (split between the parties). ‘Overtime’ is usually charged after an 
eight or ten hour mediation day. Expect also to pay travelling and other out-
of-pocket expenses. Some mediators charge for travelling time. The majority 
of commercial mediations are resolved within one day of mediation.’3
Perhaps a better indication of the cost of one-day mediation can be found in 
the following example:
‘In terms of time, parties may take purely as a guideline the sum of £1,750 
plus vat (that is, £875 plus vat payable by each party) for an average mediation 
taking one full day, consisting of 8 hours of mediation and not more than 4 
hours of reading/preparation.’4
Many of the quoted rates would appear prohibitive to the legal aid practitioner 
who must follow the LSC guidance on reasonable fees for mediators based on 
basic remuneration rates for lawyers providing county court advocacy, £66 per 
hour in 2009.
While the National Mediation Helpline quotes modest hourly rates ranging 
from £50 to £93.75 per hour, depending on the nature and value of the dispute,5 
it does not provide a venue and, in common with other providers, seems to 
be geared towards private law disputes where claims have a potential monetary 
value. Indeed, when approached, staff were unable to assist with any information 
on how to fi nd a mediator who is a public law specialist.6
Evidently, these issues only feature as diffi culties for the uninitiated. Practitioners 
with mediation experience choose their mediators on the basis of their specifi c 
expertise and know what to expect in respect of fees or how to negotiate them. 
Several interviewees who lacked practical experience said that they would consult 
colleagues for information about whom to approach, and this might include some 
initial information with regard to cost. But based on the above publicly available 
information, it can be seen that diffi culties might arise for public law practitioners 
3 http://www.solentmediation.com/mediation-costs.html (last accessed 07.05.09).
4 http://www.ladr.co.uk/cost.html (last accessed 07.05.09).
5 https://www.nationalmediationhelpline.com/costs-of-mediation.php (last accessed 07.05.09).
6 ‘Mystery shopper’ exercise on 21.11.07.
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wishing to compare the costs of mediation with those of litigation, in order to 
identify whether savings could be made by going down the mediation route.
So is mediation cheaper than litigation?
Solicitors can estimate the cost of a judicial review action at various stages of the 
process on the basis of past experience in similar cases. Indeed, they are obliged 
to provide costs estimates to clients throughout. The LSC has data on the average 
cost to the fund of judicial reviews in various case categories, at every stage of the 
process. For example, the LSC is able to say that the average cost of a community 
care case that ends prior to being considered for permission is £2607,7 and it rises 
to £8647 for cases that are concluded after permission has been granted.8 The 
average cost of a housing case at the same stages is £1634 and £4353 respectively.9 
However, the LSC is unable to produce equivalent data as to the actual or average 
cost of mediated judicial reviews. Too few such cases have been submitted for 
payment and, moreover, it would be diffi cult to make relevant comparisons due to 
the multitude of factors involved. So we asked practitioners how much they paid 
for mediations and how this compared with the cost of litigated judicial reviews.
Lawyers and mediators with experience of mediated public law cases were 
unable to provide confi rmed fi gures for the total cost of mediations they had been 
involved in, and expressed a variety of views regarding the comparative costs of 
mediation and litigation. An experienced public law solicitor, with a mixed private 
and legally aided caseload, who was also a trained mediator, was asked whether 
he knew how much a particular mediation had cost:
‘A lot I would imagine . . . we got LSC funding for it . . . Counsel’s fees would 
have been about £4,000 or thereabouts I would imagine, plus whatever – I 
mean we can’t charge very much, about £89 an hour or something, maybe 
even less, I don’t know whether the [LSC] knocked us down because we 
were attending. It’s a bit like going to court; you don’t get the hourly rate 
. . . and we had to pay the mediator’s fees obviously. Actually I think there 
the authority agreed to meet the costs of the mediator’s fees. But anyway it 
would have been a few thousand, fi ve or six or seven thousand.’
The mediator in the same case, who was also a barrister, pointed out the non-
monetary costs involved in this diffi cult and ultimately unsuccessful mediation:
‘I’m not even entirely sure if the local authority came to the mediation with 
counsel; I think they had their own solicitor there. If I remember right, we 
had a half a dozen people sat there for what in the end must have amounted 
to two working days. So you can see the expenditure on resources would 
have been considerable . . . I think it was at the pre-permission stage but 
the dispute had been going on for a long time, including an ombudsman 
complaint and a previous judicial review.’
Another solicitor with considerable judicial review and mediation experience, 
who was also a trained mediator, said about the cost of a successful mediation 
lasting ‘a long day’:
7 Based on 408 cases. Data provided by the LSC in September 2007 at the request of the project team.
8 Based on 64 cases.
9 Based on 1143 and 215 cases.
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‘A good mediator costs between £2,000 and £3,500 a day. [In that particular 
case] it was about £2,500 I think for the mediator’s fees and the venue, which 
wasn’t good at all.’
An experienced mediator who was involved in three community care mediations 
in our sample could not provide any fi gures for costs:
‘I haven’t looked up how much [the costs were] . . . We would normally set 
an hourly rate comparable to the seniority of the mediator . . .’
Costs in relation to the characteristics of judicial
review litigation
While unable to provide fi gures for the actual cost of mediated cases, practitioners 
expressed views about the cost of mediation generally. It is, of course, impossible 
to generalise, but as can be seen from the confl icting responses below, some 
characteristics of judicial review litigation make it likely that, unless mediation 
occurs at a very early stage, most judicial reviews would in fact be cheaper to 
litigate than to mediate. Those characteristics are: 
a. It is inexpensive to issue judicial review proceedings – It costs £50 to issue 
an application for permission, and a further £180 to apply for judicial 
review following grant of permission.10
b. Costs are incurred early on – A relatively substantial part of the preparation 
costs, at least for claimants, is incurred early in the process. A QC/
mediator explained why it is that for mediation to be cost-effective, it 
would need to occur at an early stage, preferably before the claim had 
even been issued:
‘As you . . . know, one of the characteristics of judicial review is that, 
particularly from the claimant’s point of view, the costs are very front ended; 
you’ve virtually done all the work you need to do apart from doing the 
skeleton and turning up. So if you only think about mediating by the time 
the claim form has gone in, you’ve lost what seems to me to be the best 
opportunity to get in early when you fi rst see the dispute looming.’
Yet, it is diffi cult to set up mediations prior to issuing proceedings because of 
the need to protect the claimant’s interest with regard to time limits, because 
defendants are often unwilling to engage in settlement considerations in complex 
cases until after a claim had been issued or permission granted. The extent of 
availability of public funding can also be a consideration.
c. The simple procedure of judicial review is costs-effective – Therefore, a 
short hearing is unlikely to cost more than mediation. A barrister/
mediator acting for central government explained:
‘I think that the cost of mediation is not dissimilar to the cost of litigation. 
Most judicial reviews are not document heavy. You don’t do lengthy witness 
statements; it is about a one day or two days’ hearing, the barristers have to 
prepare for mediation also, so you are looking at very similar costs.’
10 In 2009.
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d. The majority of claims settle anyway – Where defendants accept that 
a claim has merit, they are likely to offer a settlement, or agree to 
participate in a roundtable meeting to resolve complex arrangements. 
Defendants next consider settlements after permission has been 
granted which may already be too late to make mediation a less 
expensive option.
e. Final hearings are relatively short – Most judicial reviews that reach 
substantive hearing do not last more than a day or two, as pointed out 
in the two following examples from barristers/mediators:
‘In terms of being cheaper, when you go to court, you don’t have to pay the 
cost of the judge or the premises, and you do have to pay a mediator. In 
fact, most public law disputes are not that expensive, especially the minor 
education disputes; you have a one day hearing, [and] a limited amount of 
costs on each side.’
‘One of the reasons judicial reviews don’t mediate is that, whereas you 
have a commercial dispute taken to the high court for a fortnight’s trial, it’s 
eminently sensible for the parties to spend some money on a day’s mediation 
to see if they can settle it, as you know, most judicial reviews don’t last more 
than a day or two at most, and if you fail after a day of mediation to settle 
it, you have pretty dramatically escalated your wasted costs and the costs 
benefi t ratio is starting to look not nearly as healthy.’
f. Lawyers need to be present in mediations of judicial review disputes – One 
of the presumptions underlying assertions that mediation is less costly 
than litigation is that the involvement of lawyers can be limited,11 if 
not dispensed with, thereby removing one of the expensive factors 
in the overall cost of the case. But this did not sit well with the views 
expressed by most practitioners, as well as mediators, that mediation 
of judicial review cases usually requires the involvement of solicitors 
and sometimes also barristers.12 Nor is it appropriate to consider low-
cost mediation (e.g. time limited, or with an inexperienced mediator) 
in public law disputes. In these circumstances, according to a barrister/
mediator specialising in housing law:
‘If you’ve got a fully represented mediation, there’s no difference between 
that and litigation.’
A legal aid practitioner and a trained, though non-practising, mediator who was 
involved in many judicial review mediations explained why this is necessary:
‘You’ve got to have proper funding . . . one of the concerns about mediation 
in judicial review cases in community care and mental health and so forth is 
about the equality of arms. Now I know you’re not supposed to bring arms 
(weapons) to mediation, but – you’re talking about the individual versus the 
state. So you’re talking about bodies that are immediately in a position of 
power and lack of power. And therefore any mediation has to be on a formal 
footing and it can’t be a sort of on the cheap, volunteer ad hoc this is a cheap 
solution. It isn’t a cheap solution – if you compare the cost of the average 
11 LSC interview on 18.02.08.
12 See Section 6.
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judicial review with a decent mediation, it’s about the same. It’s about the 
same for a day’s mediation as it is for a day’s litigation.’
The exception to this view came from a city lawyer whose experience in 
mediated judicial reviews was in the area of licensing:
‘A day at a mediation is cheaper than a day at court, because you’ve got to 
prepare for court – there’s not all that much preparation to be done for a 
mediation. Mediation will always be cheaper – particularly if it happens some 
months before what would otherwise be the date of the court hearing. I had 
one spread over two days. But at my level, the costs of a fi rm like mine are 
such that mediation will always be cheaper.’
This perspective reinforces once again the notion that mediation tends to 
offer better value fi nancially in commercial disputes involving two privately paying 
parties engaging expensive lawyers as opposed to publicly funded claimants and, 
for example, in-house local government solicitors.
A different perspective on the components that cause the cost of mediations 
to escalate came from a non-lawyer mediator. While lawyers on the whole 
doubted that mediation would often be cheaper than a court hearing, given that 
mediators and premises have to be paid for whereas judges and courtrooms do 
not, he thought that the most expensive part of mediation is created by lawyers 
themselves:
‘The cost of the mediator is the most incidental; it’s the cost of everyone else 
who attends . . . The extra layer is that the lawyer, barrister, and expert may 
be there, getting up to £10,000 a day easily. It is up to the lawyers as to which 
one goes to mediation, which means the cost is within their power.’
However, this level of legal fees would certainly not apply where the claimants 
are publicly funded, as are most individual claimants in judicial review disputes, and 
this aspect did not feature in any of the case studies in this project.
But costs benefi ts are not necessarily quantifi able
The costs of a process need not be seen merely in terms of how much each party 
pays out in mediation and legal fees. There are other aspects that can be regarded 
as being costs savings, as described by a senior solicitor at TSol:
‘In commercial cases you can do this by comparing claim and settlement 
amounts. You can’t do this in public law because claims aren’t money based. 
We can’t do it empirically. We might measure it by the shortened length of 
the case. We just have to believe that if a conversation narrows the issues, 
it saves time and costs. The benefi ts of mediation are not all quantifi able in 
fi nancial terms . . .’
Despite articulating the benefi ts of mediation though, this interviewee 
confi rmed that he was not aware of any instances of TSol attempting to resolve 
a judicial review claim by mediation. In practice, claims either settle directly, or 
are defended.
A barrister and mediator who often acts for local and central government, 
agreed that the cost is not only measurable in fi nancial terms, but also pointed out 
the consequent cost to defendants in terms of human resources:
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‘It’s not just the fi nancial cost. If you settle the case . . . you haven’t got all 
your in-house solicitor, your social worker, their care manager and their line 
managers’ time being taken up in constantly dealing with litigation, and that’s 
why it tends to be in the more complicated cases that mediation is used and 
favoured because in the more simple and straightforward cases there might 
not be so much of a cost saving or a human resource saving.’
Conclusion
The comparative speed and cost of mediation and litigation can depend on the stage 
at which mediation happens, on the anticipated duration of a substantive hearing 
compared with the duration of the mediation and on whether the mediation is 
successful. Mediation is unlikely to be feasible in cases requiring urgent interim 
relief, for which the judicial review process is quick and effective. Even in non-
urgent cases, the stage at which the mediation is held will infl uence the time 
savings achieved.
As for cost, it needs to be borne in mind that normally the parties each pay 
only half the costs of mediation, costs can also be negotiated as part of the fi nal 
settlement agreement, and paying for a mediator and a venue is an added expense 
which is unlikely to be offset by any savings in reduced preparation time. In the 
case of a judicial review that proceeds all the way to a fi nal hearing that typically 
lasts no longer than a day or two, it is unlikely that mediation would lead to costs 
savings. On the contrary, it is likely to be more expensive, although there can 
be other costs aspects that are not quantifi able and other benefi ts with regard 
to outcome that might lead parties to wish to mediate. In such cases, however, 
rather than being the ‘cheap justice’ that some practitioners have objected to,13 
mediation might in fact be the Rolls Royce option.
On the whole, interviews with lawyers and mediators did not support the claim 
that mediation is cheaper than litigation and have actually highlighted how diffi cult 
it is to generalise in this respect. It is clear that in some situations a successful 
mediation will be cheaper than a lengthy and complex court hearing, but more 
expensive in other situations. Our interviewees indicated that in judicial review 
cases involving a commercial dispute between two privately paying, litigation-
savvy bodies, mediation might well provide fi nancial benefi ts. But, as put by one 
experienced solicitor/mediator dealing with many community care cases:
‘[Mediation is] really not a cost saving exercise at all in judicial review, if 
you’re going to do it properly.’
In the absence of empirical data to support the assertion that mediation is 
cheaper than litigation in the context of judicial review, how does this claim arise 
and why is it repeatedly rehearsed? One possibility is that the claim arises from 
experiences in commercial law disputes. However, if this is so, the very different 
processes and issues involved in public law disputes preclude the simple transfer 
of the claim from one arena to the other.
13 See e.g. responses to the LSC’s ‘New Focus’ legal aid consultation: http://www.publiclawproject.org.uk/
downloads/Response-NewFocus.pdf.
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Mediation providers have a fi nancial and ideological interest in promoting 
mediation and they have formed a powerful and persuasive lobby. What better way 
to recruit support from the establishment than the promise of savings on costs, 
both in terms of public funding and of judges’ time? It is not suggested that claims 
about costs savings are made in bad faith, but it is suggested that, certainly in the 
context of judicial review, where there is no evidence to support them, uncritical 
adherence to them could have signifi cant implications for both policy and practice. 
For example, the assumption that mediation is cheaper is at the core of the rationale 
for costs sanctions against a party who ‘unreasonably’ refuses to mediate.
At present, in the absence of any provisions for compulsory mediation, the 
promotion of the notion that mediation is cheaper than litigation does not 
necessarily impact on the choices made by practitioners and judges as to how to 
proceed with a case. These choices are based on a multitude of factors. But should 
mediation be made compulsory, not an unlikely proposition in light of numerous 
pronouncements by senior members of the judiciary,14 the belief that mediation 
can save costs could lead to misconceived pressure on parties to mediate for the 
wrong reasons.
14 See Section 1, ‘Introduction and background’ for recent pronouncements by Lord Chief Justice and 
Master of the Rolls.
Introduction
This section presents the narratives of 15 mediations of judicial review cases, 
which have been anonymised to preserve the parties’ confi dentiality. These cases 
were reported to the research team by interviewees. This account represents the 
fi rst attempt to collate and present a signifi cant number of mediation case studies 
in the public law fi eld and to provide information not hitherto available about 
real life examples of judicial review mediations. As we have noted in Section 2 on 
methods, it is diffi cult to obtain information about mediated cases generally due 
to the confi dentiality of the process, but examples of mediations concerning public 
law disputes are nearly impossible to come by. Yet, in the absence of concrete 
examples of cases that involve issues that are relevant to their work, it is diffi cult 
to illustrate to public law practitioners who are not familiar with mediation how 
the process could be applied in their practices.
The 15 examples below were recounted by 10 interviewees: four claimant 
solicitors, of whom two were also trained mediators; two mediators who were 
qualifi ed, but not practising, as solicitors; two defendant solicitors, one of whom 
was a trained mediator; and two barristers who were both trained mediators.
One barrister and trained mediator said that she had been involved in 12 
mediations of public law disputes over a fi ve-year period, and one solicitor 
and trained mediator had been involved in eight such mediations. These were 
exceptions. One city lawyer and one mediator each had experience of three public 
law mediations and the rest of those who took part in these mediations had, at the 
time, been involved in only one mediation each.
What types of case were mediated?
Of the 15 cases, four were commercial-type disputes, three of which concerned 
challenges to threats to withdraw licences, all conducted by the same solicitor, 
and the fourth case was a dispute between a government department and a local 
business enterprise. Another case was a dispute between two public bodies. 
The 11 remaining cases, although they were classifi ed variously as concerning 
community care and education disputes, had several important common features: 
in all the cases the claimants were vulnerable individuals and the defendants were 
Section Eight
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local authorities, and in none of the cases was it disputed that a duty was owed by 
the defendants to the claimants, so that the mediations revolved around questions 
as to how those duties were to be performed.
Many of the cases discussed below share the characteristic of having reached 
a stalemate in efforts to resolve them before attempting mediation. Although the 
sample of mediated cases is small, this supports the common assertion that the 
skills of an independent third party can be particularly benefi cial in cases that 
involve complex emotional dynamics.
At what stages in the judicial review procedure did the mediations occur?
The stage in the judicial review process at which mediation occurred was known 
in 14 out of the 15 cases. In 10 cases, the mediations took place after permission 
had been granted. This refl ects what interviewees had told us about the stage at 
which they considered mediation to be most likely to take place. The following 
comment from a barrister may partly explain why this is so:
‘Where you quite often make headway with a public body that has refused 
mediation or just ignored the suggestion, is you issue proceedings. And 
either before the permission stage or particularly if you get permission, the 
local authority will then become much more enthusiastic to try and engage, 
because often they’ll think, well we think we’ve got a really good case or 
we’re really p—d off with this person, they will want to get the case knocked 
out at the permission stage if they can and if that fails then they will be much 
more receptive to mediation at that stage.’
It was interesting that, of this relatively small sample of 15 cases, three mediations 
had taken place before proceedings were issued. In two of these cases it is known 
that a settlement was reached, although in one of them the mediator said that it 
‘wasn’t a kind of nice, tidy, ribbon-tied settlement . . .’ and that ‘very frequently, 
it’s not possible for a mediation to button everything up. But arguably it’s a very 
important stage . . . on the road [to resolution]’. One mediation took place after 
the case had been issued but before it was considered for permission.
What were the outcomes of the mediations?
A review of the cases discussed below also raises the issue of what constitutes 
a successful mediation. In four of the cases that were mediated post-permission, 
mediation did not conclude with a settlement. Yet in three of those cases, the 
parties involved have suggested that the mediation helped to break a deadlock and 
resolve some issues or enabled the parties to move closer towards full agreement 
later on. In one case, it was reported that the mediation provided no benefi t, but 
was instead a hindrance to constructive dialogue. The remaining six mediations 
resulted in settlement.
Empowerment
A number of the case studies raise doubts about the extent to which the stated 
benefi t of empowerment is manifested in practice. In one case, the experience 
of the lay participants was described by the mediator himself as being gruelling 
and, in another, the claimant’s solicitor thought the experience had, in fact, 
been humiliating.
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Court, mediation or both?
Three mediations in this section raised issues regarding the interplay between 
the forum of the Administrative Court and mediation. In the fi rst case (case 
study 2: ‘The best of both worlds?’), mediation took place after the court had 
determined that the local authority had the power to set up an independent 
user trust, a legal question that could not have been resolved in mediation. The 
complex details of the trust were then negotiated at the mediation between the 
legal representatives of the various parties involved. This is an example of a case 
in which a combination of the two processes, litigation and mediation, was needed 
to provide the necessary range of solutions to a complex situation. Neither forum 
alone could have provided a satisfactory outcome. Similarly, in another case (case 
study 3: ‘It’s good to talk’) important legal principles were established with regards 
to the claimants’ rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Right and, at the judge’s suggestion, the complex details of care provisions were 
then agreed in a mediation, mainly between lawyers and representatives of the 
relevant public bodies.
The third case (case study 7: ‘The human factor’) highlights how opportunities 
to set legal precedents in cases raising issues of public interest may be lost 
when the duty to obtain the best outcome for individual clients dictates that 
cases be dealt in the private forum of mediation. In this case, although other 
service users in similar circumstances in the same borough would have benefi ted 
indirectly from the mediated agreement to train more female care staff, the terms 
of the agreement would not have been publicised and the case would have had 
no wider radiating effect. This touches upon concerns raised by commentators 
and practitioners as discussed in Section 4 about the extent to which mediation 
privatises justice and removes potentially important issues from being considered 
in a public hearing. It could also be regarded as an example of a case in which 
defendant public bodies could regard mediation as offering them the advantage of 
confi dentiality, thereby avoiding publicity and public scrutiny. At present, there is 
no mechanism to seek a legal ruling on points of law once a particular dispute has 
been settled in negotiations.
Mediations of judicial review cases
Case study 1: A question of trust
Long-term failures and mistrust between the parents of a disabled child and their local 
authority led to a bitter stalemate. Mediation was an attempt to get them talking, and to 
establish trust (and a Trust).
Jack and Rita, the parents of a severely disabled child had lost all trust in the local 
authority’s attempts to provide suitable educational provision. Jack and Rita asked 
the local authority to set up and fund a user independent trust, so that they could 
take over responsibility for arranging the support their child needed. This had 
never been done before and the judicial review proceedings were partly about 
the local authority’s refusal to consider this request. Jack and Rita also wanted 
compensation for the local authority’s many past failures. An earlier complaint to 
the ombudsman had been upheld and permission to go ahead with judicial review 
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had been granted. At this stage 
the court proceedings were 
stayed for mediation to be 
attempted. 
The mediation was initiated 
by the parents’ solicitor with 
all the parties and their legal 
representatives attending. 
The mediator was also a 
barrister and was specifi cally 
selected for his expertise in 
education law. Despite the 
entrenched positions of both 
sides, the parents’ solicitor felt 
that mediation could achieve 
more than a hearing. They 
reasoned that a judge could 
only determine whether the 
local authority had the power 
to set up a trust. Even if that 
proved to be the case, the 
local authority would still have 
to decide whether or not to establish one , and there would be lengthy ongoing 
discussions about what the trust would look like. Based on what had happened 
in the past, the claimants felt that this would inevitably lead to protracted debate. 
It is likely that the local authority, with an ombudsman fi nding against them and 
knowing that permission for judicial review had been granted, felt that they had 
little to lose by entering into negotiations. The mediator thought that this was an 
optimal case for mediation, because of the detail and complexity of the issues, and 
the need to salvage what was left of the relationship between the parents and the 
local authority.
The mediation, which the claimant’s solicitor described as gruelling for the 
parents, took place over two days in the mediator’s chambers. On the fi rst day the 
negotiations went on until three in the morning. No fi nal settlement was reached, 
as Jack and Rita’s distrust of the local authority made it very hard for them to see 
eye to eye over even the most trivial things. According to the mediator, although 
this appeared to be an optimal case, the mediation failed partly because there 
were some issues that one of the parties did not want to be mediated and because 
the parents had reached the point where they assumed there was a hidden agenda 
behind everything the local authority said. In the words of the mediator, ‘They 
have gone beyond the stage at which they were capable of agreeing anything, even 
to the most trivial drafting suggestions.’
However, the principle of the trust was agreed and most of the terms were 
drafted. The fi nal details were to be agreed later, but in the end no agreement was 
reached. Both the mediator and the parents’ solicitor felt that mediation would 
have been more effective at an earlier stage, before so much mistrust had built 
Case study 1:
the claimant’s solicitor
‘. . . the most we could have got from 
the proceedings was the judge saying to 
the authority you have a power to enter 
into a user independent trust, and you 
therefore have to make a decision as 
to whether to do so or not, properly, 
rather than just not make a decision or 
wrongly assume you have no powers to 
do so. And we realised that even if we’d 
got, they could make a decision not to 
do it and we could only then challenge 
them if it was based on unlawful grounds. 
Or if they agreed to do it, we’d still have 
ongoing signifi cant discussions about the 
nature of the user independent trust 
and what would it look like; what would 
be its terms; who would sit on it; who 
would be the trustees? So for all of those 
reasons we thought mediation . . .’
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up between the parties. Soon after, the child turned 19, and the local authority’s 
educational responsibilities came to an end.
Case study 2: The best of both worlds?
Sometimes the adjudicatory process is not enough to sort out the detail involved in 
resolving a case. In this instance, mediation and the judicial review process provided 
complementary solutions.
The Leander family had been in dispute with their local Primary Care Trust (PCT) 
for six years about their daughter Susan’s care. It seemed impossible to agree either 
a home-based care package or a care plan which centred on a residential facility. 
What the family wanted was enough money to be set aside by the authority in an 
independent user trust so that they could arrange care in the way they thought 
best. However, the PCT did not believe it had the power to allow this.
Mediation took place just a week before the fi nal hearing was due to take place. 
The mediator visited the Leander family at home and met with Susan. Afterwards, 
at the mediator’s suggestion, the representatives from the PCT did so too. Both 
separate and joint meetings were held with the family and the PCT to work through 
complex fi nancial details and to explore the role the family could or should play in 
managing the care package. No settlement was reached because the PCT was still 
reluctant to commit to a trust fund unless it knew whether or not it was within its 
powers to do so. Despite the lack of agreement, the mediator believed that the 
process had been benefi cial because communication had been restored between 
the parties and ‘things actually looked different at the end of the day than they had 
looked at the beginning of the day’.
At a fi nal hearing, the judge ruled that the PCT did have the power to set 
up a trust fund for the Leanders with the result that the detailed arrangements 
worked out at mediation could be implemented. The judge commented that 
‘Judicial Review is an unsatisfactory means of dealing with cases such as this’, but 
the mediator recognised that in this case the parties needed both the formality of 
a judicial determination and the fl exibility of the mediation process.
Case study 3: Multi-party disputes
Getting 20 people around a table to talk is never going to be easy, but in this case it 
overcame deep-seated hostility and restored a sense of dignity to the disabled sisters at 
the heart of the dispute.
Grace and Alice East were adult sisters who were severely disabled. The local 
authority provided home carers and for many years things went smoothly; but 
when a new manual-handling protocol was introduced, the carers were told that 
they should use hoists to lift Grace and Alice. The sisters reacted badly to this 
and their parents were furious. The carers stopped working as a result and trust 
between the East family and the local authority had completely broken down.
Lengthy litigation followed. In a fi ve-day hearing, the judge tried to balance the 
health and safety of the carers, with the Article 8 rights of disabled people and the 
process resulted in a ‘ground breaking’ ruling about the principles which should 
govern manual-lifting protocols. The claimant then requested that an independent 
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trust be set up because of 
the bad feeling between the 
parties. It was argued that this 
would allow the local authority 
to provide the public funding 
and the family to arrange their 
own care. The judge agreed to 
this but referred the matter to 
mediation so that the details 
of the proposed trust and the 
care plan could be agreed.
The claimants’ solicitor 
proposed the mediator, who 
was accepted by the large 
number of parties with an 
interest in this case. The 
mediation took place over a 
long day in which a detailed 
agenda was worked through 
during a series of joint and 
separate meetings. Grace and 
Alice attended the fi rst part of 
this post-adjudication hearing 
in their wheelchairs and their parents were there for part of the mediation as well. 
In fact, the agenda was too extensive and it was impossible to decide everything 
in the course of a single day. However, the big picture was agreed, and the fi ner 
points were negotiated later between the lawyers, who had maintained a good 
working relationship. This resulted in a complicated memorandum and detailed 
articles of trust being negotiated after the mediation.
There were a number of different perspectives on whether the mediation had 
added value to this process. Both sides’ lawyers felt that the arguments and ill 
feeling had become so deep-rooted that they could never have resolved things 
without the help of a mediator, though one observed that since the judge had 
‘decided all the diffi cult stuff the mediator had an easy time’. The mediator felt 
strongly that involving Alice and Grace in deciding how they were cared for was 
the focus of the whole procedure.
Case study 4: A journey of a thousand miles . . .
It’s not always possible to tie everything up neatly in a single settlement. Sometimes 
mediation is a tool within the context of wider litigation and ongoing negotiations, not a 
straightforward alternative to a judgment.
Pamela had severe learning diffi culties and lived in a residential care home. When 
she plucked up courage to tell her parents that she had been sexually abused at 
the home and at a day centre she attended, they took her straight back to live 
with them at the family home. They could not forgive the local authority for what 
had happened and were unable to agree with them about the nature of a new 
Case study 3: the defendant’s 
barrister
‘I think without mediation, it probably 
wouldn’t have reached a resolution 
because the dispute between the parents 
were so deep-rooted and intractable 
and hostile really, they could never have 
sat down and had a sensible discussion 
and just sorted it out as you would 
expect most disputes could be sorted 
out . . . Where you’ve got that level of 
hostility or distrust, as you had from 
the parents towards the local authority 
in terms of distrust and then from the 
local authority’s perspective, they were 
utterly fed up with the parents and 
feeling that nothing they ever did would 
ever be good enough, you’re never going 
to get them round a table to sort things 
out in the absence of some formalised 
structure.’
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care plan for Pamela. They also planned to claim for damages because of what had 
happened to her.
Before the application for judicial review was submitted, mediation was suggested. 
Although Pamela was too vulnerable to attend, her parents brought a photo of her 
along to the mediation sessions, so that local authority representatives, lawyers 
and everyone there remained focused on her needs. With the help of a very 
experienced mediator, they talked for two days and met again three months later 
for a review. A temporary care plan was agreed and Pamela’s parents promised 
not to issue the damages claim immediately while they waited to see how things 
would work out.
It was impossible for the family and the local authority to make defi nite long-
term plans, so this was not a ‘nice, tidy, ribbon-tied settlement’. But, it was argued 
that the mediation did offer a place where Pamela’s parents could vent their anger 
and gave them an opportunity to agree interim measures so that Pamela could 
start to get on with her life after her trauma.
Case study 5: Lack of powers 
Although this highly unusual case was issued as a judicial review, it had much in common 
with a commercial dispute. However, the government department involved felt that they 
had no power to negotiate a business compromise because the issue was ultra vires.
Widgets plc complained to a government department that a change in regulations 
had affected the market for its product despite an undertaking to the contrary 
that the company claimed the department had given. The company argued that its 
legitimate expectation had been undermined by the department’s decision. The 
department, on the other hand, felt that it had no power to change the regulations 
once made.
A judicial review was issued and, although the department believed its 
interpretation of the law was correct, it offered to go to mediation. The mediation 
took place over the course of a single day, but no agreement was reached. The 
company was unwilling to accept the department’s offer and the department felt 
it had no power to offer further concessions. 
The department ultimately ‘lost’ the case at the court hearing. The judge 
decided that it did have a responsibility to try to mitigate the effect of the changes 
in the regulations. The judge was not aware that mediation had been attempted, 
or what had been offered at that stage but his proposed solution was similar to 
that proposed by the department at the mediation.
Case study 6: The devil is in the detail
Despite the paucity of data on this case, it illustrates a common claim for the added value 
of mediation.
The Madden family were exasperated by their ongoing battles to secure special 
educational provision for their son. Their solicitor sent a letter before action to 
the Local Education Authority (LEA) threatening a judicial review if the LEA could 
not reach an agreement. The LEA suggested mediation and the solicitor held off 
from issuing proceedings while the mediation took place.
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A detailed agreement was worked out between the LEA and the Maddens at 
the mediation. The family’s solicitor confi rmed that the most they could have got 
from taking the case to court was an order that the LEA should make some form 
of special educational provision for their son. The judge could not have specifi ed 
all the practical details agreed in mediation of how their child’s needs would be 
best met.
Case study 7: The human factor
Strong feelings about personal treatment clashed with a Health Trust’s worries 
about the wider implications of permitting a patient to have a say in the choice of 
carers. Mediation provided a place for a severely disabled woman to tell her story 
in her own words.
Marion, a severely disabled woman in a long-term NHS facility, required regular 
intimate care. This had been provided by female nursing staff for 32 years. Changes 
in shift procedures meant that the PCT could no longer guarantee female carers; 
Marion was horrifi ed that her intimate care might be provided by a man, as this went 
against her Christian principles and said that she would stop eating and drinking 
whenever male staff were on duty so that she wouldn’t need that care. Her solicitor 
made several attempts to resolve the issue with the PCT through letters and by 
requesting a meeting or a mediation. The PCT felt unable to promise female carers 
because of the resource implications for other service users. They were concerned 
that it could lead to patients being able to insist on other specifi c characteristics with 
regard to carers. Proceedings were issued, an injunction obtained and permission 
for judicial review was granted. The last circumstance provided the trigger for the 
PCT to agree to mediate, as proposed by Marion’s solicitor.
The mediation took place over a single day and involved Marion, her solicitor, 
and representatives of the PCT and their legal team. The mediator, who was not 
a lawyer, was experienced in dealing with disputes involving religious principles. 
By the end of the day, a settlement was reached. The PCT agreed to train 
female auxiliary staff to provide home care and to use female agency staff where 
necessary. This would apply not just to Marion herself, but to other service users 
as well. Marion’s solicitor believed strongly that by meeting her client and hearing 
her tell her own story the PCT was made aware of the day-to-day reality of her 
disability and the depth of her concern about who should provide her intimate 
care. It was suggested that being faced with a human being made all the difference 
to the PCT’s attitude.
The agreement reached in the mediation was attached to a consent order. 
However, Marion’s solicitors had to go back to court to get a decision on who 
should pay the costs of the case and ended up being awarded only 50 per cent of 
the costs. If they had won the case in court, they would have been able to claim 
all the costs at a higher rate.
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Case study 8: The costs trap
Although mediation produced the outcome which the claimants wanted, there were 
disadvantages in this case. The confi dentiality of the agreement kept other residents who 
might benefi t in the dark and there were costs implications for the claimants’ solicitor as 
well as the LSC.
Jimmy and Martin were adults with severe mental health problems. They had a 
history of being hard to place, but had lived for nearly 10 years in a residential 
home where they were very happy. However, when the care home increased its 
fees, the local authority refused to pay and the care home gave Jimmy and Martin 
notice to leave. The care staff believed that a move would have had a disastrous 
effect on the men and their solicitor suggested mediation in order to discuss the 
situation. The local authority refused. As a result the claimants’ solicitor applied 
for judicial review and permission, as well as an injunction, was granted at an 
oral hearing. At this point, Jimmy and Martin’s solicitor repeated the mediation 
proposal to the judge. After pressure from the court, the local authority agreed 
to mediate. Possibly, this was because they were nervous of the knock-on effect 
of a court order requiring them to pay the higher fees. It was also suggested that 
a mediated agreement would enable them to keep the outcome confi dential from 
other service users and insulate them from further claims.
It was anticipated that both the local authority and the care provider would 
participate in the mediation, but when the local authority failed to confi rm to 
the care providers that they would meet their costs of attending the mediation, 
the care home refused to attend. The clients were too ill to attend. Despite the 
absence of the main players, the mediation, which lasted a whole day, was successful 
in that the local authority agreed to pay the cost of a further mediation with the 
care-providers, albeit on condition that the claimants’ solicitor did not attend. 
The claimants’ solicitor felt that both sides gained a better understanding of their 
respective positions and that this led to an improvement in their relationship.
The second mediation took place between the two parties with a fi nancial 
interest in the outcome and a settlement was reached. Although the details were 
kept confi dential from everyone else involved, it meant that Jimmy and Martin could 
stay in the home. Further negotiation produced an agreement to use arbitration 
to resolve any future disputes about fees.
The claimants’ solicitor who initiated the mediation thought, in hindsight, that it 
would have been quicker and cheaper to have obtained a ruling in a judicial review 
if they had won at that point. It was accepted that a court-based precedent could 
also have been of benefi t to other care-home residents faced with an uncertain 
future. The costs implications of the case were also signifi cant. If the court had 
decided the case in Jimmy and Martin’s favour, they could have recovered the full 
costs of the case, at a realistic rate, from the local authority. But in mediation, 
parties usually bear their own costs. Although the claimants’ solicitor could claim 
the basic legal-aid rate for the work, the LSC on that occasion refused to fund an 
application to try to recover the full costs from the local authority.
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Case study 9: A wasted opportunity
Although it seemed as though mediation was the ideal forum for getting down to the 
details, a combination of high confl ict between the parties and poor mediator tactics 
sabotaged any possibility of agreement on the day.
Beatrice had diffi culty with the care provided for her father, Frank, after his stroke. 
Although the local authority was responsible for Frank’s care needs, the care plan 
was constantly being changed, carers often did not turn up, and the care agency 
was far from helpful. The repeated arguments, accusations and confl ict between 
Beatrice, the agency and the authority escalated into a messy personal dispute.
Frank’s solicitor began a judicial review action and a judge granted permission 
for the case to go ahead. The claim was repeatedly amended as circumstances 
changed and several hearings were adjourned, but nothing was resolved. Frank’s 
solicitor suggested mediation, as things seemed to be going round in circles. There 
were no legal principles at stake, as the local authority accepted that Frank was 
entitled to care. What they were all arguing about was who should provide his 
care, how it should be provided, and how it should be paid for.
The mediation took place over a long day in the local authority offi ces and 
seemed to the parties to drag on forever. Although there was a good working 
relationship between Frank’s solicitor and the defendant’s lawyers, the bad feeling 
between Beatrice and the local authority made face-to-face discussion diffi cult. For 
this reason, the mediator decided the parties should remain in separate rooms, 
while he ‘shuttled’ between them passing on comments, suggestions and offers. 
However, this proved to be unsuccessful. In addition, the representative from 
the local authority did not have the authority to settle on the day and everyone 
became  frustrated that they couldn’t talk face to face. The mediator suggested a 
second day of mediation, but everyone agreed that it would be a waste of time.
The two solicitors met 
later and it did not take them 
long to draft an agreement. It 
was suggested by the claimant 
solicitor that the fact that a 
mediation had been agreed 
by both sides meant that the 
lawyers were predisposed 
to negotiate reasonably
and were able to do so once 
they were away from the 
heated atmosphere of the 
mediation day.
Case study 9: the defendant’s 
solicitor
‘If we’d found a way to have a 15-minute 
chat with all of us there . . . then we’d have 
been much better off. I suggested that 
we sack the mediator and try to reach 
an agreement between us. [However, 
the mediation] helped bring us together 
and focused our minds on the details. 
The fact of saying let’s mediate means 
that you’re already thinking is this the 
kind of case in which we can get the 
answers we want?’
Section Eight: Case studies
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Case study 10: No one wants to be the fi rst to blink
An ‘invitation’ from a judge and the efforts of a proactive mediator brought two recalcitrant 
organisations together.
A local authority was pursuing a judicial review against a regulatory body over 
the process which had led to a report which had been critical of the authority. 
Two attempts at a roundtable meeting had been unsuccessful and both sides were 
waiting for a date of hearing to be listed. More than 250 pages of written pleadings 
had been exchanged, with inevitable cost consequences. The judge ‘invited’ the 
parties to try to settle, or at least to narrow the grounds of their dispute. Both 
agreed to try mediation in principle, but neither would actually commit to a date.
A breakthrough was achieved by a proactive mediator who proposed back-
to-back preliminary meetings with both sides and even suggested the dates. This 
meant that neither side risked showing weakness by being the fi rst to consider 
compromise. An interviewee suggested that mediation went ahead without any 
loss of face and a provisional settlement was reached for the court to endorse. The 
mediator believed that the opportunity to explore issues between the in-house 
decision-makers and their external advisers in private was an important element 
in reaching agreement. Given the failure of two previous roundtable discussions, 
the mediator argued that it was unlikely that this dispute would have been settled 
without the aid of a mediator.
Case studies 11–13: Strategic offers of mediation
In three similar cases where the claimants’ case was weak, a canny solicitor gambled that 
the defendant could not refuse to mediate and achieved a good deal for his clients.
In three separate cases, licence-holders applied for permission for a judicial review 
of the regulator who had threatened to withdraw their licences because conditions 
had been breached. In each case permission was granted. All three licensees were 
represented by the same solicitor, who had a realistic view of his clients’ positions. 
On his advice, his clients agreed to propose mediation, on the ground that if the 
cases went to court they might well lose, whereas a deal might be possible in 
mediation. He rightly assumed that the regulator would not want to be seen to 
refuse to mediate.
And so it proved. All three cases settled, and more quickly than they would have 
done if the court process had continued to the end. The outcome was especially 
good for the licensees because the agreements reached at mediation included a 
number of issues which could not have been resolved in court. The solicitor also 
felt that the cost to his clients was signifi cantly less, as mediation did not involve 
as much detailed legal preparation as a court hearing would have done.
Case study 14: A troubled teenager
In this dispute between a family and a local authority, there were no clear grounds for 
judicial review but some kind of agreement needed to be brokered for the sake of a 
troubled teenager.
Kevin was out of control and his mother Martha simply couldn’t cope. Social 
services wanted to carry out a needs assessment, but Martha refused to let them, 
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as she was so fed up with what she saw as their unhelpful attitude. It seemed 
impossible to agree about what would help Kevin but Martha and her husband 
thought he needed plenty of sporting opportunities, especially cricket. The local 
authority felt this was extravagant and inappropriate.
Although the family’s solicitor was threatening judicial review, the local 
authority lawyer knew that it was unlikely to succeed. It wasn’t that the authority 
was refusing to carry out its duty to assess Kevin’s needs. Rather, the solicitor 
argued, it was Kevin’s parents who were refusing to let the local authority do so. 
But she could see that something needed to be done to end the stalemate. So she 
suggested mediation, as she thought that an independent person who was not part 
of the council or the family might help to calm things down. The outcome of this 
attempt is not known as the lawyer who recounted it had no further involvement 
in the case.
Case 15: Home closure
In this case the local authority decided to close down a residential care home and to 
move its residents elsewhere. The residents did not want to move to another home and 
their lawyer was able to demonstrate that an enforced move could be detrimental to 
their health.
This pre-permission mediation lasted for a full working day and was attended by 
solicitors and counsel for both sides and some additional 20 people supporting 
the defendants. The claimants’ solicitor had suggested mediation. She expected 
that in the course of the mediation there would be some discussion about the 
fi nancial implications of closure as well as about the effect of the proposed move 
on the residents. In fact, she found that the only point that the local authority’s 
representatives were prepared to talk about was that the residents simply had 
to move elsewhere. This is an example of a situation in which one party, having 
entered mediation in which there was the expectation of engaging with the other 
side and exploring options together, did not, in fact, do so in good faith. Indeed, 
the claimants’ solicitor could not, on refl ection, understand why the local authority 
had agreed to take part in the fi rst place.
Other mediations involving public bodies
• A failed asylum seeker who resisted deportation was injured by the 
control and restraint techniques used by immigration offi cers. Her 
claim for £35,000 damages was settled through mediation and the 
Home Offi ce agreed to suspend her removal order for two months 
while she recovered.
• A dispute over fee increases between a local authority and a care home 
was resolved through mediation shortly before the court judgment 
was due.
• A student with mental health problems began a disability discrimination 
claim against his university in the county court. The university proposed 
mediation as a way of dealing with the issue out of the public eye. The 
case was settled through mediation with a payment of £5000 to the 
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student, which the mediator felt was a higher award than he would 
have received in court.
• A defendant government agency proposed mediation in a long-standing 
acrimonious dispute with a district council, following years of litigation 
and a failed roundtable meeting. The proposal to mediate, the agency 
hoped, would place it in an advantageous position with regards to 
court costs in the forthcoming High Court hearing should the other 
side refuse. The claimant accepted the suggestion. At the start of 
the mediation, the mediator insisted that the parties concentrate on 
various substantive and practical aspects of the dispute and leave to 
the end the most contentious issue, that of the costs that had accrued 
over time in the course of the dispute. This proved to be a wise tactical 
decision as by the time this matter came up, the parties had already 
reached agreement on many important matters. A memorandum of 
agreement was drawn up and, although it was not turned into a court 
consent order, it was offered as a template to other councils who had 
similar problems. Both sides felt that an agreement had been reached 
which could never have been achieved in court. 

It was a premise of this study from the outset that there is little recourse to 
mediation among public law practitioners. This was confi rmed by the Dynamics 
of Judicial Review study which found that less than six per cent of public law 
practitioners had either considered the possibility of using mediation in any of 
their cases or had actually participated in a mediation of a public law dispute.
However, while lacking experience of mediation, public law practitioners had 
extensive experience of the negotiation and successful resolution of judicial review 
claims. The Dynamics of Judicial Review Report has shown that most judicial review 
claims are settled and most settlements satisfy the claims made in the challenge.
Settlements occur at various stages of the process, starting with the estimated 
60 per cent of claims that resolve though dialogue between the parties following 
the letter before claim but prior to issue of any proceedings. Cases thereafter 
tend to settle either shortly after claims have been issued or following the grant 
of permission. Some 60 per cent of cases that are considered for permission are 
refused and conclude at that stage. The combined effect of the many settlements 
that occur throughout the process, together with the fi lter provided by the 
permission stage in judicial review, leaves only fi ve per cent of cases that proceed 
to substantive hearing, according to offi cial statistics.1 The permission stage fi lter 
can thus be viewed as a form of early neutral evaluation which successfully disposes 
of unmeritorious cases.2
While some cases that settle as a result of bilateral negotiations could arguably 
result in a better outcome for one or both parties were they mediated instead, 
mediation is an unlikely option where more familiar and straightforward routes 
to disposal are available to lawyers. Any exploration of the role of mediation 
in judicial review would therefore be likely to focus on the small percentage of 
unresolved cases that proceed beyond the permission stage and in which both 
parties have an interest in reaching a settlement but are unable to do so because 
negotiations have become ‘stuck’.
Section Nine
Conclusion
1 http://www.justice.gov.uk.docs/judicial-court-stats.
2 It is not suggested here that all the cases disposed of in this manner are necessarily unmeritorious, merely 
that cases that are pronounced unarguable by a judge at permission often conclude at that stage.
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Policy makers’ and mediators’ perspectives: facts or myths?
In the past decade or so, policy makers have reiterated the case for mediation made 
out by mediation providers and have sought to promote the use of mediation in 
all areas of civil litigation, including public law. The claims that are made in support 
of mediation are essentially that it is quicker, cheaper and offers better outcomes 
than could be achieved through the court process. Given all these benefi ts, the 
apparently irrational failure on the part of practitioners to incorporate mediation 
into their practices was attributed, inter alia, to self-serving profi t motives and 
ignorance of the benefi ts of the process. Of all the above claims and charges, only 
two were borne out by the evidence, namely that many public law practitioners 
displayed a lack of knowledge about the precise nature of the mediation process, 
and that mediation can lead to outcomes that cannot be reached through direct 
negotiations or through adjudication.
Many lawyers have no detailed understanding of the mediation process and 
confuse it with other forms of settlement negotiations, such as roundtable meetings. 
There is no doubt, therefore, that there is room, and also a need, for training to 
increase awareness and understanding on the part of public law practitioners of 
the mediation process. Such training, however, needs to be geared to the realities 
of public law practices. It must address lawyers’ reservations and assumptions 
rather than promote idealised models of mediation that lawyers cannot relate to 
their own experience and to the needs of their clients. In addressing these realities, 
training must also take into account fi nancial and resource considerations for both 
claimants and defendants and the differences in their respective perspectives.
The assertion by some mediators and policy makers that lawyers resist mediation 
due to fi nancial considerations, implying that they would choose to maximise 
profi ts by litigating rather than mediating, has not been borne out by the evidence 
in this study. Firstly, interviewees appeared to be primarily concerned with their 
clients’ interests, although it could of course be argued that lawyers would be 
unlikely to admit to profi t motives as a driving factor. Secondly, practitioners 
regularly engaged in direct negotiations with a view to reaching settlements, 
an approach which undoubtedly generates less profi t than would mediation of 
the same cases. Further, in public law litigation, such an attribution about profi t 
motives could only be levelled at claimant solicitors, as defendant solicitors are 
often salaried, working for local authorities or central government. Yet, we did 
not fi nd that defendant solicitors had more mediation experience or were more 
likely to suggest mediation than claimant solicitors.
There was little, if any, evidence to support the claims that mediation is 
quicker or cheaper than judicial review. On the whole, interviews with lawyers 
and mediators did not support these claims and highlighted how diffi cult it is to 
generalise. Mediation certainly cannot be as quick (or as cheap) as an injunction 
or an expedited hearing, yet it may well be both quicker and cheaper than a fi ve-
day substantive court hearing involving multiple parties. However, in the case of a 
judicial review that proceeds to a fi nal hearing typically lasting no longer than a day 
or two, it is unlikely that mediation would lead to costs savings. On the contrary, 
it is likely to be more expensive.
Section Nine: Conclusions
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We suggest that a possible explanation for these repeatedly made but 
unsubstantiated claims for the speed and cost benefi ts of mediation is that policy 
makers may have adopted uncritically claims made by mediation providers whose 
experience is more often derived from commercial law disputes, which present 
very different issues from, and cannot therefore be simply mapped onto, public law 
disputes. It is suggested that certainly in the context of judicial review, where there 
is no evidence to support these claims, uncritical adherence to them could have 
signifi cant implications for both policy and practice. For example, the assumption 
that mediation is cheaper is at the core of the rationale for costs sanctions against 
a party who ‘unreasonably’ refuses to mediate.
At present, in the absence of any provisions for compulsory mediation, the 
promotion of the notion that mediation is cheaper than litigation does not 
necessarily impact on the choices made by practitioners and judges as to how 
to proceed with a case. But should mediation be made compulsory, the belief 
that mediation can save costs could lead to misconceived pressure on parties to 
mediate for the wrong reasons.
While the stated benefi ts of speed and cost are questionable, it is clear from 
our case studies and interviews that mediation can be a useful process where 
negotiations are impossible, diffi cult or have broken down. As an independent 
neutral third party, a mediator is in a good position to assist where parties are in 
general agreement about the course of action required to resolve a dispute but 
need help to hammer out the detail, as well as to reduce or obviate oppositional 
dynamics in more confl ictual situations. In several of our case studies, mediation 
enabled underlying issues in a dispute to be teased out and all the successful 
mediations resulted in outcomes that gave claimants more than they would 
achieved had they been successful at court.
Our fi ndings confi rm that, apart from a small number of commercial-type 
mediations, mediated judicial review disputes tend to be neither quick nor cheap, 
yet mediations can, and often do, provide innovative and long-lasting benefi ts. It 
could therefore be said that, rather than being the ‘cheap justice’ that mediation 
providers promote and that practitioners have objected to, mediation might in 
fact be a Rolls Royce option. In that case, would policy makers and the LSC still 
wish to promote mediation over adjudication, or would they respect lawyers’ 
judgments as to the appropriate choice of mechanism and fund accordingly?
Practitioners’ perspectives: theory and reality
The study has shown that practitioners considered mediation to be unsuitable in 
judicial review cases for a variety of reasons, both practical and principled. Practical 
reasons included cases that needed an injunction, cases in which the decision-
making body was functus offi cio or cases requiring a legal determination on a 
disputed question of law or policy. The practitioners who had signifi cant mediation 
experience, many of whom had also trained as mediators, placed emphasis on 
‘principled objections’, such as the need to establish judicial precedents, the need 
for transparency and publicity in public law cases, and issues of power imbalance 
between unequal parties.
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Such principled objections, however, could be said to be as relevant to the many 
settlements that are negotiated daily between solicitors as they are to mediation. 
This study shows that lawyers engage in direct and roundtable negotiations, as 
well as mediations, even where important issues of public interest are involved, 
wherever they believe that such mechanisms can achieve the best outcome for 
their clients. As one participant argued: ‘If directly negotiated settlements are 
not considered constitutionally suspect, than surely neither are mediations?’ 
Principled objections, important as they are, do not, therefore, appear to inform 
practitioners’ choices of redress mechanism in public law disputes. It needs to be 
stressed, however, that lawyers and mediators interviewed for this study were 
almost unanimous in their view that the presence of lawyers at mediations is 
essential in order to redress the power imbalance between the parties. The view 
that negotiation and mediation do not raise substantially different concerns about 
issues of principle must be seen in that context.
It appears that when mediation does occur, there are a multitude of factors 
that combine to bring it about. These factors can be quite complex given that both 
parties must want to mediate and that in most situations claimants and defendants 
are likely to have different motives for wishing to participate.
Lawyers and mediators: towards a better understanding
Lawyers and mediators in this study appeared to agree that the presence of 
lawyers was necessary at mediations of public law disputes in order to redress 
the power imbalance between the individual claimant and defendant public bodies. 
In addition, lawyers saw their role as providing support in terms of ensuring that 
their clients’ rights and interests were protected, as well as providing reassurance 
when needed; and mediators considered lawyers’ presence as being useful in 
helping to frame realistic expectations. Lawyers were also needed in order to 
draw up complex settlement agreements. This necessity for expert lawyers to 
be involved in mediations of public law disputes is also a factor that affects the 
cost of the process as compared with mediations that do not necessitate the 
involvement of lawyers.
Lawyers expected their mediators to understand the legal framework of the 
relevant disputes, and expressed a strong preference for mediators who were 
either legally qualifi ed, or who had a working understanding of public law principles 
and the framework of duties and powers within which public bodies operate. 
The reasons given for the clear preference for legally informed mediators were 
that the mediator’s grasp of relevant terminology and concepts saved time and 
unnecessary frustration; that legal knowledge helped the mediator to understand 
the parties’ respective positions and enabled the mediator to move along complex 
issues and to challenge the parties where necessary; that it ensured realistically 
practical outcomes; and that legal knowledge was essential where novel points 
were being considered.
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Finally
This study has shown that there is no single explanation for why there are so few 
mediations of public law disputes, nor is it possible to create a checklist of factors 
that would identify public law cases that are suitable for mediation. While many 
practitioners are unfamiliar with mediation and are therefore unlikely to consider 
it even in appropriate cases, the study has shown that even practitioners who are 
trained mediators and who are fully aware of the potential benefi ts of mediation 
rarely engage in mediations of judicial review cases or other public law disputes. 
Explanations provided by these practitioners were that there are few opportunities 
to use mediation in public law because the majority of disputes settle anyway and 
many of those that do not settle are considered unsuitable for mediation.
The study has exposed a number of gaps between theory and practice.
It has shown that the arguments that are made in favour of using mediation 
over adjudication cannot be justifi ed and that the promotion of mediation by 
policy makers is based on little, if any, evidence.
It has shown that lawyers on both sides who consider mediation a useful process 
rarely fi nd opportunities to use mediation in their judicial review cases.
It has also shown that principled objections raised by practitioners to the use 
of mediation in public law do not, in fact, prevent them from utilising mediation 
in their practices where possible. Practitioners are trying to adapt the mediation 
process itself in order to take account of these principled concerns, for example 
by incorporating into mediated agreements commitments on the part of public 
bodies to changes in policy or practice that would benefi t other service users or 
members of the public, and by negotiating agreements to publicise the terms of 
mediated settlements. Such innovative developments have the potential to make 
mediation a much more useful tool in the toolkit of public law practitioners.
Ultimately, the idealisation of mediation by mediation providers and its 
promotion by policy makers and some judges in the face of the reservations 
and concerns of experienced and well-informed practitioners is short-sighted 
and unhelpful. It obscures the complexities of practice and does not address 
the realities of what mediation can and cannot achieve in the public law arena, 
thus undermining the real potential that mediation might have in the context of 
public law disputes. Enthusiastic and sweeping assertions, such as those made by a 
mediator interviewed for this project who stated that ‘there is a fundamental fl aw 
in our judicial system [in] that it says there is a winner and a loser, and life is not 
like that’ and that ‘mediation is the best way and therefore it should be appropriate 
to any form of dispute’ are not conducive to gaining the confi dence of sceptical 
and hard-pressed public law practitioners. Mediation enthusiasts and lawyers alike 
must each be able to incorporate into their own perspectives the insights gained 
from the others’ experience rather than set up litigation and mediation as mutually 
exclusive alternatives one of which is good and the other bad. Ultimately, however, 
the choice of redress mechanism must be made by practitioners together with 
their clients, and no one else.
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